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ABSTRACT 
 
ZSOLT NAGY: Grand Delusions: Interwar Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1941  
(Under the direction of Chad Bryant) 
 
 
This dissertation examines the development of interwar Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy, concentrating on efforts in three areas: academia, the tourist industry, and 
motion picture and radio production. In the post-Versailles era new and old European 
states faced the challenge of creating or revising their respective national identities. They 
also forged images of their respective nations for various foreign audiences. In Hungary, 
the significance of international public opinion became painfully apparent only after the 
First World War when the victorious Allies granted 71.5 percent of the country’s territory 
to its neighbors. In order to secure Hungary’s status as a proper European nation and to 
gain invaluable international support for its foreign policy aims—the revision of the 
Trianon Treaty and international recognition of the Hungarian state—the Hungarian 
political elite devised an all-encompassing cultural diplomatic campaign. In cooperation 
with the country’s intellectual and industrial elite, they mobilized and deployed the 
country’s cultural capital—real and imagined—in order to influence international public 
opinion. The Hungarian leadership viewed cultural diplomatic efforts as a continuation of 
war by other means.  
While the main focus of this study is Hungary, this dissertation also offers a 
transnational view of interwar cultural diplomacy. First, interwar Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy was influenced by and carried out in competition with other East and East-
iv 
 
Central European nations. Second, these efforts were part of a larger, nearly universal, 
phenomenon whereby nations large and small sought to sway international public 
opinion. While domestic discussions about Hungarianness vis-à-vis Europeanness had a 
crucial effect on the image they tried to construct, models and information provided by 
other countries also played an important role in the reorganization of Hungarian cultural 
production. Finally, changes in international relations also influenced the ways cultural 
diplomacy supplemented traditional diplomacy.  
In the end, this dissertation offers a different perspective on the interwar period by 
examining a small country’s efforts to maneuver the uncertain terrain of post First World 
War international relations. It is a story of how Hungarian elites perceived, and 
misperceived, themselves, their surroundings, and their own ability to affect the country’s 
fate amid high hopes and deep-seated anxieties about the country’s place in a newly 
reconstructed Europe.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“It is obvious, that our political situation in the world can only be improved, if the great 
nations’ collective verdict of us will improve too.”  
       (Kuno Klebelsberg, 1927)
1
 
“Recent polling suggests that support for the United States throughout the world 
is on a slight increase but remains well below the fifty percent mark in many 
countries, even among those nations normally considered strong allies. . . It is 
time to re-think how we conduct our public diplomacy.” 
                                                                           (Senator Richard G. Lugar, 2009)
2
 
 
Why would one start a study that promises to examine interwar Hungarian 
cultural diplomacy with quotes from the Hungarian Minister of Culture and a Senator 
from Indiana? The reason is very simple. Anxieties about reputation have been, and 
continue to be, an essential component of international relations. Utilization of culture 
and cultural production has been one of the ways countries have aimed to construct a 
positive image in order to formulate public opinion. To create and promulgate a positive 
image is the task of cultural diplomacy. These anxieties were especially evident in the 
wake of the First World War as governments realized the underlying power vested in 
public opinion. Why else would one find among the contributors to the 1926 
                                                             
1 Kuno Klebelsberg, Neonacionalizmus (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1928), 107. The document was first 
published in the Nemzeti Újság in November 1927. All Hungarian translations, unless noted otherwise, are 
mine. 
 
2 Quoted in John F. Kerry, U.S. Public Diplomacy. Time to Get Back in the Game: A Report to Members of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations (United States Senate: One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, 
February 13, 2009),v. accessed November 11, 2010, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
111SPRT47261/pdf/CPRT-111SPRT47261.pdf. 
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Encyclopedia Britannica the names of German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, 
Czechoslovak President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister 
Edvard Beneš, Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Iorga, or Hungarian Prime Minister 
István Bethlen?
3
 These influential statesmen all believed that their respective county’s 
reputation is something that needed to be carefully constructed and nurtured. Cultural 
diplomatic activities were especially crucial to the foreign policy objectives of East and 
East-Central European countries. The lack of military, economic, and political power 
meant that cultural production that targeted foreign public gained priority.  
 Interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy, the focus of this study, was an essential 
element of the country’s emergent foreign policy strategy. In November 1918 Austria-
Hungary capitulated, signaling the end not only of the First World War but also of the 
Dual Monarchy. Within two years Hungary experienced a democratic bourgeois 
revolution and its failure; the rise of a Soviet Republic, its red terror, and its ultimate 
collapse; foreign occupation; counter-revolution; pseudo-civil war; white terror; and a 
draconian peace treaty. On June 4, 1920, Hungarian delegates signed the Treaty of 
Trianon, which had been drafted by France, Great Britain, and the United States. With the 
stroke of a pen Hungary lost 71.5 percent of its prewar territory and 63.6 percent of its 
population. Importantly for the revisionist argument, there was also the issue of the 
approximately three million ethnic Hungarians in the detached territories who, overnight, 
became minorities of the neighboring countries. Hungarians reacted to the treaty with 
disbelief and resentment. The “Trianon Syndrome,” as some historians termed it, 
transformed the mentality of the country. Revisionism became Hungary’s civic religion. 
                                                             
3  Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.33-35, 13th ed. (London: Encyclopedia Britannica Ltd., 1926). 
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The majority of the population, including Hungarian leaders, agreed that recovering the 
lost territories should be the primary aims of foreign policy, and as such it became the 
motivating force behind the country’s cultural diplomatic campaign.  
 “It is not the sword, but culture that can sustain and make the Hungar ian 
homeland great once again,” Kuno Klebelsberg announced in his 1922 inaugural 
speech.
4
 Klebelsberg as minister of religion and public education (Ministry of Culture—
VKM) was intimately connected with the Hungarian cultural diplomatic efforts. Indeed, 
he was one of its main architects.
5
  He argued that the negative image of the county 
was responsible for the severity of the treaty. After the treaty, the Hungarian political 
elite, Klebelsberg and his colleagues, Prime Ministers Pál Teleki and István Bethlen, 
and members of the Foreign Ministry (KÜM), saw cultural diplomacy as one of the 
most viable means of regaining these lost territories. The “ministry of culture shall 
simultaneously carry out the duties of the ministry of national defense,” as Klebelsberg 
put it.
6
  After the First World War, Hungary found itself the bête noire of the European 
continent. The Great Powers deemed Hungary to have been one of the parties responsible 
for the outbreak of the war. The Hungarian leadership was anxious that the Great Powers 
                                                             
4 Quoted in Kuno Klebelsberg, Jöjjetek harmincas évek! (Budapest: Athenaeum, 1930), 111.  
 
5 Count Kuno Klebelsberg was born on November 13, 1873, in Magyarpécska, Transylvania (today Pecica, 
Romania). After his secondary education he studied in the universities of Berlin and Munich, as well as the 
Sorbonne. Between 1913 and 1917 he was a state secretary in the Hungarian Ministry of Religion and 
Public Education. During the red terror of Béla Kun he hid out in the countryside. Between 1922 and 1931 
he was the minister of culture and education. During his reign, culture and education became central to 
Hungarian political life. He was responsible for the reorganization of the Hungarian educational system on 
all levels, from kindergarten to university. In addition, he also conducted the country’s cultural and sport 
diplomacy, and supported the building of various colleges and sport facilities. He spared no energy in 
achieving his goal. His ardent workload took its toll. While visiting an opening of a public school in the 
countryside, he developed paratyphoid fever and died on October 12, 1932.  
 
6 Kuno Klebelsberg, Gróf Klebelsberg Kuno beszédei, cikkei és törvényjavaslatai, 1916-1926 (Budapest: 
Athenaeum, 1927), 516. The statement was originally made on February 20, 1925, during discussion about 
the budget the Ministry of Culture.  
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might perceive their newly independent country as anachronistic, belligerent, and a 
liability to European peace.
7
 Thus, the new Hungarian government sought to break free 
of its international isolation and relied on cultural diplomacy in its attempt to do so. It 
also realized that its campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the West suffered from 
a late start as neighboring countries had already made considerable advances in this area. 
Other nationalist groups from the region and their lobbyists had been at work in Western 
capitals soon after the war had begun. They further argued that restoring the country’s 
integrity—geographic and otherwise—and establishing Hungary as a legitimate member 
of the community of European nations required a worldwide public relation campaign of 
cultural diplomacy. 
 
Emergence of Cultural Diplomacy 
Before proceeding further with the Hungarian case a few words about the 
emergence of cultural diplomacy are in order. Richard T. Arndt depicts the significance 
of cultural diplomacy as follows: “if war in Hugo Grotius’s phrase was the ‘last resorts of 
kings’ – ultima ratio regum – then cultural diplomacy was surely the first.”8 Cultural 
diplomacy has been practiced since the Bronze Age. Some scholars, such as historian Jan 
                                                             
7 To what degree this view was just a figment of the Hungarians’ imagination is debatable. Yet, while 
recalling his stance at the 1919 Peace Conference, Sir Harold Nicolson, member of the British delegation, 
wrote that while he thought of Austria as a “pathetic relic,” he “confess[ed]” that he regarded Hungary to 
be a “Turanian tribe with acute distaste.” He added: “Like their cousins the Turks, they [the Hungarians] 
destroyed much and created nothing.”  László Péter, “British-Hungarian Relations since 1848: An 
Introduction” in László Péter and Martyn Rady, eds., British-Hungarian Relations since 1848 (London: 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 2004), 8.  
 8 Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(Washington, D. c.: Potomac Books, 2005), xi 
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Melissen, argue that image cultivation was practiced in the time of the Bible and 
practitioners of this sort of activity were present during the Byzantine times and the 
Italian Renaissance.
9
 According to him, the Venetians had already introduced the regular 
distribution of newsletters, but it was the invention of the printing press that truly 
revolutionized the role of public opinion in international relations. One of the “true 
pioneers” who realized the potential of “identity creation and image projection” was 
Cardinal Richelieu in early seventeenth-century France.
10
 In 1635 he established the 
Académie Française to cultivate French language and culture in order to broaden the 
influence of the kingdom.
11
 His successor, Cardinal Mazarin, continued the work of his 
tutor and in turn established the Collège des Quatre-Nations in 1643.  It was only at the 
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, as historian of cultural 
diplomacy Philip M. Taylor writes, that “attempts to inform, cultivate, control and 
manipulate public opinion have resulted in the scientific development of the new arts of 
publicity, public relations, advertising and propaganda conducted through organizations 
designed specifically to influence the audience to respond in a manner desired by those in 
power or by those who wish to be in power.” 12 France’s Alliance Française (1883) was 
the forerunner of this development. The institution’s goal was to promote the French 
                                                             
9 Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in Jan Melissen, ed. The New 
Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 3.  
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Philip H. Gordon and Sophie Meunier, “Globalization and French Cultural Identity,” French Politics, 
Culture & Society 19, no. 1 (2001): 34. 
 
12 Philip M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919-1939 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1. 
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language and culture worldwide. Among its founders were Jules Verne, Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, and Jules Renan.
13
  
Yet the real turning point in the history of cultural diplomacy was the First World 
War. As Harold D. Lasswell put it in his 1927 Propaganda Technique in the World War, 
“the history of the late War shows that modern war must be fought on three fronts: the 
military front, the economic front, and the propaganda front.”14  In the aftermath of the 
Great War intellectuals and politicians alike became aware of the power of propaganda. 
A new emphasis on the cultivation of public opinion resulted in an explosion of studies 
on the subject. The United States led the way in the new field of public relations. 
Universities, one after the other, started to offer courses on the subject and public 
relations firms were established. Intellectuals, such as philosopher John Dewey (1859-
1952), were deeply concerned with the effects of propaganda on the public 
consciousness, not to mention its effect on political practices. Opposed to the liberal 
optimists, such as Dewey, were the realists, who propagated a scientific understanding of 
the concept and promoted the new brand of public relations expertise. Their camp 
included the likes of Edward Bernays, Ivy Ledbetter Lee, Harold Lasswell, and Walter 
Lippmann.
15
 Lippmann pointed out that we, as people, know our environment only 
indirectly. Newspapers, books, and other materials indirectly influence our understanding 
and belief system, argued Lippmann.
16
 In his 1923 book Crystallizing Public Opinion 
                                                             
13 Alliance Française Homepage, accessed September 7, 2010, http://www.alliancefr.org/sommes-nous.  
 
14 Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), 214. 
 
15 Brett Gary, The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 15. 
 
16 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), 4-5. 
7 
 
Edward Bernays argued that “perhaps the most significant social, political and industrial 
fact about the present century is the increased attention which is paid to public 
opinion.”17 Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, used a combination of his uncle’s 
psychoanalysis and the French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon’s work on crowd 
psychology to explain the concept of public relations. In his view, “no idea or opinion 
[was] an isolated factor.”18 Harold D. Lasswell argued in a similar vein; however, he 
went even further by pointing out that those ideas and opinions were often constructed by 
governments through the utility of propaganda. He maintained that even after the 
conclusion of the war “all governments are engaged to some extent in propaganda as part 
of their ordinary peace-time functions.”19 To what end? Lasswell had an answer to this 
question as well: “They [governments] make propaganda on behalf of diplomatic friends 
or against diplomatic antagonists, and this is unavoidable.”20  
Nations small and large came to appreciate the benefits of positive foreign public 
opinion. Democratic and authoritarian governments from London to Tokyo deployed 
their cultural capital and under the aegis of “cultural diplomacy.” Various governmental 
and institutions closely related to government opened their doors with the goal of 
promoting their respective nations’ cultural, scientific, and historical achievements. In 
order to fulfill their task they utilized all the scientific and technological advances of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
17 Edward L. Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York: Liveright Publishing Cooperation, 1923), 
34. 
 
18 Ibid., 97. 
 
19 Lasswell, Propaganda Technique, 14. 
 
20 Ibid. 
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time period, projecting their messages on moving pictures and through radio waves. In 
1923 the French government acknowledged openly the need for “intellectual expansion.” 
The “cultural relation section” of the French Foreign Ministry began to open various 
cultural institutions within and outside of embassies worldwide. In these institutions one 
would find the crème of France’s young intellectuals, many of them would become 
household names in academic circles, names such as Claude-Lèvi Strauss, Michel 
Foucault, and Roland Barthes.
21 
Throughout the interwar years  the French example was 
followed by German institutions, the Italian Dante Alighieri Society, the Soviet Union’s 
Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Nations, the Japanese Kokusai Bunka 
Shinkokai, and the British Council, to name a few.
22
  
The development of these institutions continued apace.  During the Cold War 
cultural diplomacy—just like that of traditional diplomacy—was dominated by the two 
superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1953 the Eisenhower 
administration established the United States Information Agency (USIA) as an 
“independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of the U.S. government 
charged with the conduct of public diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy.”23 The 
USIA’s mission was to “understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion 
                                                             
21 Arndt, The First Resort, 37. 
 
22 For more on this see  Ruth Emily McMurry and Muna Lee, The Cultural Approach: Another Way in 
International Relations (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1947); Frederick C. 
Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: 
Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Philip M. Taylor, “Cultural Diplomacy and the British Council:1934-1939,” British Journal 
of International Studies 4, no. 3 (Oct.,1978): 244-265; and Sang Mi Park, Japan as a Cultural State (bunka 
kokka Nippon): Theater, Culture, and Politics Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2007.   
 
23 USIA Homepage, accessed December 10, 2010, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/.  
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of the U.S. national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. 
institutions, and their counterparts abroad.”24 The USIA oversaw—until its arguably 
premature dissolution in 1999—cultural and educational exchange programs such as the 
Fulbright program, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Free Asia, as well 
as hundreds of America Houses and information centers.
25
 After 9/11 a great number of 
intellectuals and diplomats alike questioned the US government’s decision to dismantle 
the USIA program.  As the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recently pointed 
out it is “Time to get back in the Game.” 26 The competition, as the committee referred to 
it, remains quite stiff. The British Council, for example, has locations in some 110 
countries with over 7,900 staffmembers. The list of similar institutions includes 
Germany’s Goethe Institute, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, Portugal’s Instituto Camões, 
and Poland’s Adam Mickiewicz Institute. Two of the latest additions to this list of 
cultural institutes created quite a stir among Western—mainly US—policy makers. The 
Iranian Cultural Centers, according to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, are 
currently operating in forty-five countries and “conducting an active outreach program 
particularly in those predominantly Muslim African and Asian countries. Iranian Cultural 
Centers offer Persian language classes and extensive library resources.”27 Another major 
development was the opening of China’s first Confucius Institute in 2004. According to 
the institute’s official website, “by June 2009, 282 Confucius Institutes and 272 
                                                             
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States 
in Austria after the Second World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994), 55.   
 
26 Kerry, U.S. Public Diplomacy, 1. 
 
27 Ibid. 
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Confucius Classrooms had been established in eighty-three countries and regions around 
the world.”28  Today’s nations, large and small, regardless their political and ideological 
systems employ cultural diplomacy as an essential part of their foreign policy 
apparatus.
29
 Indeed, cultural diplomacy continues to be one of the most important factors 
in international relations. 
 
Terminology and Perspective of Cultural Diplomacy 
What is cultural diplomacy? Is it simply propaganda masquerading as cultural 
diplomacy?  For that matter what are the differences, if any, between “propaganda,” 
“publicity,” “cultural diplomacy,” “self-advertisement,” “image cultivation,” “image 
projection,” “public relations,” “soft power,” “nation-branding,” “perception 
management,” “national reputation management,” and the most recent addition to this 
list, “public diplomacy?” Perhaps the easiest, but evasive, answer to the question “what is 
cultural diplomacy?” has been provided by former US ambassador turned professor, 
Cynthia P. Schneider. In her formulation, cultural diplomacy is “hard to define, but you’d 
know it if you saw it.”30 Manuela Aguilar offers a more comprehensive and convincing 
definition: “the way a government portrays its country to another country’s people in 
order to achieve certain foreign policy goals . . . and incorporates the activities of 
governmental agencies established to disseminate information, news, and interpretive 
                                                             
28 Confucius Institutes Online, accessed November 17, 2010, http://www. chinese. cn/. 
 
29 Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 8. 
 
30 Cynthia P. Schneider, “Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You’d Know It If You Saw It,” Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 13, no. 1 (2006): 191. 
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material about the country . . . to instill sympathy and understanding for the goals of a 
country’s domestic and foreign political action.”31  
However, this definition needs to be modified somewhat in order to illustrate the 
true nature of cultural diplomacy in interwar East-Central Europe. The end of the First 
World War and the peace treaties that followed significantly altered both the physical and 
the mental map of East and Central Europe. The great empires of the Romanovs, of the 
Hohenzollerns, and of the Habsburgs—not to mention the Ottoman Empire—gave way to 
a collection of new, or considerably altered, nation-states. In most of these cases, the new 
states were weak and faced both internal and external pressures. Internally, they dealt 
with vexing issues concerning economic recovery, democratization, and the dilemma of 
minorities.  
As if internal pressures were not debilitating enough, these post-Versailles states 
found themselves in a dependent relationship with Western countries, as well as in a 
bitter rivalry with one another. Hungarian, Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav 
leaders competed for the West’s acceptance and support in order to secure their country’s 
place within the European community and to establish sovereign rights over their real and 
perceived national territories. The reason behind this competition lay with the 
Versailles system itself. It affirmed that the Western powers had the sole right to 
mediate and settle any border disputes and adjustment plans, call for plebiscites, and 
oversee the compliance of the various states with the treaties in respect to their 
                                                             
31 Manuela Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German American Relations, 1955-1968 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 9. 
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minorities.
32
 In this new geo-political climate the small nation-states of Eastern and 
East-Central Europe bound by their treaty obligations had to face a new reality: the 
game might be played in the East, but the referee and the rules came from the 
West.
33
 They all understood cultural diplomacy as a zero-sum game. It is not surprising 
that, for the regions’ leaders, from Hungary’s István Bethlen to Czechoslovakia’s Edvard 
Beneš, diplomacy was, to reappropriate Carl von Clausewitz’s maxim, a continuation of 
war by other means. On this battlefield, artists, architects, and filmmakers became 
warriors, just as their paintings, buildings, movies, and other cultural products became 
weaponry. 
My formula for this practice combines Aguilar’s definition of “cultural 
diplomacy” with Simon Anholt’s definition of “nation branding” and “competitive 
identity” together with the latest of the terms, “public diplomacy.”34 Such a formulation 
                                                             
32 These rights nominally belonged to the League of Nations, but in reality it was under the purview of the 
Great powers. On interwar minority rights see Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
33 The definition of “West,” as a homogeneous entity, is of course problematic. For example, Hungarian 
cultural diplomacy targeted Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France, and the United States, not to mention 
Holland, Sweden, or for that matter Argentina and Japan. And the list could be extended. Naturally there 
were subtle differences in the way Hungary addressed Germany and the United States, for example, but 
even if the means differed in certain ways the goals remained the same. 
 
34 It was Simon Anholt who coined this term in 1996.  Yet, he begins his 2010 book, Places: Identity, 
Image, and Reputation by stating: “Let me be clear: there is no such a thing as ‘nation branding.’ It is a 
myth, and perhaps a dangerous one.” While it may seem a “tantalizing prospect” it is an illusion to believe 
in a “quick fix for a weak or negative national image,” Anholt continues. By now, Anholt views nation-
branding not as the solution, but rather as the problem, for he believes that it is “public opinion that brands 
countries—in other words, reduces them to a weak, simplistic, outdated, unfair stereotypes—and most 
countries need to fight against the tendency of international public opinion to brand them, not encourage 
it.” Instead, he suggests—admittedly, referring to contemporary issues—that “governments need to help the 
world to understand the real, complex, rich, diverse nature of their people and landscapes, their history and 
heritage, their products and their resources: to prevent them from becoming mere brands.” For more, see: 
Simon Anholt, Places: Identity, Image, and Reputation (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 3. 
The latest exhortation is “public diplomacy.” The phrase is generally attributed to Edmund 
Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in 1965. However, 
Nicholas J. Cull argues that his was simply a “fresh use of an established phrase.” According to the 
Fletcher School definition, “public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation 
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might look like this:  “Take one small to medium sized country with clear foreign po licy 
goals but a lack of political, military, and economic might necessary to achieve them. 
Add in much needed manpower: intellectuals, business and industry leaders and, most 
importantly, a governing political elite—the more influential and more dedicated they are 
the better. These people in turn establish powerful governmental and non-governmental 
agencies and institutions that utilize the country’s cultural productivity to create an 
image. The selection and creation of the right cultural product—for example, an 
academic journal, an escorted tour, a film, or even a piece of music—is the most 
important step in the process. These items must showcase the country’s individuality, the 
uniqueness of its culture, the contribution of its genius to European culture, and the 
merits of its character; while meeting the expectations and the tastes of the West. After 
all, these items, and the image they are supposed to propagate, are designed for foreign 
consumption.” Even when all these conditions were met, practitioners of interwar East-
Central European cultural diplomacy faced a number of challenges. First, selecting the 
right elements necessary to create a positive image abroad was a complex undertaking for 
there was little agreement on the choices to be made. Second, practitioners had to make 
sure that the end-products did not have a “propaganda–smell,” since most Western 
countries squarely rejected propagandistic overtures. Lastly, the practitioners had to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional 
diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private 
groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs  and its impact on 
policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign 
correspondents, and the process of intercultural communications….Central  to public diplomacy is the 
transnational flow of information and ideas.” Yet, not everyone agrees with this definition. The Routledge 
Handbook of Public Diplomacy (2009) and the Wilton Park conference(s) brought together scholars and 
practitioners of public diplomacy with the aim of defining what public diplomacy is. The conference 
concluded that “public diplomacy entered the lexicon of the 21st century without clear definition of what it 
is or how the tools it offers best be used.” For more, see Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds. Routledge 
Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York and London: Routledge, 2009. 
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realize that they were not only battling Western indifference and the existing stereotypes 
and negative images of their given country, but they were also competing with 
practitioners of other East-Central European countries, for they too sought to win the 
support of the West. 
While definitions are important, it is even more essential to learn how 
contemporaries defined their activities. János Hankiss, Hungarian thinker and practitioner 
of cultural diplomacy since the early 1920s, defined cultural diplomacy 
(kultúrdiplomácia) as an action that “brings about foreign policy goals with the use of 
cultural instruments.”35 Hankiss argued in his A kultúrdiplomácia alapvetése (The Basic 
Tenet of Cultural Diplomacy) that one must understand cultural diplomacy as a 
combination of three different factors.  First, it was competition. He argued that, if 
Hungary wanted to claim, in his words “maintain,” the country’s “cultural superiority,” 
or simply did not want to fall behind the competition, all must accept the fact that the 
competition was indeed real and that it took money and effort to compete on the world 
stage’s “politics of presence.” Second, continued Hankiss, cultural diplomacy was an 
advertising campaign. This is one of the most significant factors of Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy, for “as everybody well knows, Hungary is not or very little known abroad.” 
As he put it, the old adage “good wine needs no bush”36 (“jó bornak nem kell cégér”) 
holds little truth and indeed the greatest enemy that cultural diplomats must face is 
indifference. He further pointed out that Hungarian cultural diplomacy must break with 
                                                             
35 János Hankiss, A kultúrdiplomácia alapvetése (Budapest: Magyar Külügyi Társaság, 1937), 1. 
 
36 The adage, popular in Hungary at the time, has English origins where public house owners hang a branch 
on their door to suggest good quality ale/wine. It was made famous in William Shakespeare’s As You Like 
It. 
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the habit of viewing Western public opinion as a “court of law” and instead look at it as 
an “audience.” In addition, continued Hankiss, behind Hungary’s “advertising campaign” 
there must be a well-developed idea, power, adaptability, knowledge of humanity, and 
consistency. The third and final facet of cultural diplomacy, according to Hankiss, was 
education, for he believed that the different nations continue to educate one another and 
that during the process they educate themselves.
37
 He also summarized the three main 
goals of Hungarian cultural diplomacy. First, make Hungary known abroad in all 
respects. Second, move Hungary forward in the competition of nations. And lastly, 
advance the matter of treaty revision.
38
 To be sure, Hungarian cultural diplomacy aimed 
to achieve all these goals. The ways the Hungarian government and the country’s 
intellectual and economic elite created, organized, and carried out this cultural diplomatic 
campaign is the main topic of this dissertation. The study examines these developments 
and, in the process, challenges our thinking about the relationship between national 
identity, culture, and foreign policy. 
 
Scope, Aims, and Significance 
My study offers a new interpretation of interwar diplomatic history of East-
Central Europe by examining how the Hungarian leadership sought to mobilize diverse 
cultural and intellectual resources to alter the country’s international situation and to 
amend its post-1920 borders. I want to emphasize that this is not another study about the 
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38 Ibid., 17. 
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rights and wrongs of the postwar treaties in general, nor it is a reevaluation of the Treaty 
of Trianon. Without a doubt, territorial revisionism was the leitmotif of both traditional 
and cultural diplomacy in Hungary, just as securing the postwar status quo motivated 
Romanian, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak diplomacy. However, my study seeks to better 
understand the shared experience of this cultural and political moment in Europe, while 
avoiding what Konrad Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger call the “obsessive 
preoccupation with the role of one’s own nation as either victims or a perpetrator.”39 This 
study is thus about the origins, organization, and practice of East-Central European 
cultural diplomacy between the two wars. But this study reveals much more. I suggest 
that interwar East-Central European national identity construction, and its imagery, was a 
result of regional competition, state interaction, and the various countries’ efforts to live 
up to real and imagined European/Western ideals. Consequently, my dissertation seeks to 
go beyond the limited framework of the nation-state and attempts to better understand the 
evolution of national politics and national cultures within an international framework.  
 My dissertation engages existing scholarship on cultural diplomacy in general, 
and interwar East-Central European history in particular, but also aims to forge new 
directions. Scholars of cultural diplomacy have for the most part disregarded both East-
Central Europe and the interwar period, preferring to focus on post-World War II 
American-Soviet cultural diplomacy.
40
 Following the examples set forth by Jessica C. E. 
                                                             
39 Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger, “Contours of a Critical History of Contemporary Europe: 
A Transnational Agenda” in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger eds., Conflicted Memories: 
Europeanizing Contemporary Histories (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 16. 
 
40 For example, see, Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive; Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of 
Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain 
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Gienow-Hecht and Andrea Orzoff this dissertation challenges the hitherto hegemonic 
periodization and geographical focus of the pertinent literature and argues that cultural 
diplomacy in the period between the two world wars was indeed looked upon as a viable 
and essential addition to traditional diplomacy and that some of its principal practitioners 
were the “small countries” of East-Central Europe.41 Being a “small country” with the 
added burden of being a “small country” defeated in war significantly reduced Hungarian 
diplomatic options. Cultural diplomacy seemed a viable option to enlarge Hungary’s 
presence on the international stage. 
 Inspired by the work of Holly Case, this study questions the predominant 
interpretation of interwar East-Central Europe, as a “subset of German history, as a time-
lagged aping of the rise of Fascism and the failure of liberal democracy.”42 Instead, by 
tracing the development of Hungarian cultural diplomacy from 1919 to 1941, I argue that 
it was not any one ideology that governed Hungarian foreign policy, but something more 
pedestrian: borders and legitimacy. Neither of these concepts is peculiarly Hungarian. On 
the contrary, geographical boundaries, and the sentiments that surrounded those borders, 
have been principal causes of war and violence throughout European (and world) history. 
The question of borders not only defined interwar East-Central European history, but 
provided the conditions for the start of World War II. The problem of borders was best 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003); and Naima Prevots, Dance for Export: 
Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1998).   
 
41 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, ed., Decentering America (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007);  Jessica C. 
E. Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., Culture and 
International History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); and  Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The 
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summarized in 1939 in a delightfully funny book Europe—Going, Going, Gone! by 
Count Ferdinand Czernin. In his chapter entitled “The Burden of the Borders” Czernin 
writes: “The borders of Europe still exist, and they stopped being mere blue, or green, or 
yellow lines on the map, lines upon which customs barriers and tariff walls are raised and 
lowered, and where passports have to be stamped with beautiful eagles, lions and vultures 
. . . most of them, have become particularly insurmountable obstacles . . . .”43 Indeed, 
borders were insurmountable obstacles that impeded cooperation and peaceful 
development in the entire continent.  
Recovering the lost territories, and gaining sovereign rights and legitimacy over 
them, was the leitmotif of interwar Hungarian foreign policy.  I suggest that the 
Hungarian political and cultural elite—despite political changes—had no special affinity 
toward Germany, but continued to work toward the “West” in general. Also significantly, 
as my dissertation will show, the Hungarian elite were and for the most part remained 
anglophile and sought to gain the support of Great Britain. This, however, did not stop 
them from making substantial overtures to the United States and France, not to mention 
the Scandinavian countries, Japan, Brazil, and Argentina. To be sure, Hungary did have 
close political, economic, and cultural ties with Germany, but these relations did not start 
with Hitler. While I would not want to entirely ignore the influence of anti-Bolshevik 
sentiment, the discontentment with democracy, or the radicalization of the Right and the 
growth of anti-Semitism, I argue that it was not some sort of like-mindedness based on 
ideological beliefs that caused Hungary to gravitate toward Hitler. It is much more simple 
                                                             
43 Count Fedinand Czernin, Europe—Going, Going, Gone! A Sketchy Book Trying to Give a Rough 
Explanation of Europe, its Politics, and its State of Mind, for the Benefit Mainly of Anglo-Saxons, 
Politicians, and other Folk with Uncomplicated Minds (New York: Greystone Press, 1939), 78. 
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(or more complicated): Only in 1938, and after many efforts to forge positive relations 
with a Western power, did Hungary make a Faustian deal with the Third Reich, a deal 
that was the result of the apathy of the other Great Powers and was motivated by a sense 
of injustice, wants, and unchecked pride.  
Just as one cannot view Hungarian foreign policy as monolithic activity, one 
cannot view Hungarian cultural diplomacy in such a way either. Until 1918 there was 
little of what one might call cultural diplomacy in Hungary. Between 1918 and 1927 the 
government’s main goal was to consolidate power, bring about domestic stability, and to 
break out from international isolation. Revisionist rhetoric, as such, was removed from 
the official agenda. However, that does not mean that the government forgot about its 
main goal. It was during these years that the infrastructure and institutional setting that 
was necessary to carry out a cultural diplomatic campaign was established. The peak of 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy was between 1927 and 1938, when the Hungarian 
government actively sought to influence foreign public opinion in order to gain the 
necessary support for territorial revision. The 1938 Munich Conference and the outbreak 
of the Second World War initiated a new phase in Hungarian cultural diplomacy. Further 
territorial revisions remained a main goal, but keeping the country out of the war by 
securing neutrality also became a chief occupation for those who planned and carried out 
the country’s cultural diplomatic campaign. These goals were, of course, contradictory 
and it was a contradiction with tragic consequences.  
The second issue that governed Hungarian foreign policy was the quest for 
legitimacy. This issue is a rather complicated one. On the one hand, Hungary needed to 
establish itself as a legitimate European country in order to convince the rest of the world 
20 
 
of the legitimacy of its claim to lost territories. On the other hand, one should not forget 
that defeat meant that Hungary had to come face to face with its marginality just as it, 
paradoxically, achieved independence. It was a genuine moment at which Hungary and 
Hungarians had the opportunity to (re-)define themselves as independent peoples for the 
first time since 1526. To apply Victor Turner’s expression, the society was “betwixt and 
between.”44 It was a liminal stage when society as a whole had already separated itself 
from its past, but had not yet arrived to the point of aggregation. It was the critical and 
complex moment of transition when the recently defeated country celebrated its 
newfound independence and mourned its territorial and human losses. While in the short-
run cultural diplomacy aimed to create a positive, marketable image, in the long-run it 
helped to delineate the basic characteristics of the nation. In the process, practitioners and 
creators wrestled with questions of Hungarianness and the meanings of being European. 
This process of identity (re-)construction illuminates not only the Hungarian anxieties 
about Europeanness, but also allow us the gain a better understanding of the zeitgeist of 
interwar Europe as a whole. 
As for the general aim of this dissertation, it hopes to reach out to a diverse 
community of scholars in the humanities and social sciences in order to fulfill one of the 
main goals of this project, which is to remove the geographical, methodological, and 
historiographical restraints that characterize discussions of interwar Eastern and East-
Central Europe. Instead the study has been situated within a larger European, and to a 
more limited scale, global, framework. As a final caveat I want to emphasize that I share 
Anthony Haigh’s assessment on the role of cultural diplomacy. According to him, 
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cultural diplomacy is a “technique which can be used for good purposes or bad, and is 
therefore strictly neutral in its connotation.”45  It is the technique and message of 
Hungary’s cultural diplomacy that I intend to illustrate; hence my dissertation should be 
read as neither endorsement nor a condemnation of these policies. 
 
Structure 
The dissertation is organized into five chapters. The first chapter contextualizes 
the construction of interwar cultural diplomacy in Hungary and elsewhere.  It starts with 
the war years of 1914-1918 to illustrate the growing importance of propaganda. The 
chapter asks the following questions: In which ways did the Hungarian leadership arrive 
at the understanding that the “resurrection” of the country depended on its image abroad? 
What steps did it take to organize the country’s cultural production in order to compete 
with the similar efforts of the neighboring states?  
Chapter 2 illustrates the complexity of image (re-)construction. By investigating 
the ways Hungarians viewed themselves and the rest of Europe, my study depicts the 
anxieties, fears, and hopes that surrounded Hungary’s effort to renew its tarnished image 
abroad. I also argue that competing visions of Hungarianness played an important role in 
the construction of national identity.  Finally, the chapter speaks to the larger questions of 
Europeanness, for the Hungarian elite were determined to build a national identity that 
would enable the country to join the European community of nations.  
                                                             
45 Anthony Haigh, Cultural Diplomacy in Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1974), 28. 
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The next three chapters present detailed studies of the Hungarian cultural 
diplomatic campaign in practice by examining three separate, yet related, topics: 
academia and scholarship, the tourism industry, and radio and film production. There 
were other topics to consider for sure. Sports, fairs and festivals, and 
industrial/agricultural products and their marketing could have been included in the 
discussion. I have decided to limit my examination to the three subjects for two reasons. 
First, there is the basic problem of sources. Unfortunately, during the Second World War 
and the Revolution of 1956 much of the relevant documentation that was housed at the 
Hungarian National Archive was destroyed. My second consideration is has to do with 
target audiences. Academic representation targeted a small, educated, and, for the most 
part, privileged elite of intellectuals, such as university professors and their students. 
Tourism targeted those who could afford to travel. In the 1920S and 1930s, despite the 
advances made in mass transportation, travelling abroad for leisure for the most part 
remained the privilege of the well-off, which included the elite and the upper middle 
class. However, radio and cinema offered ways for Hungarians to bring the country to the 
lower classes, as these media were the most “democratic” instruments of cultural 
diplomacy. Consequently, my selection provides an across-the-border analysis of 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy. The in-depth analysis of these three “construction sites” 
indicates that cultural diplomacy, depending on its target, at times complemented 
traditional diplomacy, while at other times it probed possible avenues that traditional 
diplomacy could not. Moreover, it shows that the construction of national identity, 
especially when it is done for foreign consumption, is a complicated process 
accompanied by uncertainty, manipulation, and conflict. Governmental and non-
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governmental organizations joined forces to fashion a European identity for Hungary, yet 
they were uncertain about what would be considered European. In their search for 
positive illumination of the Hungarian character they manipulated (at times invented) 
cultural traditions and created and managed new outlets for cultural production, which on 
occasion led to conflict between traditionalists and modernizers, as well as between 
ideologues and businessmen. These same efforts drove a wedge between Hungary and its 
neighbors.  
The concluding chapter investigates the ever-so-elusive issue of reception and 
both the short-term and long-term legacies of interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy. The 
latter concern seems especially intriguing in the light of post-1989 Hungarian efforts to 
convince the rest of Europe of the European character of the country. 
It seems fitting here to return to Count Ferdinand Czernin. In a way—in a very 
humorous way—he names the two main issues that govern my understanding of interwar 
Hungary, and East-Central Europe in general: the issue of borders and national character. 
In his chapter on Hungary he writes:  
The Hungarian is chivalrous and patriotic and loves his “lost provinces,” even 
though those provinces may love being lost. He wants them back and will go on 
saying “Nem, nem, soha,”[No, no, never] which means that he is one day going to 
get them. Hungary, for such a small country, has considerably more boundaries 
than it deserves. In fact, it has two complete sets of them. The real ones and the 
historic ones. The former the Hungarian despises and the latter he is likely to 
explain you at the slightest provocation. . . . Though they are charming people to 
dine and get drunk with, they are impossible people to get on politically. . . . 
Hungarians are proud.
46
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CHAPTER ONE 
MOBILIZING THE NATION: FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO  
PEACETIME CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 
 
“International public opinion is an amazing thing. It is like atmospheric pressure, 
one cannot see it, yet under its pressure one has anxious feelings.” 
               (Kuno Klebelsberg, 1927)
1
 
On May 4, 1921, the Hungarian Parliament discussed the country’s position in the 
arena of international public opinion. Count Gyula Andrássy (1860-1929) pointed out the 
lessons of the First World War as he reviewed a publication on the propaganda work of 
Lord Northcliffe. In his speech to the National Assembly, Andrássy argued that Hungary 
must realize that, in the current situation, armed conflict is out of question. Therefore, 
there was no need for saber-rattling.  Instead, he proposed that Hungary must influence 
international public opinion.
2
 His viewpoint was shared by most governmental and 
intellectual elites, who believed that the country’s future was intimately connected with 
its foreign reputation. Most everyone in these circles also shared the widely-held belief 
that the severity of the Trianon Treaty was the direct result of the circumstance in which 
Hungary was an unknown, or misperceived entity. There was also a consensus about the 
reasons behind the poor state of Hungary in international public opinion. First and 
foremost, there was enemy propaganda during the First World War. According to this 
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understanding, enemy propaganda misrepresented Hungarian goals and its character to 
the West, thus turning public opinion against the country. Klebelsberg, for example, 
pointed out that it was this sort of “slander” that painted an “odious” picture about 
Hungarian aspirations and the Hungarian cause in front of the “grand forum of Europe.”3 
While the political elite believed in its own story of victimization, it too assigned blame 
to the lack of Hungarian efforts in the past to present Hungary and its achievements on 
the international stage. Klebelsberg addressed this matter as well, when he noted that one 
of the greatest errors of the recent past was that the political elite’s almost single-minded 
focus on domestic issues. Cultivating the country’s foreign reputation was more or less 
entirely eschewed, as if Hungary had not been in the center of Europe but an island in the 
Pacific Ocean, Klebelsberg argued.
4
 
 The post-Trianon Hungarian elite sought to alter the situation through a cultural 
diplomatic campaign. Inspiration for this campaign was provided by the propaganda of 
the First World War. Yet Klebelsberg and his colleagues also recognized that, in the 
aftermath of the war, propaganda, the word and activity, bred “mistrust” and attracted 
“suspicion.”5 Their task was to create a positive image of the country abroad through 
means that would not repulse people. In other words, the challenge was to conduct 
propaganda in camouflage. The central theme of cultural diplomacy was based on a 
conviction according to which the solidification and promotion of the country’s alleged 
cultural superiority (kultúrfölény) and Western roots would facilitate the rise of Hungary.
 
Klebelsberg argued that the challenge for Hungary was to maintain and expand its role as 
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5 Ibid., 107. 
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primus inter pares, that is, to be “first among equals” in the field of cultural achievement 
in East-Central Europe, and to portray its superiority to world.
6
  
The first part of this chapter explains the emergence of wartime propaganda 
organizations and its effects on the way the Hungarian leadership viewed the significance 
of foreign public opinion. The second part illustrates Hungary’s struggle to gain 
international recognition between 1918 and 1920. The third part examines the period 
between 1920 and 1927 when the Hungarian government struggled to break out from its 
international isolation. The fourth section analyzes the importance of 1927, a year which 
marks the beginning of active Hungarian foreign policy, and as such, the beginning of an 
openly revisionist cultural diplomatic campaign. The last section of the chapter shows the 
changing directions and aims of cultural diplomacy from 1927 to 1941, which I consider 
the end of interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy.  
 
From the Emergence of Wartime Propaganda to the Changing Nature of 
International Relations 
One of the things we surely know about the First World War is that techniques of 
mass persuasion were important weapons in the arsenal of the belligerents. Historians 
have studied wartime propaganda, but for the most part they have focused their attention 
on Allied efforts against Germany.
7
 Studies of British anti-German propaganda often 
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point to the key role that Lord Northcliffe’s Crewe House played in gathering much 
needed public support for the British war efforts. It is only recently that historians—most 
significantly Mark Cornwall—have turned their attention to the practice and influence of 
propaganda on the Eastern front.
8
 
 The British propaganda campaign against Austria-Hungary was also carried out 
by the Crewe House.
9
 In his 1920 publication about the story of Crewe House, Sir 
Campbell Stuart, Northcliffe’s deputy director, triumphantly wrote that the operation 
against Austria-Hungary was British “propaganda’s most striking success.”10 Lord 
Northcliffe, as he was known both home and abroad, was owner of The Times, Observer, 
the Sunday Dispatch, and The Daily Mirror, and used his considerable influence to 
recruit editors, politicians, and intellectuals into the service of Crewe House. Two of 
these recruits were R.W. Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed. Seton-Watson (1879-
1951) was a trained historian, while Steed (1871-1956) was a journalist and the The 
Times Vienna foreign correspondent between 1902 and 1913.
11
 Seton-Watson and Steed 
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co-directed the activities of the Austro-Hungarian section, which was the first unit of the 
Crewe House that began operations. 
 The section under the direction of Seton-Watson and Steed had two goals. The 
first objective was to provide moral and active support to the various nationalities living 
within the Habsburg Empire. By stirring up their already existing nationalist sentiments, 
the Austro-Hungarian section aimed to handicap the Dual Monarchy’s army.12 The 
second objective of the section was to destroy Austria–Hungary as a political entity. The 
second aim was especially problematic since there was considerable opposition to it in 
Great Britain. In his rather self-aggrandizing memoir, Through Thirty Years, Steed 
referred to this opposition as “Jew hornets,” “Jesuit hornets,” “British snob hornets,” and 
other “pro-German hornets.”13 What he found most troubling, in other words, was the 
supposed influence of German-Jewish international finance, the “militant Roman 
Catholicism,” and the “snobbishness of British ‘society’ which looked upon ‘Austrians’ 
as ‘nice people’ because”—Steed asserted rather bitterly—“their country houses were 
well kept, their shooting was excellent, and their urbanity superior to that of the 
Germans.”14 In the case of Hungary, Seton-Watson and Wickham Steed also had to face 
the fact that because of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution (and Lajos Kossuth’s subsequent 
tour of the West) Hungary enjoyed a certain degree of respect in Great Britain. Wickham 
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Steed was keen to destroy the myth of Hungary as a country with a “system of liberal and 
progressive self-government.”15 
 The propaganda campaign greatly benefited from the cooperation between Seton-
Watson and Steed, on the one side, and various émigré intellectuals, such as Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk, Milan Ratislav Štefánik, and Edvard Beneš, on the other. It was the 
latter three that established the Czechoslovak National Council in February 1916. In his 
1916 pamphlet, Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie! Le martyre des Tchéco-Slovaques 
(“Destroy Austria-Hungary! The Martyrdom of the Czech-Slovaks”), Beneš left little 
doubt about their determination to undo the Dual Monarchy.
16
 It was a message that 
resonated well with Croatian, Serb, and Romanian nationalists. The relationship between 
the émigrés and Crewe House was mutually beneficial. Steed and Seton-Watson provided 
a platform for said émigrés, while their presence lent credibility to Crewe House’s 
propaganda. It was in this spirit of cooperation that Masaryk, with the help of Seton-
Watson and Wickham Steed, secured a lecturing position at London’s King’s College and 
founded the Czech Press Bureau in London.
17
 The two also assisted in the creation of the 
Press Bureau’s propaganda publications, including the La Nation Tchèque and The New 
Europe.
18
  
                                                             
15 For example, see Henry Wickham Steed, “Nemesis in Hungary—Future of the Magyars—A Tyrant 
Oligarchy,” The Times, 20 January 1915, 9. 
 
16 Edvard Beneš, Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie! Le martyre des Tchéco-Slovaques (Paris: Delagrave, 1916). 
The English-language translation appeared in 1917 under the title Bohemia's Case for Independence 
(London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1917). 
 
17 Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1918 (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 40-1. 
  
18 Ibid. 
 
30 
 
These publications, especially the latter, were presented as scholarly journals 
lending further credibility to the propaganda they carried out. It was on the pages of these 
publications that Seton-Watson, Steed, and émigré politicians sowed the seeds of distrust 
about the Dual Monarchy’s ability to secure peace and began the campaign that 
represented Hungary as the domineering force within the empire, and one that was almost 
solely responsible for the war. For example, Seton Watson explained the origins of the 
First World War on the pages of the journal The New Europe in a following way: “. . . 
this is not only a German War, but also a Magyar War. Nay more, it is as much a Magyar 
War as it is a German War: for the Magyars have done more than any other people to 
create that electrical atmosphere in South-Eastern Europe which produced the fatal 
explosion.”19 The journal continued driving home the point about Hungary’s war-guilt. In 
a 1917 article, Seton-Watson simply introduced the Hungarian Prime Minister István 
Tisza as “the masterful Tisza, whom our reader knows as one of those responsible for the 
European war.”20 Another approach employed was to use atrocity stories to establish 
parallels between “Teutonic Huns” and the “savage Magyars.” Once again, The New 
Europe illustrates this point. “It is not the custom of The New Europe to deal with 
atrocities,” the editorial begins. However for all of those who asked why the Yugoslavs 
and Czechs will not favor home rule within the Dual Monarchy the journal offered a 
document—supposedly based on a report from the Croatian newspaper Novosti—about 
the brutality of Hungarian soldiers in the Balkan, a “veritable Witches’ Sabbath, which 
filled the spectators  with loathing and horror.” The editor notes as a fact that a “single 
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Magyar battalion had 1,000 yards of rope with it, when it was sent from Sarajevo to the 
frontier. At Tuzla (today in Bosnia and Herzegovina) over 300 Serbs were seen hanging 
on trees.”21 These kinds of atrocity stories were coupled with another propaganda theme, 
which offered an introduction to the history, culture, and politics of the various 
nationalities that constituted the Habsburg Empire. The general idea was to emphasize 
that the southern Slavs, Romanians, Czechs, and Slovaks suffered under the yoke of their 
Hungarian and German overlords and a need for territorial reorganization.
22
 
 In order to centralize anti-Habsburg propaganda and win more support for the 
destruction of the Dual Monarchy, Crewe House organized a number of inter-allied 
propaganda conferences. First there were meetings in Paris (March 6-8, 1918) and then in 
the Crewe House in London (March 14, 1918), before the establishment of the Central 
Inter-allied Propaganda Commission or Padua Commission (April 18, 1918-June, 
1918).
23
 The Padua Commission, which was actually organized in cooperation with the 
Italian High Command, built an  impressive network that included links to the 
Czechoslovak National Council, the Yugoslav Committee, and of course, Crewe House. 
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According to the painstaking research of Mark Cornwall, during its seventeen-month 
existence the Padua Commission produced 492 different leaflets in tenlanguages.
24
 
 With the help of émigrés, anti-Habsburg and anti-Hungarian propaganda was 
present on the other side of the Atlantic as well. For example, the Bohemian National 
Alliance’s diligence was essential in bringing the “Czechoslovak question” to the US 
political theater. The Alliance and the Slav Press Bureau, with its close ties to the 
Czechoslovak National Council, made its initial move before the US entered the war. 
These organizations sent individual letters, along with copies of Tomáš Čapek’s The 
Slovaks of Hungary: Slavism and Panslavism and prints of The New Europe, to every US 
senator and representative.
25
 In September 1917, when President Wilson established the 
Inquiry, a collection of scholars that were to examine the European situation and advise 
the president, Czechoslovak émigrés were ready. The organization was directed by 
Colonel Edward M. House. Among its members were the founding editor of The New 
Republic, Walter Lippmann, geographer Isaiah Bowman, and historian James Shotwell. 
The Czechoslovak National Council greatly benefited from the Inquiry’s and Wilson’s 
lack of geographical, historical, and cultural knowledge of the region. As the last Austro-
Hungarian ambassador to the United States, Konstantin Dumba, put it “the utter 
ignorance of facts and geography displayed by Wilson . . . were the Czechs’ best 
allies.”26 The Czechoslovak nationalists were able to convince the Wilson administration 
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that Bohemians, Moravians, and Slovaks formed a single cohesive ethnic unit. Just as 
importantly, they also successfully conveyed that the new Czechoslovak state—which 
was to replace oppressive Habsburg rule—would be a model democratic state that will 
uphold the ideals of the American Revolution.
27
 
Other émigré groups also found a way to influence US public opinion. The style 
and message of Romanian-born American writer Konrad Bercovici, for example, differed 
very little from those of his counterparts publishing in London and Paris. His article, 
“Hungarian Lust for World Power,” presented Hungarians to American readers as follow: 
“The cruelty and intolerance of the Magyars is as proverbial in the Balkans as is their 
arrogance and stupidity. Long of arms, bowlegged, with fierce mouth and deep-seated, 
small eyes, the Magyar is the typical savage of history. Like his brother, the Teuton, he is 
an abject slave and a horrible master.”28 In the same piece he directly addressed the 
United States and argued that if the US would not take charge of the region, the 
consequences will be nothing short of horrific: 
After this war is over Eastern Europe will be turned into a charnel-house. The 
mad passion, the blood lust so long repressed of all those thinly veneered 
barbarians [Hungarians, Germans, and Turks] will be give free play. Dark days 
are awaiting Eastern Europe. The peaceful readjustment of boundaries based on of 
equitable principles of nationality will only be possible if a strong and 
disinterested hand directs it. Like the German, the Magyar does not desire a place 
in the sun; he wants all the space under the great luminary. There is only one way 
to prevent terrible bloodshed in the Near East at the close of this war—the United 
States Government must see to it that all the nations of the Balkan Peninsula form 
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a federated republic like our own. This would prevent future wars and save the 
Balkan peoples from the Kultur of the Teuton, Turk, and Magyar.
29
 
Austria-Hungary lost the propaganda war. While it is true that the Dual Monarchy 
too carried out propaganda, it was more limited in its scope. These activities sought to 
depict the monarchy as the bulwark of European culture against the barbaric tides from 
the East. Russia was depicted as a deadly threat to European ideals of liberty and honor: 
it was a war of worldviews and battle of cultures, as some newspapers referred to it.  
They also carried out a largely unsuccessful propaganda campaign against Italy.
30
 The 
Kriegpressequartier (War Press Office), a unit within the Armeeoberkommando 
(Austrian High Command), controlled press releases and regulated both domestic and 
foreign correspondence.
31
 In order to counter the influence of enemy propaganda, both 
the Austrian and the Hungarian halves of the empire introduced strict censorship of the 
press. But this is as far as their efforts went. In general, most of the Austro-Hungarian 
leadership remained cold to the idea of propaganda. Emperor Karl I of Austria (Karl IV 
in Hungary), grandnephew of Franz Josef, summarized his stand on propaganda when he 
reiterated that ideas “could not be recommended like laxatives, toothpaste, and 
foodstuff.”32 Similar was the judgment of the former Austro-Hungarian Chef of Staff, 
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Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. He viewed the Entente propaganda campaign as 
despicable, vulgar, and dishonorable.
33
 
In the end Austria-Hungary not only failed to fight the propaganda war, but lost 
the actual war too. There were undoubtedly a number of reasons behind the collapse of 
the monarchy. Most historians would agree that it was the monarchy’s failure to unite its 
people, to secure their continued loyalty and to offer something in exchange, and the 
overall stresses of war that led to the dissolution. The role of propaganda in this collapse 
and the actual influence of propaganda in the decision to dissolve the monarchy and 
establish nation-states is a matter of debate. However, the crucial fact was that the 
Hungarian elite were convinced that losing the propaganda war was the reason for losing 
the war, and then territories.  
Hungarian inactivity on the field of propaganda during the war does not mean that 
there were no voices calling for action. On December 7, 1915, Count Mihály Károlyi—
one of the country’s few self-identified pacifists—gave a speech in the Hungarian 
Parliament. He emphasized the need for genuine electoral and constitutional reform, not 
the least because this would prove to the world that the Hungarian nation was just as 
civilized as any other. As he put it: “We are not highwaymen [betyár], we are not a 
nation of Gypsies, now and for all time, we, object to being represented as some sort of 
an outlaw nomadic nation, barbaric, savage, a nation of highwaymen, a country of 
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wranglers [csikós nemzet] . . .”34 Even conservative statesmen like Count Albert Apponyi 
began to address the question of the country’s foreign image. He pointed rather bitterly to 
the role that Lord Northcliffe’s media empire and the Reuters monopoly played in 
Hungary’s foreign presentation. However, he too emphasized that one should not be 
surprised that the country had such a negative image, for the Hungarians had failed to 
provide information about the nation’s achievements, just as they had failed to combat 
the negative depiction of the country in the foreign press and public opinion.
35
 The 
journalist-turned-diplomat Gyula Gesztesi argued that with the exception of Germany no 
other nation was more “hated” than Hungary. The reason behind this, he claimed, was the 
lack of Hungarian efforts to establish an organized “media policy.” As an example 
Gesztesi pointed out that the Ukrainian National Press Bureau in 1916 alone produced 
thirty-six daily (and weekly) papers and magazines in Ukrainian, French, English, 
German, Hungarian, Russian, and even Esperanto and circulated them in cities such as in 
Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, Munich, and Cleveland. Even more eye-opening for 
Hungarians, continued the author, should have been the success of the efforts of Czechs 
and Yugoslavs. Gesztesi argued that, in the past, for example after the 1848 Revolution, 
the Hungarian elite paid due attention to the media and Hungary’s national image. The 
Hungarian émigré press bureau in Brussels helped to keep the Hungarians’ struggle at the 
forefront of people’s minds on the continent and beyond. He further argued that this sort 
of commitment to European public opinion was necessary and should be the example to 
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follow.
36
 In December 1918 another intellectual, Alpár Rejőd, argued that Hungary could 
no longer afford to ignore international public opinion and in fact should view the “past 
ten years of self-conscious work” of the surrounding nationalities as an example to 
follow. He was especially critical of the Hungarian government’s lack of attention to 
émigré communities. He told the story of a high-ranking Hungarian diplomat, who 
refused to make use of Hungarian clubs abroad because to him “beer-breath-smelling” 
clubs and their “bowling nights” were not acceptable places for information exchange. 
Rejőd maintained that Hungary could not afford this sort of attitude and must use every 
available means to promote the country abroad.
37
 Indeed, by the end of 1918 Hungary 
needed a sympathetic foreign audience more than ever because Western powers were 
gathering in Paris to decide upon the future of the region.  
 
Hungarian Dreamland and its Destruction, 1918-1920
38
 
On October 17, 1918, the Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza announced: “I 
must acknowledge that what Count Mihály Károlyi said yesterday is the truth. We have 
lost this war.” He continued, “We could make our enemy’s final victory an expensive one 
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. . . yet we have no more hope of winning this war, hence we must seek a peace.”39 Count 
Károlyi demanded swift and explicit action, fearing that the existing government would 
not be able to deal with the domestic situation. He called for the resignation of the cabinet 
and the proclamation of an independent Hungary:  
The most important thing is to make peace. It would be a sin to support any 
illusion contrary to this fact. . . . In the foreign political situation, just as in the 
domestic state of affairs we are facing entirely novel problems hence we must 
follow a new orientation. The political course followed hitherto has utterly failed. 
. . . In the future we ought to conduct a nationality policy, which corresponds with 
the spirit of the time. . . . We must openly take a new stand on the basis of 
pacifism, and we must accept this, as the sole foundation of our future.
40
 
On November 1, after receiving news that the emperor had named Count János Hadik as 
prime minister despite the fact that he represented the old regime, the city of Budapest 
rose in revolt. The short and, with the important exception of the assassination of István 
Tisza, relatively bloodless revolution triumphed and the National Council under the 
presidency of Károlyi took power.
41
 In an essay entitled “At the First Moment,” 
Hungary’s famed poet Mihály Babits declared that the triumph of the revolution was a 
miracle. He compared the achievement that transformed “feudal, half-dead, militaristic 
Hungary of Tisza” into an “independent, liberal and radical republic,” to the wonders of 
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the folktales.
42
 Even Károlyi’s political opponents, a group that interestingly enough 
included his father-in-law Count Gyula Andrássy, gave him their support.  Andrássy later 
wrote that “public opinion expected an immediate and favorable peace only from 
Károlyi, a fact which gave him and the revolution an enormous power. Even Károlyi’s 
greatest enemies wanted him to take power.”43 Károlyi’s wife remembered how Andrássy 
accepted political defeat: “Now it is Mihály’s turn. He wagered on the winning horse. 
Now he must show what he can do! We all must support him in this situation.”44 Károlyi 
had every reason to feel confident that with the support of nearly the entire country he 
and his government would be able to take on any of the challenges they faced, internally 
or externally. With this moment the country, its people, and its leadership arrived at the 
stage historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch calls the “state of unreality – or dreamland.”45 
Perhaps surprisingly, one of the foreign prophets of this, newly independent “dreamland” 
was President Woodrow Wilson.  
After his January 8, 1918, speech, in which he laid out his famous Fourteen 
Points, the American president enjoyed an unprecedented level of popularity in Hungary. 
Most papers carried his speech. Wilson’s collected works became a national bestseller 
and flew off the shelves with such speed that they had to be reprinted. “Since the 
Wilsonian principles will become the foundation of the forthcoming peace treaty,” argued 
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a Budapest daily, “it is the duty of all cultivated men to know and understand the works 
of the American president.”46 The general public was convinced that he was the “only 
politician in the world who will be able to forge peace.”47 The sudden rise of 
Wilsonianism in Hungary can be explained by investigating not Wilsonian principles per 
se, but rather how the Hungarians perceived them. Many believed in the promise of 
Wilsonianism. It offered a program for ending the war, and more importantly perhaps, it 
was viewed as an ideology that could be applied to solve the challenges Hungary was 
facing. It was believed that President Wilson’s principles were compatible with the 
leadership’s aims, which were to maintain the country’s territorial integrity through a 
system of confederation and the institution of plebiscite. Károlyi argued in the Manifesto 
of the Hungarian National Council (October, 16 1918) that Hungary must provide to all 
non-Hungarian nationalities the opportunity for national self-determination. He claimed 
that the acceptance of Wilsonian principles “will not endanger us, rather it will provide a 
solid foundation” for a future of Hungary.48 Furthermore, the Károlyi Party also 
advocated the idea of “safeguarding and assuring” autonomy for the nationalities within 
Hungary, which were to be reorganized and reformed in the “spirit of civic democracy, 
universal equality and civic liberty,” as expounded by Wilson, declared the party’s 
outline.
49
 This kind of “Hungarian Wilsonianism” was the only ideological choice that 
offered the possibility of Hungary’s rapprochement, as an independent country, with the 
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Western world. Moreover, Wilson’s demand for the democratization of the monarchy 
legitimized the revolution and the aims of the Károlyi government. As Károlyi himself 
said:  “I loathe more and more  the social order of the old world with its injustice, cruelty, 
corruption and falsehood; I longed for a more humane one based on the works read in my 
youth and to which now I reverted, through the impetus of Wilsonian ideals.”50 
Internationalism and pacifism for Károlyi was a matter of conviction. He was especially 
influenced by the “type of pacifism that was preached by Wilson.”51 In his memoir he 
recalled that Wilson and his pacifism was a historical force behind his fight. He argued 
that Wilsonian pacifism and its promise offered a new outlook, new prospects and the 
assurance of a new world for all humankind.
52
 “We had confidence in the democratic and 
pacifist quality of public opinion and especially in the policy of President Wilson, a 
policy that stood higher than any mere nationalism,” wrote Oszkár Jászi, Károlyi’s 
Minister of Nationalities.
53
 Károlyi was also confident—mistakenly, as we now know—
that Wilson’s vision would carry the day. He wrote: “My foreign policy is based on 
Wilsonian ideals. We have only one ideology: Wilson, Wilson, and for the third time 
Wilson. I am sure that Wilson will win not only in America but in Europe as well. The 
role of America is to remake Europe, extirpating the idea of revenge and creating a peace 
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that will not leave people embittered.”54 Little did he know, or want to know, that 
President Wilson’s position was far from secure, for he faced challenges both at home 
and abroad.  
Not only did Wilson lack support at home; he lost his influence on the 
international arena as well. The latest research on the topic indicates that Wilson’s refusal 
to recognize the validity of secret deals and promises made during the war contributed to 
his diminishing capacity to realize his goals.
55
 At the same time, the influence of British 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau 
grew significantly. The relationship between the three was far from ideal. The latter was 
quoted saying to Colonel House: “Talk with Wilson! How can I talk to a fellow who 
think himself as the first man in two thousand year to know anything about peace on 
earth . . . I get on with you. You are practical. I understand you, but talking to Wilson is 
something like talking to Jesus Christ.”56 Nor was his own staff fully in agreement with 
the President. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State under Wilson, concluded early on that 
the Wilsonian principle of self-determination would jeopardize the peace process: “The 
phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It 
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called 
the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late . . . What a calamity 
that the phrase was ever uttered! What a misery it will cause!”57 The overall demand for 
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national self-determination became so extensive that even Colonel House noted that the 
idea “has become a craze and in many instances ridiculous.”58 The non-Magyar 
nationalities—more than 50 percent of the population—of the Hungary did not think of 
the idea as “ridiculous” and they pushed for independence. Károlyi faced not only face 
the challenge of Wilson’s diminishing influence but also had to cope with an explosive 
nationalities problem as well.  
The nationality question was, as Oszkár Jászi readily acknowledged it, “the 
Archimedes point for the future of Hungarian democracy and independence.”59 The 
relationship between the Magyar elite and the non-Magyar nationalities had been steadily 
declining since 1848 and worsened after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich, or 
Compromise. The non-Magyar nationalities—with the exception of the Croats—did not 
receive rights and privileges they hoped for. As the Nationalities Act XLIV of 1868 
stated:  
In accordance with the basic principles of the Constitution, all subjects of 
Hungary politically form a single nation, the indivisible unitary Hungarian 
nation, of which every citizen, whatever his ethnic affiliation, is a member 
with equal rights. . . . By virtue of the political unity of the nation, the state 
language of Hungary being Hungarian, the sole language of debate and 
administration in the Hungarian parliament shall continue henceforth to be 
Hungarian.
60
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The subsequent generation went even further. They refused all “aspirations to 
polyglot status” and referred to them as mere “political vulgarities.”61 A period of 
“Magyar-ization,” or forced assimilation of other nationalities followed.62 Some of the 
strongest measures of Magyarization were authorized by Count Albert Apponyi in the 
1907 law known as “Lex Apponyi,” which was to ensure the dominance of Hungarian in 
education. Consequently the number of ethnic schools was cut by half and only 20 
percent of the country’s primary schools were permitted to teach in non-Magyar 
languages.
63
 The idea was to create a new type of “Magyar gentleman.” Contemporary 
historian Béla Grünwald depicted this transformation as a meat-grinder: non-Magyar 
boys were forced in at the one end, and Magyar gentlemen, alienated from their ethnic 
group and cultural heritage, emerged at the other.
64
 The supremacy of the Magyars was 
well represented in all spheres of life. In 1910, approximately 96 percent of civil servants, 
91.6 percent of all public employees, 96.8 percent of judges and public prosecutors, 91.5 
percent of secondary school teachers  and 89 percent of medical doctors spoke (or 
claimed to speak) Hungarian as their mother-tongue.
65
 When in the fall of 1918 Károlyi 
dispatched Jászi to seek a compromise with the nationalities, he presented the idea of a 
Danubian Confederation, a federalized structure for the monarchy based on the Swiss 
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model. The arrangement included five federal states: Hungary without Croatia and 
Slavonia, Austria, territories of the Czech Crown, Poland, and a Croatian led Illyria that 
would include Serbia, while there was a possibility for enlargement with the joining of 
Romania. Since there were large numbers of minorities within all the proposed member 
states Jászi guaranteed territorial and cultural autonomy.
66
 Despite the hopes of Károlyi, 
the plan offered too little and came too late. 
Yet the most debilitating issue that the Károlyi government had to face was the 
lack of international recognition of Hungary and his government. The Western powers 
not only had control over the new boundaries, but also had the power to confer or, as in 
the case of Hungary, withhold recognition and legitimacy of the new states.  Károlyi and 
his entourage traveled to Belgrade on the November 8, 1918, to negotiate an armistice 
with the commander in chief of the Allied Army of the Orient, the French general Louis 
Franchet d’Esperey.67 The general (“who put on the airs of Napoleon, and showed an 
ignorance and a narrowness which would have disgraced a Breton village domain”68) and 
the treaty guaranteed the jurisdiction of Hungary over its territory and decided on the 
military demarcation lines. The delegation left Belgrade with a sense of accomplishment 
not realizing that the Allied Supreme Council recognized the convention as being “of 
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purely military character with no political significance,” thus it did not represent the 
sought after political recognition that Károlyi had wished for.
69
 The withholding of this 
acknowledgment encouraged the neighboring states to embark on the occupation of 
Hungarian lands. During the months of November and December the Czechoslovak, 
Serbian, Romanian armies occupied large parts of the country. The occupiers, 
disregarding the Belgrade convention’s decision concerning Hungarian jurisdiction, did 
away with the Hungarian public and civic administration in the areas they took over. 
They were able to do so with virtually no military opposition. The returning troops (1.2 
million) were disarmed and discharged, which later contributed Hungary’s own “stab-in-
the-back” legend.  
Károlyi made repeated pleas to the Great Powers, personally appealing to Wilson 
to no avail. On January 18, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference opened without 
representation from the Károlyi government. Károlyi bitterly commented that 
“[e]veryone is disappointed with me, yet nobody offers a helping hand. The Entente will 
not recognize my government, saying that it is not stable. Yet, who could form a stable 
government under the current circumstances?”70 He argued that excessive territorial 
demands of Czechoslovakia and Romania would endanger Hungarian democracy and 
even aid the growth of Bolshevism. Romania’s Ion I. C. Brătianu on the other hand 
accused Károlyi of encouraging Bolshevism and claimed that the Romanian 
incorporation of Transylvania was a necessity in order to have a strong barrier against 
Bolshevik Russia. A similar argument was presented by the Czechoslovak 
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representatives, who, like their Romanian counterparts, made their territorial demands 
known in February.
71
 In the beginning of March Károlyi publically indicated that he 
would not sign a treaty enshrining territorial demands against Hungary, yet he also voiced 
his hopes that Wilsonian ideals would be victorious at the conference.
72
  To promote his 
vision (peace without territorial reorganization) abroad the Károlyi government 
established the Országos Propaganda Bizottság (National Propaganda Committee). It was 
this organ that devised the slogan “Nem! Nem! Soha!” (“No! No! Never!”), which 
became not only the rallying cry of Hungarian irredentist organizations for years to come, 
but also a formulaic source for the stereotypical representation of Hungarians.  On March 
20, Colonel Vix (sometimes referred to as Vyx), the head of the Allied Military Mission 
in Budapest, presented Károlyi with the new territorial demands, known as the Vix 
Memorandum.
73
 When Károlyi and his Minister of Defense, Vilmos Böhm, suggested 
that the demands were unacceptable and it could lead to the disintegration of a 
democratic government and even the growth Bolshevism, Vix replied in German: “Das 
ist mir ganz egal” (“I could not care less”).74 The next day Károlyi resigned, and this 
paved the way for the Bolshevik rule of Béla Kun. The Károlyi government had come to 
an end largely because it failed to gain the necessary international recognition. The 
Western powers’ refusal to grant legitimacy to Károlyi meant the end of the Hungarian 
experience with liberal democracy as well. This was something that even Lloyd George 
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acknowledged:  “We cannot be blind to what just has happened in Hungary. Károlyi was 
favorable to us and endeavoring to work with us, but found no encouragement.”75 
It was rather clear to everyone both at home and abroad that early support for the 
Bolshevik regime was not the result of some sort of sudden change of heart about its 
actual ideology.
76
 It was nationalism that allowed Kun to take power, not Bolshevism. He 
was aware of this as well. He promptly rejected the Vix Memorandum and began to 
establish the Hungarian Red Army. A number of leading former K.u.K (Austro-
Hungarian Imperial and Royal Army) officers joined Kun and promised to fight every 
enemy that threatened the country’s territorial integrity. His saber-rattling did not go 
unnoticed. Fear of the Russian Red Army and a Bolshevik Revolution in Germany further 
motivated the Great Powers. The Allied Commission sent the South African-British 
general Jan Smuts to negotiate with Kun. General Smuts offered certain modifications to 
the Vix Memorandum and an invitation to the Paris Conference. It was the sort of an 
international recognition that Károlyi was unable to secure during his brief tenure. Yet 
the same force that put him to power also limited his freedom to act. He could not accept 
mere alterations; that would not satisfy the population. Kun was forced to action. Despite 
the patriotic fervor of the troops, the military brilliance of Lt. Colonel Aurél Stromfeld, 
and some success in Slovakia, shortage of food and other materials and the lack of hoped-
for Russian support coupled with the destabilizing—and at times brutally executed— 
policies of the government led to the disintegration of the army. On August 1, 1919 Kun 
and some of his closest allies fled to Vienna, and from there to Moscow, while Romanian 
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troops occupied Budapest. The counterrevolutionary forces under the leadership of the 
last admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, Miklós Horthy, were gathering at the 
southern city of Szeged.  
Unlike the pacifist Károlyi, the conservative Horthy was recognized as the head 
of the Hungarian government by the Allies. During the subsequent White Terror—which 
was carried out in retaliation for the preceding Red Terror that preceded it— paramilitary 
troops brutalized the countryside. The final death toll was between 3,000 and 5,000 
people, including many Jews who were labeled as instigators and supporters of the 
Bolshevik regime. On March 1, 1920, Horthy was elected Regent of Hungary. Yet, he 
was not able to stop what was coming either. On June 4, 1920—despite Hungarian pleas 
for a plebiscite—representatives of the Hungarian Kingdom signed the Treaty of Trianon. 
The war was over, but a new war, a war waged on a different battlefield had just begun. 
 
Hungary, 1920-1927: From Turmoil to Consolidation 
In 1920 Hungary was economically fragile, politically divided, and internationally 
isolated.  At Trianon the country lost its salt, gold, and silver mines. Only 38 percent of 
the railway network remained within the new borders. The country that once was one of 
the leading exporters of timber was now reliant on imports. Overall agricultural 
production in 1920 made up 50 to 60 percent of that prior the war. Industrial output in the 
same year was about 35 to 40 percent of that before the First World War. A stagnant 
economy coupled with rampant inflation led to hunger and misery. This was especially 
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true of those 350,000 to 400,000 refugees arriving from the detached territories.
77
 It soon 
became apparent that the country could not recover without substantial international 
loans. However, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia supported by France opposed 
any loan to Hungary. 
In addition to economic problems the country was also politically divided. In 
1920 the three political groups—democrats, right wing radicals, and conservatives—had 
their daggers drawn. Somewhat unexpectedly, Horthy, who came to power as a symbol of 
the radical Right, appointed first Pál Teleki, then in April 1921, Count István Bethlen as 
prime minister. The conservative Bethlen remained in power for more than a decade and 
his regime can be credited with the consolidation of conservative power, economic 
recovery, and stabilization. The 1922 new electoral law curtailed the number of electives.  
After the 1919 electoral reforms, 40 percent of the total population was entitled to vote. 
After the 1922 restructuring this figure went down to 28 percent. This was not a uniquely 
Hungarian-state of affairs. Yugoslavia (23 percent), Switzerland (25 percent), France (28 
percent), and Belgium (30 percent) had similarly restrictive electoral systems, while 
Germany (61 percent), Austria (59 percent) and Great Britain (47 percent) boasted much 
higher numbers.
78
 Bethlen made a compromise with democratic and social democratic 
forces (the Communist party was outlawed) and the improving circumstances weakened 
the support of the radical Right. Many of leading figures, from Gyula Gömbös to Endre 
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, gravitated toward Bethlen.
79
 Another domestic challenge was the 
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status of Karl IV, the last emperor of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. As the 
Apostolic King of Hungary he laid claim to the throne of Hungary. In this he was 
supported by royalist circles of the country. He attempted to return to Hungary and claim 
the throne twice during 1921. The first peaceful attempt during the spring of that year 
failed. The second attempt, on October 23, 1921, led to violence between the opposing 
groups. Ultimately the royalist coup failed. On November 6, 1921, the Hungarian Diet 
proclaimed the dethronement of Karl IV, who was exiled by the Great Powers to the 
island of Madeira, where he died in April 1922.  The country remained a kingdom with 
Regent Miklós Horthy at the helm: a kingdom without a king. Yet Horthy did not wield 
dictatorial powers. His rule was based on a parliamentary system, albeit one with limited 
representation and power. 
The Horthy regime, while legally recognized, was isolated at the international 
level. In 1922 there only eight countries were not part of the League of Nations: Ecuador, 
Egypt, Germany, Mexico, the United States, Bolshevik Russia, Turkey, and Hungary. 
The Little Entente—an alliance among Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
devised under French tutelage—further limited Hungarian maneuvering room in the new 
international setting. This military and political pact sought to circumvent the restoration 
of Habsburg rule, keeping Hungary and Hungarian irredentism in check, thus creating a 
common voice in the international scene. The main goal for Hungary was to break out 
from its international and diplomatic isolation.  
Hungarian efforts were countered by the Little Entente’s determination to secure 
the peace and the territorial restructuring that accompanied it. The lesson they learned 
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during the war was that propaganda works. Thus, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia remained committed to continue their propaganda. However, this propaganda 
had to be less confrontational and less propagandistic. They continued to utilize 
previously built relationships as new, and more refined, scholarly publications and 
political magazines were added to time-tested venues such as of newspaper articles and 
popular books. The League of Nations’ monthly list of selected articles show a 
bewildering number of publications that offered expert analysis—from a Czechoslovak 
and Romanian point of view—on the “Hungarian problem” and the role of the new states 
in securing European wide peace and prosperity.  Seton-Watson and his colleagues 
continued to publish on the behalf of their wartime allies on the pages of the 
Contemporary Review, Current History, Foreign Affairs, Spectator, Economist, and the 
newly established Central European Observer.
80
 The brutality of the White Terror did 
not help matters, for most Western newspapers condemned on the happenings. The 
Contemporary Review, for example, published a very critical essay in which it quoted 
Horthy’s alleged order to the “White Terrorists”:   
The officers’ troops summoned on an alarm are under the obligation of 
proceeding with armed force against the disturbers of the peace at the first 
command, and to fire a volley upon the crowd at once without the usual warning 
shots. The shooting must continue implacably without consideration for the 
number of victims. Use your arms with the consciousness that you see before you 
not human beings but wild beasts.
81
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The source of the quote was the Viennese Socialist newspaper, the Arbeiter-
Zeitung. R. W. Seton-Watson’s pen continued to work in the pre-1920 fashion: harsh, 
albeit not unreasonable criticism of Hungary as opposed to unreserved praise for 
Czechoslovakia and the justification of the Little Entente. Indeed, the White Terror, the 
Numerus Clausus (a 1920 Law limiting a percentage of Jewish students in higher 
education), and the continuous lack of representation of peasants and workers were 
without doubt events that deserved criticism. However, when Seton-Watson put the 
Károlyi government as the liberal model for Hungary to follow, he conveniently forgot 
that the Great powers refused to offer much-needed international recognition.
82
 At the 
time when Hungary was dependent on securing foreign loans, the international press was 
far from supportive. Another major publication, The Economist, offered a similarly 
unsympathetic assessment of Horthy’s Hungary:  
[To] the traveler fresh from Austria, present conditions in Hungary assume 
the light of sinister contradiction. Whereas in Austria the task of 
reconstruction is being faced by all sections of the people with common 
resolution and renewed hope, Hungary, befogged by illusions, bedevilled 
by suspicions and hatred, is drifting on a tide of warring interests, 
discontent, and despair. While the problem of Austria was never more 
than an economic question, over Hungary, reactionary, irredentist, and 
potentially dangerous, there might well be erected a sign: ‘It is useless to 
throw economic stones at this notice-board.’ Every question is confused 
by political issues, each factor in the grave problem which the country 
presents being obscured by psychological considerations.
83
 
How far one should consider the situation in Austria in the early 1920s simply as an 
“economic question” is debatable, but the Economist’s characterization of Hungary as a 
country “befogged by illusions” was accurate. The country, which in the early 1920s was 
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facing economic collapse, political upheaval, international isolation, and a thoroughly 
negative international reputation, was indeed “befogged” by an illusion which 
determinated its action for decades to come. It was the illusion of revisionism that 
actually united the otherwise divided country.  
 Predictably, the Hungarian reaction to the Treaty of Trianon was one of universal 
disbelief, horror, and anger. Indeed, it was universal in that it was not limited to any 
single political, social, or economic group. 
84
 Revisionist propaganda started soon as the 
treaty was signed—if not before.  However, in the beginning the source of this sort of 
propaganda was not the government, but various private organizations, albeit those with 
close ties to governmental circles. The likes of Területvédő Liga (Tevél—League for the 
Protection of [Hungarian] Territory), Magyar Országos Véderő Egyesület (MOVE—
Hungarian National Defense Force Association), Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete (ÉME—
Association of Awakening Hungarians), and the Kettőskereszt Vérszövetség (Apostolic 
Cross Blood Alliance) were only a few of the dozens of organizations that carried out 
unofficial propaganda.
85
 By 1921 the activities of these irredentist organizations—mostly 
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right wing—became so widespread that a Budapest daily asked: who actually makes the 
country’s foreign policy? It concluded that the painful situation was that, in the past, 
nobody wanted to make foreign policy while nowadays everyone thinks they should.
86
  
The government’s situation was precarious. On the one hand, as the political elite 
attempted to consolidate its power it could not afford to alienate the population by 
ignoring the very real emotions of disbelief, horror, and anger that resulted from the 
treaty. Nor did they want to, for anger over the treaty diverted attention from other real 
domestic problems, such as the situation of the peasantry and the workers. On the other 
hand, however, as part of the ratification of the treaty (July 26, 1921) the country was to 
halt the activities of irredentist organizations. More importantly, irredentist propaganda 
was deemed harmful to the government’s aim of joining the League of Nations and 
securing much-needed international loans while continuing its struggle to break out of 
isolation. As a result, during a confidential meeting between Prime Minister István 
Bethlen, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Miklós Bánffy, representatives of the Ministry 
of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the most influential leaders of social 
organizations, it was decided to suspend such organizations and limit similar activities in 
the future.
87
 With this action the government took charge of revisionist propaganda. It 
was the beginning of a development—which was to come full circle in 1927—whereby, 
according to an unofficial division of labor, the unofficial propaganda in its more direct 
and more vitriolic fashion was conducted by societal organizations, more often than not 
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supported financially by the government, while the officially-conducted activity was 
more indirect, less propagandistic and employed the tools of cultural diplomacy. 
The decision to assert governmental control over revisionist policy was a prudent 
decision, for the Hungarian government lacked connections, institutional settings, and 
organizations to compete in the new field of international public relations and, thus could 
not afford to alienate international public opinion. Since the 1867 Ausgleich Hungary and 
Austria had a joint foreign policy and as such a joint foreign representation was directed 
from the Ballhausplatz in Vienna. According to Hungarian historian and specialist on the 
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Pál Pritz, in the Ballhausplatz there were 292 Hungarian 
citizens employed out of the total of 902.
88
 The Károlyi government announced the 
establishment of an independent Hungarian Foreign Ministry in December 1918. Yet this 
amounted to little more than a rhetorical separation, since Károlyi was not recognized as 
the legal ruler of Hungary, and as such could not offer real alternative as the country’s 
reorganized foreign representation. For the most part, the personnel recruited during the 
Károlyi government remained in place even under the Kun regime. In October 1919, after 
the fall of Kun, Hungarian Foreign Ministry moved to its permanent location to the Dísz 
Square. The first embassy was established in Vienna (during the Károlyi government) 
and it was not until the middle of 1920 that the second embassy—in the Vatican—was 
opened. Consulates and missions were established in Berlin, Bern, and Warsaw. This was 
followed by the establishment of embassies in Paris (September 1920), London (June 
1921) and Washington (January 1922).
89
 By 1922 Hungary had some sort of diplomatic 
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representation in fourteen places and plans were being made to establish new ones.  
However, as Pritz points out, most of these diplomatic missions were understaffed, 
without connections to the foreign political elite, and in general were less than 
functional.
90
 
The establishment of the political intelligence division of the KÜM was a first 
step toward creating the necessary structure to carry out Hungary’s campaign of cultural 
diplomacy. In 1920 Zoltán Gerevich suggested that the organ had hitherto overseen 
preparations for the Paris treaties—Békeelőkészitő Iroda— seemed to have lost its raison 
d'être. Nevertheless, he pointed out that this conclusion was not entirely true. In his 
memo he formulated the aforementioned division of labor whereby the government 
officially eschewed propagandistic activities, leaving it to nongovernmental organization 
and practicing what he called “scientific propaganda.” Gerevich argued that the main 
targets of this “scientific propaganda” should be foreign political and intellectual circles. 
Furthermore, continued Gerevich, a central organ within the KÜM would also enable the 
government to direct activities and coordinate with other governmental and non-
governmental organs.
91
 The exact date of this transition remains unknown. Nonetheless, 
other documents suggest that the new division within the KÜM was indeed established, 
although its existence and much of its activity remained hidden until 1927. The main 
document that proves the existence of this division is an order dated November 6, 1922, 
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calling for an internal review of the KÜM.
92
 The subsequent memo—designated: 
“Szigorúan Bizalmas!!!!” (“Strictly Confidential” with indeed four exclamation points)—
pointed out that, since the activities of the Political Intelligence Division were for the 
most part confidential the report should not cover the entire activity of the division.  
According to the document, the main purpose of the division was to connect 
Hungary with “universal European social, cultural, and scientific life” in order to bring 
about “friendly relations” between the country and the international community. As such 
it was to support and assist foreign travelers visiting Hungary—individuals, students, and 
organized groups alike. Together with the Ministry of Culture, it was to establish student 
and teacher exchanges. Moreover, it was to support Hungarian exhibitions abroad. It was 
also designed to establish and reestablish ties between Hungarian and foreign academic 
and scientific institutions and to distribute official Hungarian government publications 
(including, but not limited to official statistics), and other academic works. Furthermore 
the division was likewise to supply photographs illustrating Hungarian culture, industry, 
and the likes to foreign magazines and presses. Finally the last nonconfidential activity of 
the division was to place movies “representing Hungarian life from the correct point of 
view” in foreign markets. Other sorts of activities listed—crossed out with pencil— were 
overseeing propaganda organs’ work abroad, the contact with foreign Christian groups, 
fighting against Bolshevik ideology, countering the negative propaganda of the White 
Terror, and similar counterpropaganda from Hungarian émigré groups which undermined 
Hungary’s interests.93 In my reading, the document established not only the activities of 
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the division, but also the basic tenets of the country’s cultural diplomatic efforts that 
followed. 
The KÜM, nominally led by the minister of foreign affairs but in reality by Prime 
Minister Bethlen, found a willing partner in Klebelsberg, minister of the VKM. Under the 
careful direction of Bethlen and Klebelsberg, the two institutions began to forge 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy. Bethlen and Klebelsberg shared the belief that Hungary 
must return to the community of European nations. As Bethlen said, Hungary “must be in 
harmony” with the rest of Europe, for Hungarians were “not living on an island, but are 
members of a grand family of nations.”94 In the process they mobilized the country’s 
cultural and, in due course, industrial production. They established a circle of politicians, 
intellectuals, artists, and industrialists who all shared a single belief and a single vision. 
They believed that that the Trianon Treaty was the result of Hungary’s negative image 
abroad. The Hungarian political and intellectual elite believed that improving of the 
country’s foreign image would improve the country’s international standing and 
ultimately would lead to the revision of the treaty. To them cultural diplomacy became a 
tool that opened doors otherwise closed or hard to open.  
At the beginning of the 1920s, Hungarian foreign policy was an ad-hoc activity. 
Because of the country’s international isolation, there was very little space to maneuver. 
Various, and often contradictory, plans were drafted. For example, the Hungarian 
government aimed to begin secret negotiations with Czechoslovakia and Romania. Yet, 
at the same time they also reached out to Germany, Italy, and Bolshevik Russia, three 
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states that had no interest in maintaining the status quo. Hungary made overtures toward 
Germany from the start. However, Gustav Stressemann’s Erfüllungspolitik, which sought 
rapprochement with the rest of Europe, did not need a revisionist Hungary on its side. In 
1924 Italy signed a friendship treaty with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Overtures 
were made toward Bolshevik Russia as well. After its official establishment in 1922, the 
Soviet Union also was seen by a number of Hungarians as a possible partner. After all, 
the Soviet Union was not invited to Paris. It actually supported the idea of an independent 
Transylvania, it had territorial claims against Romania, and it was a potential trading 
partner. These overtures came to nothing because of the protests of right-wing groups and 
rigidly anti-Bolshevist conservative elements (the latter group including Horthy himself) 
opposed such an opening. Despite the fact that Hungary gained admission to the League 
of Nations in September 1922, the country remained isolated and its finances and 
developments were closely monitored by the Allied Military Commission. Finally, in the 
spring of 1924, Hungary received a loan from the League of Nations that was 
undersigned by Great Britain, the United States, Switzerland, and Italy among others. 
With the loan Hungary not only obliged itself to reparations, but also gave the League of 
Nations the right to oversee the spending of the government. The Hungarian budget and 
spending was supervised by one Jeremiah Smith, a lawyer from Boston.
95
  
Hungary’s alternatives were limited by its continuing diplomatic isolation and 
financial difficulties until 1926/1927, when the Bethlen government, backed by Italy, was 
able to step out into the international arena. It was the beginnings of a new stage in 
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Hungarian diplomatic activities, a period that historian Gyula Juhász aptly termed, 
“active foreign policy,” in which cultural diplomacy played an essential role.96  
1927: Opening a New Phase 
Most historians of Hungarian foreign policy would agree that 1927 Hungarian 
foreign policy underwent a significant change. Benito Mussolini, alarmed by ongoing 
Hungarian-Yugoslav negotiations that would impact his plan to establish a strong Italian 
influence in Southeastern Europe, reached out to the Hungarian leadership and offered 
the possibility of cooperation. As Gyula Juhász points out, Hungary faced two choices. 
One was to continue negotiations with Yugoslavia in the hope that it would result in a 
weakening of the Little Entente. The other option was to halt negotiations with 
Yugoslavia and instead move closer to a greater power (though certainly not a Great 
Power). Italy was certainly not satisfied with the postwar settlements, and as such seemed 
a perfect partner to Hungarians. After Klebelsberg had laid the groundwork, Bethlen 
arrived to Rome on April 4, 1927. In his meeting with Mussolini he explained that 
Hungarian policy was determined by three factors: the issue of borders, the question of 
rearmament, and the position of the Little Entente. During the visit an Italian-Hungarian 
peace and friendship treaty was drafted. 
97
 
 The next date that often appears in historical studies as a watershed moment in 
Hungary’s road from isolation is June 21, 1927. It was on this day that a British 
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newspaper, the Daily Mail, published an editorial entitled: “Hungary’s Place in the Sun.” 
The piece was written by Harold Sydney Harmsworth, better known as Viscount 
Rothermere, media tycoon (owner of the Daily Mail), conservative politician, and not 
least brother of Lord Northcliffe.  In the piece he criticized the postwar treaties and 
pointed out that the Treaty of Trianon was the “most ill advised.” He advocated  revisions 
of the frontiers based on ethnic lines, which he argued was the only way to avoid further 
“conflagration.”98 There has been much speculation about the reasoning behind 
Rothermere’s article. Some have suggested that it was written under the influence of a 
lady with Hungarian roots (research shows she was actually an Austro-German). Others 
pointed toward the Hungarian Foreign Ministry as the source of inspiration, while yet 
others believed that Mussolini was behind it. In his own memoir Rothermere claimed that 
he was not solicited in any way by anyone to take on the cause of Hungary.
99
  We may 
never learn the truth behind Rothermere’s action, but for now it is enough to say that his 
article sent shockwaves through the continent from Paris to Prague. Of course, nowhere 
was the reverberation greater than in Hungary. The public welcomed Lord Rothermere as 
the champion of Hungary. Later on there was even talk of putting his son on the vacant 
Hungarian throne. Streets were named after him and a memorial fountain was erected to 
his honor.
100
 However, not everyone in Hungary was entirely satisfied with Rothermere’s 
action. Among those that were not happy was István Bethlen. The prime minister had two 
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objections to Rothermere’s action. His first objection had to do with the timing. Bethlen 
was seeking to establish cordial diplomatic relations with London and Paris, and the 
Hungarian public’s frenzy over the article undermined his position. Second, and perhaps 
more important, was the fact that the Viscount’s suggestion of territorial revision based 
on ethnic principles was not what Bethlen had in mind. Even though government circles 
never openly articulated it, their goal was to restore historical Hungary’s territorial 
integrity.
101
 While media in Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade reacted with the expected 
displeasure and the various governments used this event as yet another example of 
Hungarian irredentism, official circles reacted with less zeal. For example, Yugoslav 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vojislav Marinkovich told John Dyneley Prince, American 
Minister to Yugoslavia, the following about Rothermere’s action: 
I really have nothing to say on the subject. Lord Rothermere is a rich man 
and the owner of a newspaper, but this has no significance because he has 
no authority. In fact, he has only attracted attention in  Hungary and we 
already know the attitude of Hungary with respect to this subject which 
they have now reiterated. The only political circles in Europe which are 
paying serious attention to Lord Rothermere are certain elements in 
Hungary, but the Hungarian government itself is behaving very 
cautiously.
102
 
The newly-established Magyar Revíziós Liga (MRL—Hungarian Revisionist League) 
had reservations of its own about Rothermere. Novelist Ferenc Herczeg, head of MRL, 
made this point on the very first meeting of the organization when he said that “the so-
called Rothermere-proposal is not representative of Hungary’s aims and has not been 
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advanced by Hungarians, as the Hungarian nation will not resign her right to restore its 
territorial integrity.”103 
 As part of the new active foreign policy, the government, and Bethlen in 
particular, altered its official stance on the question of revisionism. Most historians date 
the official announcement of this new policy to a speech by Bethlen in Debrecen in 
March 1928 in which he stated that the government’s goal is peaceful revisionism, the 
alteration of existing frontiers (like most government officials Bethlen refrained from 
openly advocating the restoration of historical borders).
104
 However, he already alluded 
to this by his June 2, 1927, campaign speech in the provincial city of Zalaegerszeg.
105
 
According to the same source, the prime minister’s speech reverberated as far as Paris, 
for Le Temps published a report highly critical of Bethlen’s speech.106 Whatever the exact 
date may have been, one thing is for certain: Hungarian foreign policy changed 
dramatically. 
 
Stages of Cultural Diplomacy, 1927-1941 
From 1927 onward cultural diplomacy was an indispensable component of the 
new foreign policy. The country had recovered economically, had returned to the 
international stage, and even the Allied Military Commission had left the country. The 
official Hungarian revisionist propaganda was no longer simply to wine-and-dine foreign 
journalists, intellectuals, and politicians—though they continued the practice. Instead, by 
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mobilizing the country’s cultural products, its industries, and its artists and intellectuals 
they began to work on altering the foreign image of Hungary. Culture and cultural 
production, as Klebelsberg understood it, had become a new arsenal in the fight among 
nations.
107
 The campaign no longer limited itself to convincing the foreign political and 
intellectual elite. While they remained important, practitioners of cultural diplomacy also 
targeted mass public opinion through the promotion of tourism and by using new cultural 
media of cinema and radio.  
They targeted three groups in this grape-shot-like cultural diplomatic campaign. 
The main targets were the Great Powers. This is far from surprising. The dissolution of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—not a great power in its own right—led to the creation 
of small, militarily weak, economically fragile, and politically ineffective countries that 
relied greatly on the great powers. This dependency was especially detrimental to 
Hungary, which after losing the war found itself diplomatically cut off from the rest of 
the world. The anti-status quo character of Italy and Germany made those countries 
natural allies and as such targets of cultural export. Great Britain remained a primary 
target for Hungarians, not least because of the Hungarian elite’s Anglophile character. 
France was a more difficult place in which to operate, for the Czechoslovaks and the 
Romanians already had great resources in place. The United States was a natural choice 
for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the United States had never ratified the Paris 
Treaties. Hungary and the United States actually signed a separate peace treaty on August 
29, 1921, stating “that the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part I of 
that Treaty, nor by any provisions of that Treaty including those mentioned in paragraph 
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(l) of this Article, which relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the 
United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council 
or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent to 
such action.”108 The next main target was the League of Nations. Recent research 
indicates that articles 8, 10, 11, and 19 of The Covenant of the League of Nations were 
especially appealing to Hungarians.
109
 Article 8 called for the “reduction of national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety,” which in the case of 
Hungary, facing its neighboring countries’ overwhelming forces, saw as a point of 
support. Article 10 guaranteed the member states’ “territorial integrity and existing 
political independence,” which once again, because of the weak state of the Hungarian 
armed forces (limited to 35,000), was an important provision. Article 11 allowed nations 
to bring forward any issue that they deemed to be “affecting international relations which 
threaten[s] to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon 
which peace depends.” Finally, and most importantly to Hungarians, article 19 stated that 
“the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the 
League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international 
conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.”110 The last article 
especially contributed to the idea that Hungary might be able to revise the treaty through 
the League of Nations. The third target group has much to do with the ideal of the League 
                                                             
108 WW I Document Archive, US Peace Treaty with Hungary. (Article II section 2), accessed December 22, 
2011, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/US_Peace_Treaty_with_Hungary. 
 
109 Miklós Zeidler, “A Nemzetek Szövetsége a magyar külpolitikai gondolkodásban,” in Magyar 
külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században, Pál Pritz ed. (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 2006), 
160-161. 
 
110 Avalon Project, The Covenant of the League of Nations, accessed: December 22, 2011, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.  
 
67 
 
of Nations in which all nations—regardless of their size— were represented and, in 
theory, were able to voice their opinion. Thus Hungarian cultural diplomacy did not shy 
away from advancing a positive national image in smaller (not necessarily 
geographically) countries from Argentina to Estonia, and everywhere between. The 
strategy of appealing to nations far and wide remained a constant feature of Hungarian 
cultural diplomacy. 
As Hitler rose to power in Germany, Hungarians hoped to find a new ally for their 
revisionist goals. During the premiership of Gyula Gömbös, 1932-1936, the country 
reoriented itself toward the Rome-Berlin axis. However, it was not a happy marriage. 
Berlin made it clear from the beginning that it would not support Hungarian revisionist 
goals against Romania. In addition, there was more and more pressure from Germany to 
secure special privileges for Hungary’s German minority. Under the Darányi 
government, 1936-1938, Hungary made attempts to renew ties with other Western 
powers, especially Great Britain, in order to free itself from Germany’s economic and 
political influence. After the March 1938 Anschluss, the new Hungarian government, led 
by Béla Imrédy, established ever-closer ties with Berlin, but at the same time it also 
continued to make attempts to gain  Britain’s economic and political support. After all, 
Hungary now shared a border with Germany, a situation that made a lot of people uneasy. 
 Many, though not all, of the Hungarian demands were satisfied by the First 
Vienna Award on November 2, 1938.  The country received approximately 4,605 square 
miles with a little over one million inhabitants, the majority of whom were ethnic 
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Hungarians.
111
 Very few people in Hungary knew, or cared to know, that the price of this 
territorial reacquisition included further political and economic concessions to Germany. 
Cultural diplomacy worked energetically to secure worldwide recognition for the 
territorial gains. After a short intermezzo by Béla Imrédy’s government (May 1938-
February 1939), which passed the First Jewish Law but ironically was forced out on the 
grounds of Imrédy’s own Jewish heritage, it was once again Pál Teleki’s turn at the helm.  
Teleki tried to find a balance in Hungary’s foreign policy. Cultural diplomacy 
continued to appeal to the world. This time the goal was legitimizing territorial gains and 
continuing to make inroads toward further revision. With the outbreak of the war in 1939, 
cultural diplomacy changed gears.  While acquiring further territoriall consessions 
remained its primary goal, it also sought to secure Hungarian neutrality.  
The Second Vienna Award of August 1940 granted Northern Transylvania to 
Hungary. Hungary regained 16,602 square miles and two and a half million inhabitants, 
of which about half were ethnically Hungarian. (Approximately 400,000 Hungarian 
remained within the borders of Romania). The decision was made under German and 
Italian arbitration. Once again the country was elated. Yet it had become ever more 
difficult for Teleki to continue his balancing act. 
Regent Horthy, hoping for further territorial revisions–despite his own earlier 
refusal of Hungarian armed action against Czechoslovakia—and under unrelenting 
pressure from  Berlin and Hungarian war-hawks, authorized the discussion of joint 
Hungarian-German military action against Yugoslavia (only after Croatian independence 
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would be proclaimed). Teleki saw no exit strategy for the country or himself. His letter to 
Horthy, a de facto suicide note, is worth quoting in its entirety:  
Excellency,  
We have become word-breakers – out of cowardice – and broke our 
promise of the eternal friendship agreement based on your Mohács 
[historically significant town in Hungary] speech. The nation senses 
that we have cast away its honor. We have sided with the villains 
because the atrocities they reported, which are a pack of lies. There 
were none against Hungarians and none even against Germans! We 
will be robbing a corpse. We will be the most miserable of nations. I 
did not hold you back. I am guilty.
112
 
On April 13, 1941, two days after an independent Croatia was declared, Hungarian troops 
occupied former Hungarian territories and advanced into Serbia under German command. 
On April 7, Great Britain cut diplomatic ties with Hungary. On June 26, 1941, Hungary 
entered World War II on the side of Nazi Germany, and on December 12, 1941, Hungary 
declared war on the United States. Hungarian cultural diplomacy lost its raison d’être. 
 
Conclusion 
The First World War not only changed the geopolitical configuration of East-
Central Europe but also altered the hitherto existing practices of international relations. 
Most everyone realized the newfound significance of public opinion meant that 
diplomatic activities could no longer be restricted to negotiations carried out by political 
elites. In this new climate diplomats had to pay attention to the foreign image of their 
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respective countries. The political elite recruited scholars, artists, and the likes, to 
construct and promote a positive national image abroad.  For the small countries of 
Europe, international public opinion could mean the difference between anguish and 
jubilation. 
 While Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia had greatly benefited from their 
war-time propaganda activities, they were detrimental to Hungary. As the First World 
War came to its end, the new democratic Hungarian government, under Mihály Károlyi, 
struggled to gain international recognition. This lack of recognition severely limited 
Károlyi’s ability to deal with both domestic and international issues. Eventually, 
Károlyi’s inability to secure recognition led to the collapse of its democratic government. 
After the short tenure of Béla Kun’s Bolshevik regime, the conservative forces of Miklós 
Horthy gained power. The newly reconstituted Kingdom of Hungary and its Prime 
Minister István Bethlen, despite the illiberal nature of the regime, was finally able to 
secure international recognition. As historian Thomas Lorman has concluded—in regard 
to the British point of view, but this is more generally applicable—“the failings of the 
Bethlen government, its illiberal policies, its grudging acceptance of the peace treaty and 
its unwillingness to cultivate good relations with its neighbors were all a price worth 
paying for the economic, social and political stability that were hallmarks of the Bethlen 
consolidation.”113 
 Although the Bethlen government gained its much sought-after international 
recognition, Hungary remained isolated. The country’s foreign image continued to be 
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dreadful, not at least because the enduring activities of its neighbors. Consequently, 
Bethlen and his cabinet had to be realistic about how much room it really had to 
maneuver. After 1922 the government subdued irredentist voices and instead used the 
time to seek economic, cultural and political recovery. As Klebelsberg put it, “in 1922 it 
would not only have been madness, but straight-out comical for us to rattle our sabers, 
when indeed we had very few sabers to rattle.”114 
 After 1927, as the country gained access to the international stage, the propaganda 
work—in disguise of cultural diplomacy—could go full steam ahead. According to the 
earlier division of labor, nongovernmental organizations such as the Hungarian 
Revisionist League carried out “hard” propaganda—covertly financed by the 
government. On the other hand, the government itself utilized the tools of cultural 
diplomacy. The tools were peaceful, but it was a war nonetheless.  And as one British 
politician wrote years later “in modern war, not to use propaganda is treason. . . . Not to 
use it skillfully is to court disaster.”115 Hungarian cultural diplomacy, albeit with 
modified goals, continued to court foreign public opinion until 1941. 
 The Hungarian elite, in competition with its Czechoslovak, Romanian, and 
Yugoslav counterparts, contended for the support of the international public. This war-
like competition, much like an actual war, required mobilization of resources. These 
resources were not guns, bullets, and soldiers but cultural resources mobilized by the 
country’s political, intellectual, and industrial elite. The majority in Hungary agreed that 
the country must wage this new war by creating a new positive image abroad. By 1927 
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the necessary infrastructure was in place; however, the question of what that image 
should look like continued to divide the leadership. Negotiating the country’s foreign 
image was a complex undertaking that caused much anxiety. The next chapter seeks to 
illustrate the complexity of this question as it examines the question of Hungarianness 
vis-à-vis Europeanness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
DEBATING IDENTITY: NATIONAL CHARACTEROLOGY AND THE  
DILEMMAS OF HUNGARIANNESS 
 
“Ferry-land, Ferry-land, Ferry-land . . . even in its most daring dreams it is only roaming 
back and fro between two shores. From East to West or, rather, the other way around.” 
                     (Endre Ady, 1905)
 1
 
 
Mi a magyar? (What is a Hungarian?) was one of the most divisive questions in 
interwar Hungary. A myriad of intellectuals, public figures, and even politicians sought 
to answer the question. Because Hungarian cultural diplomacy’s main aim was to 
construct and project a positive image of the country abroad, it relied heavily on a process 
in which the political and intellectual elite sought to delineate the essence of 
Hungarianness.  What should Hungary’s Sunday best look like? What message should it 
convey? While there was a near universal agreement on the need of a new image, the 
various factions offered very different understandings of the past and the present, just as 
they failed to agree on the fundamental building blocks of the Hungarian national 
character.   
The matter of competing, and often contradictory, visions of Hungarianness was 
further complicated by anxieties about the country’s relationship to Europe. The almost 
obsessive questioning of Europeanness was a peculiarly East and East-Central European 
                                                             
1 Endre Ady, “Morituri,” Figyelő  1-2 (1905): 633-635. Translation by György Péteri in György Péteri ed., 
Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2010), 1.  
74 
 
phenomenon.  It amounted to an atmosphere that historian István Bibó described as 
“political hysteria.” In his essay, “The Misery of the Small States of Eastern Europe” (“A 
keleteurópai kisállamok nyomorúsága”), Bibó argued that this political hysteria was a 
result of uncertainty about national existence and territorial status.
2
 This sort of anxiety 
about national existence might be an “empty phrase” to Westerners, admitted Bibó, for 
whom “national death” might be just a “pompous picture” for they cannot even imagine 
the “complete political annihilation” of a nation. But to the small states of Eastern Europe 
there was a shared belief in a real need to justify their right to exist.
3
 This mentality, one 
could argue, was rooted in historical experience. For centuries inhabitants of this region 
fought to survive first Mongol then Ottoman assault only to fall under Habsburg rule. In 
the aftermath of the First World War some, like the Romanians and Czechoslovaks, 
benefited greatly from the peace and sought to justify their territorial gains. Others, such 
as the Hungarians, felt betrayed by territorial losses and looked for remedy. Regardless of 
their different aims all the region’s small nations sought justification and assurance 
abroad. That is why the new or newly reconstructed nation-states only in theory were free 
to construct their identities and the images of those identities. In reality, because of their 
dependency on the larger and stronger states, and international public opinion in general, 
they were forced to pay attention to what kinds of identities and images they were 
constructing and in what ways those images were propagated. Disagreements about the 
identifying elements of national character made the building of an effective cultural 
diplomacy—already a daunting task—ever more difficult. 
                                                             
2 István Bibó, Harmadik út: politikai és történeti tanulmányok, ed. Zoltán Szabó (London: Magyar 
Könyves Céh, 1960), 117.  
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This chapter does not offer a comprehensive picture of Hungarian national 
identity construction, but provides the necessary background information that is 
indispensable for understanding what comes next. Ever since Benedict Anderson’s 
influential Imagined Communities, we have understood that national identities are 
constructs constantly being negotiated and renegotiated.
4
 The first part of the chapter 
examines the construction and negotiation of prewar Hungarian national identity with 
special emphasis on the changing understanding of Hungarianness and the country’s 
relationship to the Habsburg monarchy. The second part of the chapter situates the post-
1918 Hungarian cultural and identity crisis within the larger analytical framework of 
regional and continental crises of a similar nature. The next section offers a short 
overview of nemzetkarakterológia, a discussion of national characteristics that created its 
own cottage-industry in interwar Hungary. The last part of the chapter, drawing from 
János Gyurgyák’s recent study, presents four different visions of Hungarianness. Based 
on their ideologies, their historical memories, their views on modernity vis-à-vis 
tradition, and their stand on the question of Europeanness, I distinguish among 1) radical 
liberals—later urbánusok; 2) fajvédők (race defenders); 3) népiesek (generally 
mistranslated as “populist”); and 4) conservative national liberals.5 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
 
5 János Gyurgyák, Ezzé lett magyar hazátok: a magyar nemzeteszme és nacionaliznus története (Budapest: 
Osiris Kiadó, 2007). 
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National Identity before the Nation-State? 
Before the beginning of the nineteenth century there were three different 
definitions of the term “Hungarian,” were used interchangeably depending on what was 
to be emphasized.  According to historian Jenő Szűcs, the first classification included all 
of those living in the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom (regnum Hungariae), regardless 
of one’s language or social status. The second included all those who belonged to the 
same linguistic and cultural group (lingua et moribus), those speaking Magyar. The third 
type, and the most privileged one, included those who belonged to the social order of the 
nobility (natio Hungarica).
6
 Thus, before the nineteenth century we cannot talk about the 
existence of one single national identity because there was no definitive national 
consciousness, let alone a nation-state. For example, in order to be part of the privileged 
group of the natio Hungarica (about five percent of the total population) knowledge of 
Hungarian was not a requirement. 
 It was the enlightened absolutism of Maria Theresa (1740-1780), and more 
importantly that of her son Joseph II (1765-1790), which ignited the development of 
Hungarian nationalism in its modern sense. The period was highlighted by the struggle 
between an ever-changing natio Hungarica aiming to safeguard its privileges and a 
Habsburg regime aiming to curtail it. One of the cornerstones of this early nationalist 
sentiment was the role of the Hungarian language. The likes of György Bessenyei—
himself ironically enough a member of the noble guard of Maria Theresa—called for 
cultural reforms. One of the key issues was the primacy of the Hungarian language 
instead of Latin (the language of administration) and German (which was to be the lingua 
                                                             
6 Jenő Szűcs, A magyar nemzeti tudat kialakulása (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó-JATE-Osiris, 1997), 337. 
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franca of the entire Habsburg dominion). In his 1802 essay, Bessenyei, addressing the 
nobility, argued that “it is time, dear Sirs, for the mind of the Hungarian Nation to be 
clarified in her mother-tongue regarding its objects!” In the spirit of the Enlightenment, 
of which he was a product, he further argued that Hungarian translations of Latin, Greek, 
French, and German works were necessary in order to refine the nation. To Bessenyei 
being Hungarian meant speaking, reading, and writing in Hungarian, for he believed that 
“whoever elevates the language of his homeland brings the esteem of his Nation into a 
luminous light.”7 During the 1820s and 1830s, under the leadership of Ferenc Kazinczy, 
the Hungarian language underwent major modernizing reforms in order to raise the 
nation’s cultural output to the European level while using the Hungarian vernacular.  
 It was during this period that we can begin to speak of the emergence of a modern 
national consciousness in Hungary—albeit one without an existing independent nation-
state.  At the forefront of the movement was the nobility—more specifically the lesser 
nobility, which, while often translated as such, was not the same as the gentry. The 
emerging national sentiment left its mark on the development on Hungarian culture. For 
example, it marked the maturity of Hungary’s national romanticism in literature with the 
likes of Mihály Vörösmarty and Ferenc Kölcsey. Some argue that this was the time 
                                                             
7 György Bessenyei, “Beszéd az országnak targyárul,” trans. Dávid Oláh, in Discourses of Collective 
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period when a “dominating trend in Hungarian literary and art criticism” originated. 
According to this “trend,” literature and art was seen as a “service to the nation.”8   
One of the aims adopted by romantic poets was the literary representation of 
Hungarian history in binary opposition to Habsburg Austria. Vörösmarty, in his 1825 
Zalán futása (The Flight of Zalán), recalled Hungary’s ancient past when the Magyar 
tribes arrived to the Carpathian Basin. The heroic poem tells the story of a series of 
battles in which the Magyar tribes led by Árpád (and his lieutenant Ete) defeated the 
tribes of Zalán and as such gained the rights for the lands. It not only celebrated the 
country’s Eastern origin, but it also emphasized the heroic bravery of the Magyar fighters 
(albeit it also offers a love story between Ete and Hajna) and offers a historical 
justification for the existence of independent and strong Hungary. In many ways Zalán 
futása was also designed to be a call to arms, as the first lines indicates: “Where are you, 
glory of old? Lost deep in the night of shadows?”9 
The figure of Árpád, closely linked in myth and tradition with Attila the Hun, 
became especially popular among Hungary’s Protestant nobility, who used this origin 
myth to further distinguish themselves from the Catholics.
10
 Their more recent heroes 
                                                             
8 George Barany, “Hungary: From Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism” in Nationalism in Eastern 
Europe, eds. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 
1969), 265. 
 
9 Mihály Vörösmarty, “Zalán futása,” trans. Watson Kirkconnell and Adam Makkai in In Quest of the 
Miracle Stag: the Poetry of Hungary, ed. Adam Makkai (Chicago and Budapest: Atlantis-
Centaur/M.Szivárvány/Corvina. Distributed by University of Illinois Press, 1996), 214. (Hereafter, I will 
refer to this anthology as Quest). 
 
10 Jenő Szűcs, Nemzet és történelem: tanulmányok (Budapest: Gondolat, 1974), 415-20 and Katalin Sinkó, 
“Árpád versus Saint István,” in Hungarians between ‘East’ and ‘West’: Three Essays on National Myths 
and Symbols, ed. Tamás Hofer (Budapest: Museum of Ethnography, 1994), 15. 
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were the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century kuruc fighters (anti-Habsburg paramilitary, 
mainly Protestant, forces) in direct opposition to the labanc (Austrian and Habsburg 
loyalist, mainly Catholic, forces). Although the confessional differences became less 
pronounced, the kuruc versus labanc mental construct, and its conflict, reverberated deep 
into the twentieth century. 
Opposite the figure of Árpád stood the tradition that venerated the role of Saint 
Stephen (Szent István), Hungary’s first Christian king (ruled 1000-1038). This story 
celebrated Hungary’s connection with the West. According to this founding myth, 
Hungary was offered up to the Virgin Mary by Saint Stephen, and since then it has been 
Regnum Marianum—the land of Mary. It was under her protection that Hungary became 
the shield of Christendom against the Mongols and Ottomans and the bulwark of the 
Catholic faith. Stephen and his descendants Imre and László were all canonized, making 
an everlasting connection to Western Christianity, and, more importantly, the Catholic 
Church. Not surprisingly, the Habsburg House, in the face of growing Protestant 
influence, encouraged and even promoted the legends of the Hungarian saints and the 
worship of Mary. However, to the Hungarians it was more than being part of the Catholic 
universe; their myth was also used as a justification for autonomy within the Habsburg 
Empire.
11
  
The duality of national self-identification also had significant impact on domestic 
policies, which was best illuminated by the conflicting relationship between nineteenth-
century Hungary’s two greatest figures: Lajos Kossuth and István Széchenyi. Kossuth, 
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from the Calvinist lesser-nobility, envisioned an independent Hungary. In his vision the 
ethnic Magyar nationality would enjoy privileges—regardless of social standing—against 
the non-Magyar nationalities of the Hungarian realm, who in turn were to be Magyarized. 
On the other hand, there was Széchenyi—a member of an old and prominent Catholic 
noble family—who looked toward gradual change, emphasized the promotion of 
education, and disagreed with Magyarization. He believed in the idea of a political 
nation, albeit under Magyar leadership. During the 1848-1849 Hungarian revolution and 
freedom fight Kossuth’s vision dominated.12 Consequently, although Hungary indeed 
gained a short-lived independence, the joint forces of the Austrian army, the agitated non-
Magyar nationalities, and the Russian forces of Nicolas I (1822-1855) eventually put 
down the Hungarian uprising. 
After a short hiatus between 1849 and the 1867 Ausgleich, during which 
Hungarians practiced passive resistance, the Hungarian national identity question 
resurfaced once again. The underlying questions remained the same. The debate 
continued to address the issue of political versus ethnic nation and the country’s 
relationship to the Habsburg monarchy. According to ethnographer Tamás Hofer, there 
were three kinds of self-identification based on competing loyalties: loyalty to the Dual 
Empire of Austria-Hungary, loyalty to the idea of a multi-ethnic Hungarian Kingdom, 
and loyalty to Hungary as a home of ethnic Hungarians who made up little more than half 
                                                             
12 It must be noted that Kossuth, while in exile, radically modified his vision of Hungary and by the 1860s 
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of the kingdom’s population.13 All three groups actively shaped national identity through 
the production of national culture. The first level of understanding was articulated in 
public buildings such as railway stations and theaters that were more or less similar 
throughout the empire and emerged as products of the modernization drive within the 
Dual Monarchy.
14
 Those who promoted a multi-ethnic political state believed in an 
inclusionary vision of Hungarianness whereby all ethnicities living in the Hungarian half 
of the Dual Monarchy were members of the nation. These liberals aimed to extend 
privileges and rights to all as they articulated the image of a unified multi-ethnic 
Hungary. Hofer’s study illustrates that in this “imagined community” folk culture played 
a pivotal role not least because the majority of non-Magyar (and Magyar) nationalities 
were peasants. Intellectuals, such as the members of the Hungarian Ethnographic Society, 
aimed to promote ethnic folk traditions. To this end they created separate sections to 
study Serb, Slovak, Romanian, and German folk culture. Literary figures, from Mór Jókai 
to Kálmán Mikszáth, often found their subject-matter in non-Magyar settings and wrote 
of them in a positive light.
15
 By the 1890s this group had lost momentum and influence 
and those with the vision of a “Hungary of Magyars” came to prominence. Their 
exclusionary policies led to the curtailment of the rights and privileges of non-Magyar 
nationalities. It was the period when, according to Hofer, Hungarian folk culture became 
implicitly Magyar, promoting an idea of historically fixed, ancient Hungarian “essence” 
that was to be “guarded and kept pure.” This understanding promoted the Oriental traits 
                                                             
13 Tamás Hofer, “Construction of the ‘Folk Cultural Heritage’ in Hungary and Rival Versions of  National 
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of Hungarian culture as invented tradition and heritage in way that argued for the 
uniqueness of the Hungarian “folk soul.”16 This folk national soul was rooted in the vast 
Eastern steppes in the areas around the Volga River, where, consistent with contemporary 
literary historian and novelist Zsolt Beöthy’s 1896 argument, the iconic symbol of 
Hungarianness, the warrior horseman was born. In his interpretation it was the Magyar 
race’s superiority, thanks to the Hungarians’ ancient Oriental traits, that made it the only 
ethnic group in the region that had the proclivity and characteristics to form a nation. He 
defined “Hungarian race” as an end product of its historical past, not in a biological 
sense. Beöthy declared that through historical development the Magyars were able to 
assimilate others and “shape” them to their “own likeness”  while maintaining  a kind of 
original Magyar “spirit,” or as he put it: “Thus the nature of the Hungarian soil, the 
dominion of the Hungarian race with its public institutions, the character of Hungarian 
history, the Hungarian language . . . all these, despite the unceasing intensive mingling of 
races , have sustained, at least in its main features, the original Hungarian spirit.
17
   
By the turn of the century competing visions of Hungary and Hungarianness were 
part of the political discourse. The experience of the First World War, revolution, 
counterrevolution, and the subsequent peace treaty further polarized the construction of 
Hungarian national identity and its imagery. Furthermore, and more importantly, in the 
aftermath of the First World War the debate about Hungarian national character 
intensified. However, the parameters of the debate changed significantly. With the 
dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, the matter of Habsburg loyalty was no longer relevant. 
                                                             
16 Ibid., 39. 
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The issue of defining Hungarians in terms of ethnic/religious vis-à-vis political 
understanding also lost its relevance in a relatively homogenous Hungarian nation-state—
with a very important exception of the discussion about the role and position of 
Hungary’s Jewish population. The main debate during the postwar years was about 
specific Hungarian characteristics and aimed to negotiate the balancing characterizations 
of modernity and tradition and pondered the meaning and importance of Europeanness. 
Although some of the discussions had roots in the country’s past, this debate was also a 
part of a wider regional and continental cultural crisis that was one of the unforeseen 
results of the war.  
 
Post World War I Crisis of Culture 
The First World War left more than physical devastation in its wake. The 
experience of war also led to a cultural and intellectual crisis as intellectuals and artists 
struggled to make sense of their new reality, a nexus of the new and the old. On the one 
hand, the world was rapidly transforming through technology. The distances between 
people were shrinking thanks to discoveries and inventions in communications and 
transportation. On the other hand, many questioned the direction in which humanity was 
moving and began to question the future of Western civilization. The “lost generation,” 
as Gertrude Stein referred to it, and which included the likes of F. Scott Fitzgerald, T. S. 
Elliot, and Erich Maria Remarque, reacted to their new reality with considerable 
disillusionment and rebellion. Novelist Robert Briffault, in his Europa in Limbo, 
described the postwar perplexity:  
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It looked much the same a few days before ten million men went to the 
shambles of war. Europe seems – to the external eye – to be still standing, 
much the same, after the blast and shambles, does it not? But is it? In 
reality, not one building-stone of it, of the essential core and foundation of 
it, is left standing! Every one of its values, the animating sparks of 
meaning without which no building-stone and no life can stand – every 
one is fallen and lies level with the ground.
18
 
German historian Felix Gilbert – who came of age as the Wilhemine Empire crumbled, 
and as, in the midst of civil strife and revolution, the Weimar Republic was born – voiced 
a similar feelings. He recalled the interwar years and wrote: “The only certainty we had 
was that nothing was certain.”19 Others also painted a dark picture of the future of 
humanity, no one more so than Sigmund Freud. In his 1929 Civilization and its 
Discontents he wrote: “Men are not gentle creatures, who want to be loved, and who at 
the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures 
among whose instinctual endowment is to be reckoned a powerful share of 
aggressiveness. . . . Homo homini lupus [Man is wolf to man].”20 During the 1920s, 
argues historian Jan Ifversen, “Europe’s predicament was regarded not solely in political, 
economic or military terms, but as something that touched the very heart of European 
life. Often it was referred to as a crisis of civilization.”21 Indeed, most historians would 
agree that one of the consequences of the war was the amplification of the debate that 
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focused on the deep-seated questions about the meaning and consequences of modernity 
vis-à-vis tradition.
22
 
 In Weimar Germany, for example, according to historian Eric Weitz, culture and 
politics were characterized by “the restless questioning of what it means to live in modern 
times, the search of new forms of expressions suitable to the cacophony of modern life, 
and the belief in the possibilities of future.”23 Others, as Jeffrey Herf points out, focused 
their attention on perceived conflict between advancing technology and the traditions of 
German nationalism, which was exaggerated by political reality. As he puts it, “the battle 
between Technik and Kultur took place against the background of military defeat, failed 
revolutions, successful counterrevolution, a divided Left, an embittered and resentful 
Right.”24 Peter Gay would argue that the crisis was about the dual character of the 
Weimar Republic, namely that it was “both old and new.”25 The question of Germanness 
divided the already fractured society even further. What is German? What art is German? 
Is cosmopolitan Berlin representative of the German essence? Or is it the Franconian 
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village?  Despite political and cultural penchants, “all of Weimar’s protagonists grappled 
with this tension-bound world of modernity.”26 
 Other countries, despite the fact that they were on the victors’ side, experienced a 
similarly tumultuous time. Italy found itself in the unenviable position after the war as the 
“least of the great powers.”27 The problem was, argues historian Mabel Berezin, that in 
1922— as Mussolini gained power—“Italy remained a state without a nation.”28 In Italy 
the debate over modernity vis-à-vis tradition was further complicated by the Italian 
Fascists’ drive to create the new Italian men. The concept of bonifica, or reclamation 
became the centerpiece of the Fascist regime’s campaign to “combat degeneration and 
radically renew Italian society by ‘pulling up bad weeds and cleaning up the soil’.”29 
Berezin defines the “Fascist project” as follows: “the Italian fascist regime that governed 
Italy from 1922 to 1943 aimed to create new men and women, a new ethos, a new culture 
. . . the regime sought to forge new identities.”30 Giovanni Gentile, who according to 
Victoria de Grazia was the personification of Fascism’s ideal of culture, envisioned the 
renewal of Italy’s cultural life “by means of a dynamic new synthesis of the national 
heritage and fascist ideology.”31 Bringing together Italy’s Ancient past, the triumphs of 
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the Renaissance, and the futuristic vision of Fascism was further complicated by the 
question of Europe. In 1934, the young art critic Renato Poggioli asked his peers: 
“Should we Italians become more European, or should Europe become more Italian? . . . 
Are we merely an eccentric peninsula on the continent, or are we still and always the 
garden of the Empire? To defend ourselves spiritually, should our culture turn its back on 
Europe, or should we be open to that which comes from outside?”32 
 However, I argue that it was interwar East and East-Central Europe that 
experienced the postwar cultural crisis to its fullest extent, and more, in a very peculiar 
form. With the end of empires, physical borders were not the only boundaries that had 
changed. The newly constructed or reconstructed countries of the region were facing the 
challenge of creating their own, independent, national characteristics. Before the war, 
they were able to define themselves in opposition to their Austrian (or Austro-
Hungarian), Russian, German, or Ottoman overlords. The end of the war changed all that. 
Polish novelist Witold Gombrowicz’s diary entry is a testament to this problem. He 
wrote: “After our struggles with Russia, with Germany, a struggle with Poland awaited 
us. It is not surprising, therefore, that independence turned out to be more burdensome 
and humiliating than bondage. As long as we were absorbed with the revolt against a 
foreign power, questions such as ‘Who we are?’ ‘What are we to make ourselves?’ lie 
dormant, but independence awakened the riddle that was slumbering with us.”33 With 
jubilation over independence also came anxiety and uncertainty about the future. Cultural 
crisis—combined with economic and political troubles—led to a crisis of national 
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identity, for they saw a positive and unified national character as the basic foundation of 
their policies that aimed to either maintain or challenge the postwar status quo.    
 The case of interwar Poland, for example, depicts a great deal of anxiety and 
apprehension about the construction of national character. Poland as a country had not 
existed since the Third Partition of 1795. The Great War meant the rebirth of the Polish 
nation. The reunification process (1918-1922), historian Jerzy Jedlicki points out, brought 
forward a number of questions that intellectuals aimed to tackle: “Will this [reunification] 
work? What precisely is the nature of the bond which unites, or could unite, a land so 
long separated, social classes so alien to each other, dialects so disparate?”34 The 
Polishness of culture, before the unification, meant language, literature, respect of 
education and, above all, argues historian Peter D. Stachura, “the perfect combination 
[of] an effervescent patriotism and rejuvenated Catholicism.”35 Even before unification 
there was disagreement about the exact meaning of Polishness among the various groups. 
The unification process, however, further polarized society. Historian Eva Plach asserts 
that a total of fourteen different governments strove to govern Poland between 1918 and 
May 1926. The 1920s’ were the pinnacle of divergence as there were nearly one hundred 
political parties in Poland, each with their very own vision of Polishness.
36
 
Although Romania gained significant territories and achieved its territorial 
aspirations, Romanians also experienced the unforeseen consequence of these territorial 
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gains: the question of national unity. As a result, the idea of “national character” 
generated heated debate in interwar Romania as well. As Katherine Verdery points out, it 
was a discussion about specificul naţional, which literally translates as “the nationally 
specific” or “the national specificity.”37 While the discussion was not entirely new, it was 
radically intensified because of the presence of Hungarian, German, and Ukrainian 
minorities in postwar Romania. As historian Irina Livezeanu puts it, the postwar 
territorial settlement was an “embarrassment of riches” and an “ambiguous and difficult 
gift.” Like a “Trojan horse,” continues Livezeanu, “it brought apparent and momentary 
glory but concealed untold social, demographic, political, and cultural challenges.”38 In 
addition, Romania, like most of its regional counterparts, was heavily dependent on the 
West in the political, economic, and military arena. The country’s intellectual and 
cultural elite was deeply divided between two camps: “Europeanists” or “Westernizers” 
and the traditionalists. The “Europeanists” propagated the continuation of Romania’s 
development based on the Western European model. They argued that Romania’s 
disposition was Occidental rather than Oriental and emphasized progress in science.
39
 To 
them the Romanian national character was rooted in the cities. Consequently, they 
promoted the continuing internationalization of Romanian culture and intellectual life. 
On the other side of the equation were the traditionalists, “those intellectuals who sought 
                                                             
37 Katherine Verdery, “National Ideology and National Character in Interwar Romania,” in NCI, 103. 
 
38 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic 
Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 7. 
 
39 For more on interwar Romania and science, see: Maria Bucur, Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar 
Romania (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2002).  
 
90 
 
models for Romanian development in its autochthonous past, real or imagined.”40 Even 
though the traditionalist camp was far from united, they all agreed on the unique and 
predominantly rural character of Romania, and, generally speaking, feared the 
continuation of “cultural imports,” cosmopolitanism, and the “craze” for everything that 
was French. Leading historian and prominent political figure, Nicolae Iorga bitterly 
complained about the condition of Romanian affairs and said that while Romanians had a 
national state they lacked national culture.
41
 
What about the Hungarians? The postwar cultural crisis led to an especially 
problematic discussion about national character in Hungary. It was a country much like 
Germany— a defeated nation that experienced Bolshevik revolt and counterrevolution. 
However, it was also a country, unlike Germany and more like Romania, that was 
dependent on others because it lacked its own military, economic, and political power. It 
was a nearly homogeneous country due to traumatic territorial loss. As a result of the 
postwar settlement, Hungary became a weak and small country with dreams of greatness 
and stature. These circumstances forced Hungarians to search for an identity that would 
reflect their national aspirations and assist them in fulfilling them both at home and 
abroad.   
 
 
 
                                                             
40 Keith Hitchins, “Gîndirea: Nationalism is Spiritual Guise” in Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940, 
Kenneth Jowitt, ed. (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 141. 
 
41 Ibid., 144. 
91 
 
Hungarian Nemzetkarakterológia  
Interwar Hungarian nemzetkarakterológia had multiple functions. It was to 
provide explanation for past failures, to assist in understanding the present, and to aid the 
betterment of the future. The discussion of national character produced enough works to 
fill a small library. I selected three works tp discuss that I believe best illustrate the 
sentiments surrounded this matter. 
The first work is Gyula Szekfű’s 1920 Three Generations: History of a Declining 
Age (Három nemzedék—Egy hanyatló kor története). Szekfű was undoubtedly the most 
important figure of the conservative national liberals. He was one of the early Hungarian 
practitioners of the German Geistesgeschichte school (szellemtörténet or szellemi 
történelem in Hungarian).
42
 Inspired by the works of Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Troeltsch, 
Heinrich Rickert, and Eduard Spranger—among others—his historical analysis focused 
on the role of the psychological and historical development of the human soul. His 
colleague and co-author of an important major history of Hungary—and later minister of 
culture—Bálint Hóman defined the school’s connection with Hungarian history as 
follows: “Hungarian history is nothing but the history of the Hungarian soul, i.e. the 
description of those forms in which the Hungarian soul manifested itself for many 
millenniums.”43 Three Generations established the basic guidelines of the conservative 
national liberals’ canon. While it was motivated by the desire to answer the question 
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“How have we gotten here?” it became much more, as historian Paul Hanebrink puts it, 
Three Generations “was a foundational text of Christian nationalist ideology, providing 
the most influential scholarly presentation of the theses that united Christian nationalists 
in Hungary.”44 
 In Three Generations Szekfű argued that the “First Generation” of reformers of 
the first half of the nineteenth century applied an understanding of Hungarian history and 
Hungarianness that was to be emulated. They promoted gradual or evolutionary progress 
based on cumulative reform of Hungary’s cultural, economic, and social life. The central 
figure of this epoch was István Széchenyi. In Szekfű’s reading Széchenyi epitomized all 
that was great in his generation and the idea of “conservative reform system.” Szekfű’s 
analysis went back to Széchenyi’s original critique:  Hungary was a wasteland (parlag) 
and would remain such unless there was a moral and intellectual reconstruction of the 
entire nation. According to Szekfű’s reading, Széchenyi argued that this moral and 
intellectual reconstruction of the national spirit was needed in order to overcome what he 
called “ancestral sins of the nation:”  vanity, conceit, “flash in the pan elation,” common 
slothfulness, envy, factionalism or partisanship, and the yearning for power (hiúság, 
önhittség, “szalmaláng lelkesedés,”közrestség, irígység, pártviszály, and hatalomvágy). 
All of these traits led to self-delusion, mystification, and daydreaming.
45
 If one 
recognizes in this listing some of the seven deadly sins, it is not an accident for both 
Széchenyi and Szekfű were Catholic. Though well-intentioned, Lajos Kossuth and his 
followers obstructed the hitherto positive developments, argued Szekfű. Even more 
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importantly, they strayed from the historical concept of the nation (St. Stephen’s) and 
promoted French and even American liberal ideals ill-fitted to Hungarian reality. In 
Szekfű’s analysis people who belonged to the heroic pantheon of Hungarian history 
(Lajos Kossuth, Bertalan Szemere, and even Sándor Petőfi—the national poet) received 
harsh criticism for their radical/revolutionary liberalism and their embrace of 
nationalism.
46
 Of course, one might note that this was not the first time Szekfű bucked 
prevailing historical norms. In his 1913 A száműzött Rákóczi (The Exiled Rákóczi) he 
already launched a serious attack on established historical memory by offering a de-
mythologizing account of eighteenth-century kuruc leader Ferenc Rákóczi.  
The “Second Generation” of Ferenc Deák and Gyula Andrássy, architects of the 
1867 Ausgleich, received high marks from Szekfű. On the other hand, József Eötvös, 
because of his work on the Nationality Laws—which according to Szekfű further 
dismantled the idea of a political nation—received criticism, as did the liberal policies of 
Kálmán Tisza.
47
 Szekfű also condemned the development of Hungarian capitalism. He 
argued that it was not Hungarian capitalist development because it was organized and run 
by Austrians and, more importantly, by Jews and because it was underpinned by foreign 
ideas of laissez faire and free competition.
48
 According to Szekfű, in viewing Jews as a 
religious community, instead of an ethnic group, and allowing immigration, the Second 
Generation allowed for the Jewish character of Hungarian capitalism and economic life to 
take hold. 
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The “Third Generation” surrendered the country’s intellectual life to foreign 
elements, Szekfű argued.49 It was the Third Generation, under and despite the leadership 
of István Tisza, which allowed the influx of radical bourgeois influence and permitted 
Marxism to gain ground. It was the Third Generation, continued Szekfű, whose efforts at 
centralization made Budapest a center of radical liberalism and capitalism, while 
drowning out the energies and importance of the countryside. Consequently, his 
argument went, Budapest and its “Jewish Hungarian culture” secured a monopoly over 
the cultural life of the entire nation.
50
 Szekfű was also critical of the lesser-nobility’s and 
even the aristocracy’s  “abdication” of involvement in the economic and cultural 
development of the country, not becoming part of the middle-class, and allowing the 
masses of the countryside to remain uneducated, thus permitting the internationalization 
of the working-class.
51
  
Even a cursory examination of the issue of Hungarian nemzetkarakterológia 
cannot be complete without bringing Lajos Prohászka and his 1941 A vándor és bujdosó 
(The Wanderer and the Exile) into the discussion.
52
 While the book was published in 
1941, it is actually a collection of studies published between 1932 and 1935. Prohászka 
shared the cultural pessimism of Oswald Spengler whose 1918 Der Untergang des 
Abendlandes (Decline of the West in its English translation) was widely read in Hungary. 
                                                             
49 Ibid., 356. 
 
50 Ibid., 384. 
 
51 Ibid., 443-57. 
 
52 Lajos Prohászka, A vándor és a bujdosó (Budapest: Lucidus Kiadó, 2005), 34-59. Reprint of the 1941 
edition. The word “bujdosó” is usually translated as “exile.” The translation of this noun is important 
because Prohászka identified it with the Hungarian nation.  As I will show Prohászka’s “bujdosó” doesn’t 
really mean “exile.” Instead it means someone who is hiding or remaining stationary.  
 
95 
 
He was also clearly influenced by the Geistesgeschichte school, for he too believed that 
certain character traits determine the historical development of a given people. Prohászka 
set out to create Europe’s national-identities-map—in the fashion of José Ortega y Gasset 
and Salvador de Madariaga—with Germany and Hungary at its epicenter. In his construct  
France was the stylizer (stilizáló), Greece was the expressive (kifejező), England the 
settler (telepes), Italy the humanistic, while Spain was ascribed Don Quixote-like 
characteristics.
53
 Germany was characterized as the wanderer, for Prohászka argued that 
German national character was best described by an “eternal search,” an “unwillingness 
to settle down,” and a certain belief in limitless boundaries, which in turn resulted in 
emotional and physical mobility.
54
 A nation that shared a historical fate with Germany, 
argued Prohászka, was Hungary. Indeed, continued Prohászka, both nations were 
outsiders in Europe. But Hungary was not the same as Germany; on the contrary, the 
Hungarian national traits made Hungary the antithesis of Germany. Hungary’s curse was 
to be born on the border of East and West. That is the reason for the duality of its 
character. On the one hand, it has a servile-like submission to great Western cultures. On 
the other, it defiantly wants to guard its independent spirit. None of these attitudes, 
continued Prohászka, was beneficial to achieving self-understanding and self-knowledge.  
Coming from the East, Hungarians brought with them the spirit of the steppes: their 
marauding and adventuring attitudes. Then arriving in Europe, it was overcome by the 
“curse” of the steppes: a desire to be hidden from danger, to be closed in, to feel secure.  
The result was a feeling of finitizmus, a peculiar sentiment of naïve complacence. This 
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finitizmus made Hungarians averse to anything that might be problematic and unresolved, 
while fighting for what is certain—even if it is scant. According to Prohászka that is why 
advancement and growth is not an organic and flexible development in Hungary, but 
always the result of outside impetus and often coming through violence and pain.
55
 Many 
“foundational experiences” came with the same duality. That is why a desire for 
independence turns into intellectual seclusion, deterministic belief leads to lack of 
ambition, and bravery leads to inevitable struggle even if futile.
56
 But, all in all, 
concluded Prohászka, there is no Western Hungarian nor is there an Eastern Hungarian. 
Both traits are to be found within the Hungarians. The unrepentant, stationary, and 
comfort-seeking Oriental is as much a part of Hungarianness as the forward-looking, 
European oriented and new-direction-seeking Occidental.
57
 
Perhaps the best-known and most often cited example of interwar Hungarian 
nemzetkarakterológia, however, was the 1939 volume entitled Mi a magyar? (What is a/ 
the Hungarian?). It was edited by Gyula Szekfű and among the contributors one finds 
some of the most outstanding intellectuals of the period, from the great littérateur Mihály 
Babits to the composer Zoltán Kodály. The book can be seen as a direct challenge to 
Prohászka’s dialectical construction in which Hungary was the direct opposite of 
Germany. The anti-German sentiment among the intellectual and the cultural elite 
intensified during the late 1930s. Szekfű’s 1920 Three Generations was based on the 
concept in which Hungary was an established and significant component of a Christian-
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German community, which in time would grow into a Christian-Hungarian community.
58
 
While he remained critical of radical liberalism and capitalist society, his late 1920s and 
1930s work, as seen in Magyar Szemle, indicates his turn to a more European orientation 
and his deep-seated distrust of Nazi Germany and its Hungarian imitators.
59
 In his preface 
Szekfű clearly indicates that the volume was a product of the preceding few years’ 
intellectual debate, which was a reaction to growing German influence, or, as he put it, 
the dark shadows that were taking over this once sunny country.
60
  
Perhaps the most intriguing contribution to the volume was by Sándor Eckhardt.  
As a literary historian educated at the Paris École Normale Supérieure he sought to sketch 
out the nature of Hungarianness as seen from abroad. In Eckhardt’s reading the negative 
reputation of Hungary originated with the tenth-century West European campaigns of the 
Magyar tribes. This image of a barbaric, bloodthirsty, and wild race continued to develop 
throughout medieval times, maintained Eckhardt.
61
 He further argued that this harmful 
characterization was resurrected in the 1823 French fables of Charles Athanase 
Walckenaer, who connected the old French word Hongre (for “Hungarian”) with the 
monster-like creature,  the ogre. Eckhardt, a scholar of French, pointed out that the word 
actually originated from the Latin orcus (god of the underworld). Yet, he continued, this 
did not stop someone like the French historian Charles Seignobos from writing the 
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following passage about the Hungarians in 1937: “They produced the impression of 
ferocious monsters and have left no trace behind them save their name, the French 
Hongrois, having become ogres, supernatural beings who were supposed to eat 
children.”62 During the Ottoman attacks the fighting spirit of the Hungarians was 
emphasized as a positive attribute, continued Eckhardt, because it was a fight for the 
protection of Christendom. The shield of Christianity, the bastion of the West, and similar 
phrases earned Hungary some positive foreign responses. It was only a short-lived 
reprieve. By the end of the seventeenth century Hungary was once again represented in 
negative terms. In this view the central message was the uneducated, uncultured, one 
could say, uncivilized nature of Hungarians with special emphasis on the backwardness 
of its ruling elite. According to Eckhardt, this detrimental understanding of Hungary and 
Hungarianness was promoted by the Viennese Court, which claimed that Hungarian 
culture as such did not exist. If there was anything Hungarian that was remotely related to 
civilization, it was due to Germans, proclaimed the Viennese Court.
63
 Nineteenth-century 
European romanticism rediscovered Hungary as the land of passion. Its symbols were the 
gallant hussar and the passionate Gypsy with his dreamy music.
64
 The period during and 
after the revolution of 1848, which gained Hungarians a great deal of sympathy, was the 
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only time when the image of Hungary was as positive abroad as it was at home, declared 
Eckhardt. From here on a dual character of Hungarianness developed in Europe: on the 
one hand they are generally sympathetic, though somewhat anachronistic, chivalrous, 
gentlemanly folk who find enjoyment in fighting, merry-making, and Gypsy music, all in 
all reminiscent of their wild, Oriental ancestors. On the other hand, these same Oriental 
traits made Hungarians incapable of coping with a modern urban lifestyle, and as a result 
they remained a sort of alien body in Europe, Eckhardt’s study concluded.65 
Eckhardt’s examination illuminates one of the key emotions of interwar 
Hungarian self-understanding, which is a feeling that nobody understands Hungarians: 
their past is misunderstood, their contributions remain unappreciated, and their character 
was distorted. Even so, Eckhardt made it clear that the culpability should not be borne by 
the West alone. As he saw it, the mistaken self-identification with Attila and his Huns, 
the self-glorification of Hungary’s barbarian past, and the never ending self-promotion of 
the puszta romanticism were all harmful to the nation. He was not alone in thinking that 
the self-construction of identity and imagery must be carefully considered because of its 
importance to influence foreign public opinion. One of those who shared this sentiment 
was Kuno Klebelsberg. 
 
Main Themes and Topoi 
The political credo of Klebelsberg was actually a program that called for the 
rejuvenation and reconstruction of the country’s cultural life. It was a loosely defined 
reform program— termed neonacionalizmus—that played an essential role in the 
development of Hungarian cultural diplomacy. He defined it in the following way: 
                                                             
65 Ibid., 120-30. 
100 
 
“solidarity of positive, active, productive and constructive people in order to rebuild the 
destroyed country.” This work, continued Klebelsberg, requires us to “consciously join 
forces while avoiding hyperbolical criticism and a negative attitude.” In addition, the 
Minister of Culture warned against self-celebration, self-aggrandizement of the past, just 
as he rejected squabbling in the name of patriotism. Klebelsberg stood in opposition to 
“naïve optimism,” but he also refused the pessimism of the “apostles of an ominous and 
despairing” future.66 
Klebelsberg’s ultimate goal was to reform the country’s cultural life in a way that 
would allow Hungary to join European cultural life. He called for action that would allow 
Hungary to maintain and expand its cultural superiority vis-à-vis the neighboring 
countries. This idea received a great deal of political support from the Bethlen 
government onward and became one of the leitmotifs of Hungarian identity construction 
and its imagery, and in turn, it was one of the basic guidelines of its cultural diplomatic 
efforts. However, this does not mean that there was an agreement on the meaning of 
Hungarianness. In the end Hungarian cultural diplomacy had to address four competing 
visions of Hungarianness: 1) urbánusok (radical liberals); 2) fajvédők (race defenders); 3) 
népiesek (generally mistranslated as “populist”); and 4) conservative national liberals. 
 The question and meaning of Hungary’s European character was the main source 
of the division. Europeanness in the contemporary Hungarian understanding meant 
advocating a Western orientation and welcoming modernity. The problem of where 
Hungary belongs has occupied the Hungarian imagination from the Enlightenment 
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onward.
67
 Apprehension about belonging is clearly emphasized in the opening lines of 
Mihály Vörösmarty’s 1828 poem, Zrínyi. In the poet’s words Hungary is a “torn away” 
and “kinless” nation that looks to the West, only to return its gloomy gaze to the East.68 
However, because many blamed Trianon on Europe—again, used as a short-hand for the 
West—the issue of European orientation was a thorny subject. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the radical liberals—an ideological 
movement originating among Budapest’s young and bourgeois circles— became the 
unabashed promoters of European orientation and modernity. Members of this group, 
such as Karl Polányi, Karl Mannheim, György Lukács, and Oszkár Jászi, “became 
disillusioned by the emptiness of the patriotic sloganeering that permeated political and 
social life.”69 Their debates were published in their newly founded journal, Huszadik 
Század (Twentieth Century). It was on the pages of this journal that Jászi began to 
formulate the basic principles of a political and cultural movement. In his article, “Az új 
Magyarország felé” (“Toward the New Hungary”), he argued that the image of modern 
Hungary should not be dominated by the medieval figures of a holy prince and a saintly 
nun. He called for the modernization of Hungarian society and culture, for the abolition 
of the semifeudal political and economic system, and for the secularization of society.
70
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One of the devoted readers of Huszadik Század was Endre Ady, who was 
considered by most as the founder of Hungarian literary modernism. His 1906 collection 
Új versek (New Poems) represents a radical break with the prevailing tradition of national 
romanticism. In his poems and essays Ady offered a relentless criticism of Hungarian 
reality. He condemned the backwardness of societal structure and its cultural milieu.  In 
his poem titled “A magyar ugaron” (“On The Magyar Fallow”) he painted a picture of a 
regressive Hungary: 
I walk on meadows run to weed, 
on field of burdock and of mallow. 
I know this rank and ancient ground— 
this is the Magyar fallow.
71
 
 In this “fallow”—to connect the previous poem with another—stands “the lost 
horseman” of the Hungarians. Unlike Beöthy’s proud and warrior-like horseman, Ady’s 
horseman, the Hungarian of his day, is a lost and apprehensive character: 
You hear the hollow hoofbeats of 
a horseman lost since long ago. 
The shackled soul of ghosted woods 
an ancient reedlands wake to woe.
72
 
The heirs to the fin-de-siècle radical liberals were members of a new intellectual left-
leaning group of the late 1920s and 1930s called urbánus by contemporaries.  The new 
group stood against the status quo of the Horthy regime. This intellectual and cultural 
current was best represented by the likes of Pál Ignotus, Ferenc Fejtő, and Béla Zsolt. 
They rejected the discontinuation of liberalization, which was taking place both at the 
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societal and the cultural level. They stood against growing anti-Semitic sentiment and 
promoted Jewish assimilation, which they saw as an essential component of a much-
needed new Hungarian identity. They loudly promoted a Western European orientation, 
progressive modernity, and democratic values. While most shared the above mentioned 
attitudes, the urbánus group was far from unified; as such it did not have a unified 
Hungarian-ideal-type nor did it have an established political platformof which to speak .
73
 
However, the progressive, modernizing, and European outlook of the urbánus circles was 
an influential cultural and intellectual movement, which had a concrete impact on the 
official image construction. 
 The fajvédők, on the other hand, squarely rejected any orientation toward Europe, 
along with its liberalism and its penchant for modernity. While their ideology was rooted 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the movement was born in the turmoil that 
followed the First World War.
74
 The number of parties, societies, and associations that 
could be placed under the umbrella of fajvédők is simply staggering—as is the sheer 
volume of their publications. While there were undoubtedly similarities between the early 
1920s movements of Magyar Országos Véderő Egyesület, Ébredő Magyarok Egyesülete, 
and the Etelközi Szövetség, they cannot be equated with either the mid-1930s 
German/Italian copycat national socialist movements (Magyar Nemzeti Szocialista 
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Munkáspárt, Egyesült Nemzeti Szocialista Párt or the Nemzeti Akarat Pártja) or with the 
later Nyilaskeresztes Párt (Arrow Cross Party) of Ferenc Szálasi.
75
 
 The early membership of fajvédő (race defender) movements was largely based 
on the returning young officer corpse of the K.u.K army. They were also the backbone of 
the counterrevolutionary forces gathered in the southern Hungarian city of Szeged and 
served as the military arm of the early Horthy government. Among these returning 
officers, one can find Gyula Gömbös and Miklós Kozma. Both of them as we will see, 
were to play significant role in Hungarian politics. The basic idea behind the movement 
was that liberal—or rather what they saw as liberal—government had yielded to foreign 
influences, which in turn had led to war and the demise of historic Hungary. By “foreign 
influences” they meant Hungary’s Jewish population—albeit not entirely. For, while they 
did not see Jewish assimilation as a real possibility, and they argued for the limitation of 
the role of Jews in Hungary’s economic and cultural life, they did not seek their physical 
destruction. Therefore, simply characterizing them as an anti-Semitic movement would 
not be telling the whole story. In their view Hungary had to be rejuvenated and a new 
Hungarian ideal-type was needed to face the challenges of the postwar order and to 
secure the continuing existence of the Hungarian nation. They had various prescriptions. 
As a result, the fajvédő movement was simultaneously anti-Semitic and anti-clerical, anti-
capitalist and anti-Bolshevik, anti-bourgeois and anti-nobility, but almost universally 
anti-European.
76
 
                                                             
75 There were many more organizations—both political and social—that could be listed here. I have only 
selected the best-known ones.  
 
76 Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky is one of the movement’s most interesting figures. He moved from the fajvédő 
camp to becoming an anti-Fascist. In the end he was executed by the Arrow-Cross. On his views on 
105 
 
According to their historical understanding, explained by the pseudo-scientific 
approach of the Turanist movement, Hungarians belonged to the Orient, as they shared 
common Ural-Altaic origins with Turkish, Bulgarian, Finnish, Estonian, and Mongolian 
people. Some even included Koreans and Japanese in this grouping and dreamed of a 
pan-Turanian conglomeration that would counterbalance Western hegemony. Others saw 
it as a way to find equilibrium vis-à-vis pan-German and pan-Slav ideologies. To them 
the Hungarian peasantry remained the only guardian of the country’s Oriental past, and as 
such, safeguards of the future.
77
 
Dezső Szabó’s 1919 novel Az elsodort falu (The Village that was Swept Away) 
was the literary manifestation of the fajvédő ideology.78 The novel takes place in 
Transylvania. The choice is not accidental, for many, like Szabó, located the roots of 
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Darányi) and KÜM officials (Zoltán Gerevich, Lajos Villáni, Zoltán Baranyai, and Domokos Szentiványi); 
as such the society was closely connected with government circles. On Turanism in general, see Joseph A. 
Kessler, “Turanism and pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945” (PhD diss., University of California, 
Berkeley, 1967), x-li. 
 
78 Szabó’s status and legacy remains a contested topic. See, for example, Ivan T. Berend, Decades of 
Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 
82. Berend places Dezső Szabó squarely within the népies camp. 
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what remained “true Hungarianness” in Transylvania’s Hungarian villages. The main 
character János Böjthe, the scion of a noble family with a lineage supposedly going back 
to Attila the Hun, turns against the prevailing aristocratic order, rebels against capitalistic 
and modernizing life, and rejects the foreign influences of Jews and Germans. As a final 
act of defiance he marries a peasant girl giving emphasis to Szabó’s main claim that the 
future of Hungary rests with the “purity” of the Hungarian peasantry.  
The népiesek, for the most part, shared the fajvédő movement’s apprehension 
about European orientation and modernity.
79
 However, the ideology borrowed from the 
Left as well as from the Right. Dezső Szabó’s influence, Ady’s legacy and Jászi’s 
program were equally represented within the népies view. In late 1920s when the 
ideology became a significant current in Hungarian cultural and political life, 
membership of the new movement included socially sensitive middle-class intellectuals 
growing up in the radical bourgeois tradition and a new intellectual circle with peasant 
origins. However, virtually everyone agreed on the need for radical changes in the social, 
economic, and cultural life of the peasantry. They too dreamed of a new Hungary. The 
vehicle to reach this new Hungary was to be the peasant tradition and peasant culture, 
which they saw as a besieged, endangered identity. However, the ideology behind the 
népies current was more than simple peasant romanticism. While the radical peasant 
                                                             
79 Just as “race defender” is  not a good translation of the Hungarian “fajvédő,” the English word “populist” 
too fails to be the correct translation for the word “népies.” Nor should the népies movement be equated 
with the German völkisch movement. Perhaps it has more commonality with the pre WW I German 
Jugendbewegung or the Russian narodniki movements. I will continue to use the Hungarian word 
throughout this study. For an interesting essay on the place of népies ideology in modern Hungarian 
intellectual discourse, see Gábor Kovács,” A népi mozgalom helye a politikai eszmetörténetben” in Beszélő 
10, no. 6 (2005), accessed: February 4, 2012, http://beszelo. c3.hu/cikkek/a-nepi-mozgalom-helye-a-
politikai-eszmetortenetben.  
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orientation was a shared feature—together with anticlericalism, anticapitalism, and the 
rejection of the existing political structure—they were divided on many other issues, 
including but not limited to the question of Jewish assimilation. As a result the spectrum 
of népies contribution is between that of the far-Right and the far-Left, and everything 
between. 
 Perhaps the most influential representatives of the népies current, László Németh, 
was also the main architect of its political/ ideological offshoot: the third way (harmadik 
út). It was based on a critical review of Western culture, which, Németh argued, had 
reached the zenith of its existence. According to this interpretation, totalitarian 
dictatorships, in both their Bolshevik and Nazi varieties, were nothing less than a last-
ditch effort at some sort of renewal.
80
 He pointed toward the untapped energies of Central 
and Eastern Europe as the source of renewal not only for the narrower region, but for 
Europe as a whole.  
The best-known member of the népies group, Gyula Illyés, represented the Left-
wing of the movement. His political agenda was simple: he wanted to enhance the quality 
of life for his kinsmen, the people of the deep countryside, and the masses of landless 
peasants. His 1936 Puszták népe (Peoples of the Puszta) was a unique blend of 
sociological examination and literary essay. His puszta is not in the Great Plains of 
Eastern Hungary but rather the south Transdanubian countryside of Western Hungary. He 
sought to destroy the idealized and romanticized picture of the countryside that some of 
his contemporaries continued to paint. Instead he offered a critical look at the living 
                                                             
80 Miklós Lackó, Sziget és a külvilág—válogatott tanulmányok (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi 
Intézete, 1996), 176-77. 
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conditions and problems of the Hungarian countryside, with its own social hierarchy, its 
own—sometimes brutal—laws and justice, and with its own isolated culture. He 
presented this as a “wild” and “dangerous” world where no shared morality safeguarded 
the virtue of young women, where the concept of private property was different, and 
where even the smell of everyday life could have been offensive to outsiders.
81
 The 
landless peasants of the puszta were the unknown and forgotten people of Hungary, as 
Illyés put it: “In general everybody forgot them in every age until it had become a 
custom. Not only [had] the statesmen of all times, but the scholars too passed them over. 
Thus there are even fewer ‘genuine’ details of their past than of their present.”82 His 
peasants were not the mythologized peasants of the fajvédő representing the bravery and 
intractability of Attila and Árpád. His peasants heroes were those who succeeded in 
breaking out of this word: the butcher’s assistant in a provincial town, a railway porter, or 
a tram-driver.
83
 Illyés’s portrayal should not be seen as negative. He was a son of the 
puszta. He also appreciated its inhabitants’ warmth and hard work, as well as their 
connection to the land, but he wanted to offer a realistic picture of their life in order to 
address the real social and economic problems that these people were facing day after 
day. It was an eye-opening read for many and furthered the interest of the countryside 
and its peasant culture.
84
 
                                                             
81 Gyula Illyés, People of the Puszta, trans. G. F. Cushing (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1967), 34-35 and in 
passim. I used the English translation of this great work, which is fortunately widely available, as my way 
of recommending it to an English-speaking readership.  
 
82 Gyula Illyés, People of the Puszta, 72. 
 
83 Ibid., 278. 
 
84 Another interesting—albeit less well-known—népies intellectual was Zoltán Szabó. One of his main 
concepts was the idea of “intellectual defense of the homeland” (szellemi honvédelem). As that the name 
suggests szellemi honvédelem was a call to arms. He rejected the false dichotomy of people (nép) and 
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 The népies camp did not gain political prominence during the interwar years. 
Some of its members turned to the Communist Left while others moved closer to the 
Hungarian Nazis. Its significance lie in its cultural prominence and the role it played in 
the népies-urbánus controversy. This dispute between the two groups over the nature and 
future of Hungarian culture indeed had considerable impact on the official identity and 
image construction. 
Conservative national liberals—the most important and most influential of all the 
intellectual and cultural currents—promoted a European orientation. Their construct was 
based on the Christian National (keresztény-nemzeti) ideology, which was the basic 
foundation of official government policy, and as such, it was the most important element 
of official identity and image construction. In the mid- to late 1920s the overriding 
consensus among the political elite pointed toward a European, that is Western, oriented 
policy. Klebelsberg, for example, readily acknowledged that Hungary’s roots were in 
Asia. He also went as far to agree that some of Asian racial characteristics remained 
intact. However, argued Klebelsberg, for millennia Hungarians had been living in the 
heart of Europe. He did not question the notion that Europe showed its “ungrateful” side 
to Hungary with the Trianon Treaty, which to him was clearly “unjust and brutal,” yet he 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nation (nemzet) and advocated for the idea of a politically independent national culture. He also presented a 
different vision for the reorganization of East-Central Europe. This went against the spirit of Hungarian 
imperial dreams for he promoted the “Europe of small nations.” In his view the greatness of a nation was 
not dependent on its size, but based on its contribution to the betterment of humanity. Therefore, he 
continued, small nations—such as Hungary— should not try to mimic their larger counterparts (a hawk 
should not try to imitate an elephant). As a result Hungary should gear up its culture for the moment where 
the whole of humanity will be disappointed with the emptiness of grand ideas and be an example to others 
by showing the “great depths of a small tarn.” 
See Zoltán Szabó, “Szellemi honvédelem” in Magyar Néző, ed. András Sándor (Budapest: Természet –és 
társadalombarát Fejlődésért Közalapítvány és Kortárs Kiadó, 2002), 17 and Zoltán Szabó, “Magyarság és 
Közép-Európa” in Magyar Néző, ed. András Sándor (Budapest: Természet –és társadalombarát Fejlődésért 
Közalapítvány és Kortárs Kiadó, 2002), 62-64.  
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disagreed with those who propagated a break with the West. Breaking relations with the 
West would be the rejection of a traditional European outlook that was exemplified by St. 
Stephen, King Matthias, and István Széchenyi and would have amounted to the rejection 
of the very essence of Hungarianness, contested Klebelsberg. To refuse modern reforms 
in the center of Europe, concluded the minister, would be “absurd,” and the nation would 
vanish.
85
 This anxiety about the nature of Hungarian-European relationship was perhaps 
best verbalized by Dezső Kosztolányi. His poem, Európa (Europe), reveals the feeling of 
betrayal and disappointment Hungarians felt toward Europe, but also illustrate how anger 
was subdued and turned into a plea:  
Europe, to you,  
by you, praising you, I present my plea  
from this century's blind botching, 
and as others bury you, tolling through the night,  
with a shrill dithyramb, with joy, 
with good morning I greet you. 
O primordial continent, 
you ancient, you roughened, you holy, you majestic  
tutor of souls, filter of scents and tastes, 
worker of wonders, bravely-browed, bookish,  
antique Europe. 
My stepmother even, then I would contend for you  
and spank you with mouthings and prank you with  
kisses  
and yoke you in phrases, so at last you love me. 
From here who could tear me,  
from here who could tear me, could snatch from your  
bosom?  
Have I not always been your pure son, and faithful?  
Have I not always since I was a brat, sitting 
at night in the rays of my lamp, learning your lesson,  
attending, marveling at your hundred-tongued speech,  
                                                             
85 Klebelsberg, Jöjjetek, 49-50.  
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so that each word insinuated itself in my heart?  
Since then my ravings have been understood;  
wherever they fling me I have hundreds of kinsmen,  
wherever they break me I have one thousand brothers.
86
 
The Hungarian political elite’s incontestable commitment to Europe had to do with much 
more than a simple case of belonging. They were convinced that Hungary could not 
afford to turn its back on the very concept that was the main message of its cultural 
diplomatic campaign, which was the Europeanness of the country. The state concept of 
St. Stephen (Szent István-i állameszme)—promoted, among others, by Gyula Szekfű—
offered a historical justification for this claim. 
 The figure of St. Stephen was perfectly fitted to serve both as a religious and 
secular symbol. The first Christian king of Hungary became in interwar image 
construction a symbol of Hungary’s commitment to Western Christianity, and 
consequently, to Europe. This commitment in Hungarian historical memory was more 
than a symbolic gesture. It made the country the “bulwark” or “shield” of Christendom, 
ensuring that the West was able to continue its uninterrupted development.
87
  Under 
government direction the St. Stephen’s Day (August 20) celebration was transformed 
from the saint’s feast day to a national holiday. The holiday was to represent the Christian 
unity of the country and the celebration of the nation’s Christian character, which was 
seen as an eternal lynchpin between Hungary and Europe. This was one of the few 
instances where government policy successfully overcame divisions. Confessional 
                                                             
86 Selection from Dezső Kosztolányi, Európa trans. Alan Dixon, accessed February 12, 2012, 
http://www.babelmatrix.org/works/hu/Kosztol%C3%A1nyi_Dezs%C5%91/Eur%C3%B3pa/en/2037-
Europe. 
 
87 For more on this, see Ignác Romsics, “From Christian Shield to EU Member,” in The Hungarian 
Quarterly 48, no. 186 (2007): 3-27.  
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rhetoric, Catholic or Protestant, had a very limited place. As historian Paul Hanebrink 
puts it, “church leaders had to acknowledge that the state’s interest in national unity took 
precedence. Religious activists could pursue their confessional interests only as long as 
they furthered the government’s policy of consolidation.”88  
 St. Stephen, as a secular figure, was also the symbol of Hungary’s “civilizing 
mission,” which cultural diplomacy offered as one of the key rationalization for the 
revision of the Trianon Treaty. According to this rationalization, as the first king of 
Hungary St. Stephen broke with the tribal traditions and established a new political 
entity: the Hungarian Kingdom built on the lines of Western European feudalism; hence 
it was quintessentially European in its essence and structure. Moreover, his legacy also 
served as a justification for claims that the Hungarians had a special talent for state-
building, unlike other nationalities in the region. This also fit an enduring argument: the 
historical kingdom of St. Stephen and its successors was a political nation not an ethnic 
nation. This argument, which was based on some very dubious evidence, was to counter 
Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav claims to the contrary. Finally, it also served as 
historical evidence for a contemporary manifestation of the Hungarian imperial dream: 
the multinational empire of St. Stephen based on the concept of pax Hungarica. 
According to this interpretation, the basic foundation of the Hungarian Kingdom was and 
should be the maintenance of European and Western civilization on the frontier of Asiatic 
and European culture.
89
 In this political framework Hungarians would continue to play 
the role of first among equals—just as the English distinguished themselves within the 
                                                             
88 Hanebrink, In Defense, 110-14 and 117. 
 
89 László Ottlik, “Pax Hungarica,” Magyar Szemle 22, no. 87 (1934): 289-97. 
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British Crown, argued a contemporary advocate of the idea.
90
 Cultural diplomacy sought 
to represent and promote all these ideas in its campaign that aimed to convince 
international public opinion about the need for the continuing existence of a strong 
Hungary within revised borders. 
 
Conclusion 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy faced a conundrum at its very conception. There 
was in effect a collective agreement within governmental and intellectual circles that 
cultural diplomacy must be pursued, yet there was much disagreement about what image 
to project. While there had been discussion about the Hungarian national character in the 
past, the First World War and the subsequent crisis—which in the case of Hungary, and 
in most East-Central European countries, was more than a cultural crisis, but also an 
economic and political crisis—altered the nature of the debate. Intellectuals and 
politicians alike sought to redefine the nation’s image abroad in order to ensure the 
country’s continuing existence and to build a case for challenging the status quo. The 
almost obsessive questioning of the country’s national character and its relationship to 
Europe divided Hungary’s cultural and intellectual elite.  Conservative national liberals 
dominated the discussion, for they possessed political power. They made it clear that the 
country was to follow a European orientation. However, as the following chapters will 
show, they could not disregard opposing views of Hungarianness. Therefore, cultural 
diplomacy remained a curious, often perplexing, combination of new and old, traditional 
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and modern, whereby the modern and progressive served as a proof of Europeanness 
while the traditional sought to depict uniqueness. Thus the following chapters trace out 
the machinery of cultural diplomacy as it developed and the struggles to find the right 
content for cultural diplomacy’s various forms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
EDUCATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION:  
CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS 
 
“With the power of knowledge that we are to hammer the prison door of Trianon, 
and with words that appeal to the intellect we will call on the nations of the world 
for justice.”  
                                                                                                  (Kuno Klebelsberg, 1929)
1
 
 
In the mid-1930s Lord Tyrrell, chairman of the British Council stated that “we 
[the United Kingdom] must regard our educational and cultural forces with as much care 
as our armed forces.”2 The rationale behind this statement was one of the “chief lessons” 
of the First World War, namely as Sir Stephen Tallents put it in his 1932 pamphlet, The 
Projection of England: “No civilized country can to-day afford to neglect the projection 
of its national personality or to resign its projection to others.”3 The Hungarian elite also 
came to this realization. István Bethlen summed up the situation and explained the 
importance of positive international public opinion from the vantage point of the less 
powerful nations: 
Never were the peoples of the world so anxious to appear in a favorable light 
before the public opinion of other countries.  Two momentous experiences are 
responsible for this. In the war period they were forced to realize how deeply 
other nations’ opinion of themselves—especially those of the Great Powers—
were able to influence their destinies. The period that followed the conclusion of 
                                                             
1 Klebelsberg, Jöjjetek, 92.  
 
2 Quoted in Philip M. Taylor, “Cultural Diplomacy and the British Council: 1934-1939,” British Journal of 
International Studies 4, no. 3 (1978): 260.  
 
3 Tallents quoted in Philip M. Taylor, The Projection, 111.  
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the Peace Treaties taught the nations another painful lesson by showing that they 
could not lead an isolated existence; that for good or ill, their fortunes were bound 
up with those of other countries. . . . These experiences induced many nations 
especially the small ones, to launch, on the one hand, [an] assiduous campaign of 
propaganda in order to present themselves in a favorable light to the Western 
nation; while, on the other, a general movement was started to promote an 
international spiritual intercourse. 
4
 
As this chapter will show, academic institutions, publications, and lectures abroad were 
meant to remind the West of Hungary’s achievements, its place among the “Western” 
nations, and the European character of the country. Discussions and debates about 
Hungary’s Oriental character, or Eastern orientation, were not presented abroad. Indeed, 
proving their Europeanness had become the main goal of all East-Central European 
countries as they competed for the support of the West. As historian Andrea Orzoff 
points out, each state “cited its adherence to Western cultural norms as proof of its moral 
worthiness,” its historical achievements, and its role in defending and creating Western 
civilization.
5
 Their “stories,” as Holly Case calls them, were “stories of always having 
belonged to, protected, defended, preserved, and represented European culture and 
values.”6 Indeed, this was a cut-throat competition that required the total mobilization of 
the various countries’ cultural resources. The Hungarians, just like their counterparts in 
the region, reorganized their cultural and educational institutions in order to meet a dual 
goal of raising the standards of education at home and projecting the image of a cultured 
nation abroad.  
                                                             
4 Stephen Bethlen [István Bethlen], “The Hungarian Quarterly, its Aim and Scope,” The Hungarian 
Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1936): 3. While Bethlen penned this for the inaugural issue of The Hungarian Quarterly 
in 1936, the reasoning behind these words motivated Hungarian cultural diplomacy since the early 1920s.  
 
5 Orzoff, Battle for the Castle, 9.   
 
6 Holly Case, “Being European: East and West,” in European Identity, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. 
Katzenstein (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 115.   
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 The motivation behind these reforms was quite simple. As suggested in earlier 
chapters, much of the Hungarian political and intellectual leadership believed that the 
West’s negative image of Hungary was primarily responsible for the severity of the 
treaty. Perhaps, however, the Hungarian understanding of the power of national 
reputation was best articulated by János Hankiss: “Once there are vultures circling above 
a destiny of a small nation, it is not the same if it is called Holland or Abyssinia, 
Switzerland or Montenegro, Belgium or Panama.”7 He continued by claiming that there 
can be no doubt that the outcome of the treaty would have been different if “Western 
public opinion would have looked at Hungary as a recognized first-class ‘small’ nation, 
not a fairytale land of shepherds, Gypsies, and oligarchs.”8  
 Hankiss was not alone in his opinion. Zoltán Magyary, state secretary of culture 
under Klebelsberg, pointed out in his work on the basic tenets of Hungarian politics of 
science (tudománypolitika) that there were new challenges to face once the union with 
Austria had ceased; Hungary for the first time in a great while represented its own true 
self in front of a foreign audience.
9
 Others, such as Gyula Kornis, were more specific and 
asserted that because of the rather esoteric nature of the Hungarian language Europe was 
not aware of the Hungarian contribution to the historical and scientific development of 
Western civilization. Even worse, continued Kornis, the neighboring countries either 
                                                             
7 Hankiss, A kultúrdiplomácia, 9.  
 
8 Ibid., 10. 
 
9 Zoltán Magyary, “Tudománypolitikánk mai állapota és e mű programja,” in A magyar tudománypolitika 
alapvetése, ed. Zoltán Magyary (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1927), 16. 
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totally ignored Hungarian research or used it for their purposes.
10
 Kornis further argued 
that one of the most endangered elements of Hungarian culture was its history, for “the 
enemies”—here almost certainly he was referring to the successor states of Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, and perhaps to lesser degree Yugoslavia and even Austria—were 
“sparing neither money nor energy” to conduct research, to establish journals and 
magazines, and to open new institutes devoted to history. On the other hand, he 
continued, the Hungarians not only failed to put up a defense, but “don’t even have the 
prerequisite of a defense,” that is, to survey the field and keep an eye on developments 
related to the history of Hungary and the region.
11
 Reading these two lieutenants of the 
reform movement that started during the regime of Klebelsberg, one can see the three 
assignments  of Hungarian cultural diplomacy, at least as far as academic production 
goes. First, as Magyary puts it, there was a need to erect “sentinels” (őrszem) of 
Hungarian culture in foreign cultural centers, possibly creating institutions to house these 
sentinels.
12
 Second, these institutions were to serve as outposts of Hungarian culture. The 
people manning these institutions were to maintain contact with the country’s intellectual 
and academic elite.  Finally, Hungarian cultural and historical achievements, and as well 
as the country’s contribution to the development of Western civilization, were to be 
promoted through foreign language publications and lectures. It is no exaggeration to say 
that the cultural elite of Hungary saw establishing Hungary’s reputation as a sophisticated 
nation to be a primary goal of cultural diplomacy. As Magyary puts it, one “cannot 
                                                             
10 Gyula Kornis, “A szellemi tudományok múltja, jelene, és jövő feladatai,” in A magyar tudománypolitika 
alapvetése, ed. Zoltán Magyary (Budapest, Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1927), 116. 
 
11 Ibid., 117. Here Kornis is being a bit harsh on his collegues, for KÜM and VKM both monitored the 
relevant  literature.  
 
12 Zoltán Magyary, “Célok és feladatok,” in A magyar tudománypolitika alapvetése, ed. Zoltán Magyary 
(Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1927), 471. 
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escape  being measured,” but it is within the Hungarian nation to see to it that it will not 
be found wanting,  for “it is not only the question of national honor, but the precondition 
of a better future.”13 The Hungarian political and intellectual elite answered this call, but 
the majority of the efforts had taken place after 1927, as the country began its recovery. 
Governmental and government-supported associations took control of educational 
institutions and scholarly publishing with the purpose of using these tools to educate and 
convince Western audiences about the just cause of Hungarian revisionism. This chapter 
tells the story how the Hungarian government reorganized the academic industry, 
produced scholarly publications, and organized lectures. It also reveals the complexity of 
constructing the image they tried to project. In addition, the chapter reveals the nature and 
dimensions of the regional competition and the surprising level of attention that academia 
received from East-Central European political leaders.  
 
Institutions 
A history of Hungarian cultural institutions prior to the Trianon Treaty would 
have to focus on three places. The first would be the Pazmaneum in Vienna. This was a 
seminary founded in 1623 by Cardinal Péter Pázmány, a leading figure of the Hungarian 
counter-Reformation. The second place, the Hungarian Historical Institute (Magyar 
Történeti Intézet) in Rome, was also the fruit of individual initiative.  It was founded in 
1895 by Bishop Vilmos Fraknói, a priest and historian whose earliest work was about the 
                                                             
13 Magyary, “Tudománypolitikánk,” 16. 
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life and works of Cardinal Pázmány.
14
 Third on the list would be the short-lived 
Hungarian Scientific Institute of Constantinople (Magyar Tudományos Intézet). 
Klebelsberg, then head of the Hungarian Historical Society (Magyar Történelmi 
Társulat), argued in 1917 for the necessity of a government-organized and funded 
scholarship system that would enable young students to further their education abroad 
and consequently provide for the future intellectual reserves of the country.
15
 This 
institute was the first realization of his dreams. As director of the institution between 
January 1917 and September 1918 he organized a number of lectures and other events to 
foster cooperation among Hungarian, German, Austrian, and Turkish scholars.
16
 
The post-Trianon era saw the growth of government interest in establishing 
Hungarian academic institutions abroad. Within the VKM there was a special section that 
was to oversee cultural relations with foreign countries and to supervise and manage the 
works of the various Hungarian institutes, libraries, and centers. However, KÜM also had 
its own cultural section. Their stated goal was, as Géza Paikert wrote many years later, to 
emphasize that “Hungarian culture is an integral part of European culture, without which 
no European culture would be complete.”17 Nor was the competition idle. For example, in 
1928 then-President Tomáš Masaryk pledged six million Czechoslovakian crowns (c. 
                                                             
14 Gábor Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék: politika, kultúra és történettudomány a “neobarokk 
társadalomban” (Budapest: Ráció Kiadó, 2010), 102. I would like to thank the author for allowing me to 
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15 József Deér, “A külföldi collégiumok” in Magyar Szemle (October, 1931):  112. 
 
16 Gábor Ujváry, Tudományszervezés – Történetkutatás – Forráskritika (Győr, Hungary: Győr-Sopron 
Megye Levéltára, 1996), 68. 
 
17 G. C. Paikert (Géza Paikert), “Hungarian Foreign Policy in Intercultural Relations, 1919-1944,” 
American Slavic and East European Review 11, no. 1 (1952): 43. Géza Charles Paikert was the head of the 
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$2,125,000)
18
 toward the construction of a Slavonic Institute in London’s King’s College, 
which remained the institutional center of pro-Czechoslovak intellectuals throughout the 
interwar years.
19
  
In order to be competitive, VKM, with the active support of KÜM, initiated the 
reorganization of the Hungarian scholarly industry at home and abroad.
20
 However, such 
a reform required a great deal of money, something that was not in abundance in postwar 
Hungary. Klebelsberg and company fought an uphill battle trying to convince the 
parliament and media that supporting scholarly reforms was far from being a “luxury.” 
Klebelsberg actually argued that spending money on building scientific/ academic 
institutions at home and abroad was an absolute necessity, because Hungary could not 
                                                             
18 Approximated relative value indicated in 2010 US $. Henceforth relative value will be shown in 
prentices after historical amount. 
 
19 The Czechoslovak Government had delivered on its pledge by 1938. See I. W. Roberts, History of the 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1915-1990 (London: SSEES University of London, 1991), 
25-39.  
 
20 My chapter will focus on the government’s effort abroad. However, the domestic scene is also very 
interesting. One of the most significant domestic accomplishments of Klebelsberg and his successor Bálint 
Hóman was the creation of the népiskola system. The népiskola was a public elementary school that was 
most prevalent in the countryside. It was especially challenging in places where the population lived in the 
tanya structure, which was essentially a collection of loosely connected homesteads.  After Trianon 
Hungary lost approximately 67 percent of its elementary schools. An average népiskola in 1920 boasted 
130 students and 2.9 teachers. Between 1922 and 1925 only 150 new schools were built. Under the new 
government program of 1926, the public education program gained momentum. The result was the opening 
of 1096 new népiskola between 1926 and 1931. The growth continued—with decreasing speed—
throughout the 1930s. Despite continuing challenges the program proved successful in curtailing illiteracy. 
In 1930/1931 among the Hungarian population six years and older, 7 percent were illiterate (in 1910 it was 
33 percent and 1920 it was 15 percent). The corresponding illiteracy rate in Germany, Austria, and 
Czechoslovakia was about 5 percent.  In comparison—to illustrate the remarkable success of the 
program—in Yugoslavia 45 percent, in Romania 42 percent, in Bulgaria 39 percent, and in Poland 23 
percent of the same segment of the population was illiterate. Secondary education also underwent some 
restructuring. According to the new model there were three different types of secondary schools: 1) 
reáliskola (which had a special emphasis on natural sciences) 2) humán gimnázium (classical education 
with special focus on Latin, Greek, and history), and 3) reálgimnázium (which had a special emphasis on 
humanities, Latin, French, and German). The transformation of the domestic scene also included the 
reorganization of Hungarian university life, the creation of the Biological Institute at Tihany to study the 
flora and fauna of the Lake Balaton, the Astronomical Observatory [Csillagvizsgáló Intézet] at Buda, and 
the National Hungarian University Collection [Országos Magyar Gyűjteményegyetem]. See Romsics, 
Magyarország története, 175-179; and Stephan Michael Herzog, “Negotiating Modernity: Cultural Reform 
in 1920s Hungary” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2003), 141-51.  
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afford to let its culture “shrink” since one of the principal grounds of the Hungarian 
revisionist claim was that Hungarians were able to create a greater and better quality 
culture than their neighbors.
21
 This was a comprehensive reform of the Hungarian 
education system from kindergarten to the scientific research institutions. While 
reforming the Hungarian politics of academia, Klebelsberg looked to the 
Prussian/German Wissenschaftspolitik. Klebelsberg was particularly impressed with the 
works of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft and the achievements of the Notgemeinschaft 
der deutschen Wissenschaft. This is not to say that the Hungarians simply used German 
institutions as their only model.
22
 On the contrary, Klebelsberg wanted to stay clear of the 
dominating influence of any one culture. Instead he wanted to infuse Hungary with the 
best that all cultures had to offer in this respect. This is what he called “culture-political 
chemistry” (kultúrpolitikai vegyészet).23 That is why Zoltán Magyary travelled widely, 
studying similar institutions and universities worldwide— including, against some 
objections from the Foreign Ministry, to the USSR. In the end, between 1925 and 1930 
the VKM received almost 10 percent of the total budget, more than double what it 
received in the years between 1900 and 1913.
24
  
The first two Hungarian institutes were the Collegium Hungaricum in Vienna and 
the Collegium Hungaricum in Berlin, both of which opened their doors in 1924. The 
establishments served dual purposes. On the one hand they were to aid Hungarians 
                                                             
21 Kuno Klebelsberg, Elnöki megnyitó beszéd:  a Magyar Történelmi Társulat 1920. évi május hó 14-én 
tartott közgyűlésén (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1920), 15. 
 
22 For more on this, see Gábor Ujváry, “Baráti háromszög (Carl Heinrich Becker, Klebelsberg Kuno, 
Gragger Róbert és a hungarológia megszületése),”Hungarológia (March, 2000): 99-120. 
 
23 Sándor Domanovszky, “Gróf Klebelsberg Kuno,” Napkelet, Vol. 21 (1936): 79. 
 
24 Romsics, Magyarország története, 175. 
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studying abroad and as such contribute to the development of a new, European-oriented, 
educated, and cultured elite. On the other hand, they were also to function as 
representative institutions of Hungarian culture. As Antal Lábán – the director of the 
Vienna institute – stated: “These institutions shall be evidence of Hungary’s will and 
aptitude to endure.”25 They were places of international academic exchange, places of 
support for foreign students interested in Hungarian topics, and places that housed 
libraries and exhibitions. Each of the institutions was led by esteemed academic 
professionals, who could and did more to earn the appreciation for “the name of 
Hungary” than “simple political tools” could have achieved, Klebelsberg argued.26 
As the government announced its active foreign policy in 1927, educating 
international public opinion became an even more essential part of cultural diplomacy. 
The 1927 Act XIII, “Hungarian Institutions Abroad and the Scholarship Program serving 
high cultural aims,” (A külföldi magyar intézetekről és a magas műveltség célját szolgáló 
öszöndijakról) was passed by the Hungarian Parliament to further boost Klebelsberg’s 
program. It called for the further development of institutions already in existence (Vienna 
and Berlin) and for the establishment of new ones.
27
 Subsequently, the VKM received 
1,200,000 Hungarian pengő (c. $2,840,000) to establish new institutions that could serve 
as the outposts of Hungarian culture.
28
 Shortly thereafter, the Hungarian government 
                                                             
25 Antal Lábán, A bécsi Collegium Hungaricum (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1928), 27. 
 
26 Klebelsberg, Neonacionalizmus, 25. 
 
27 Ezer év törvényei, 1927/XIII, accessed May 11, 2010, 
http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7697. All laws enacted by the Hungarian Parliament(s) in 
its various forms are available online. I thank to Miklós Zeidler for directing me to the website.   
 
28  This amount did not include the 200,000 pengő (c. $473,000)  allocated to the renovation/enlargement of 
Collegium Hungaricum in Vienna, nor the “regularly scheduled” 380,000 pengő (c. $898,700), which was 
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purchased the Palazzo Falconieri in Rome and the third Collegium Hungaricum opened 
its doors. 
Each of these centers of learning had a specialization. Vienna was the place for 
students of history—thanks to the Historical Institute in Vienna—as well as those 
learning German or studying to become doctors and lawyers. Berlin mainly welcomed 
those interested in the natural sciences and engineering. Rome remained a functioning 
seminary for Catholic priests. It was also the place for church and art historians as well as 
practitioners and students of the fine arts.
29
 According to its field of specialization, each 
institution was led by a distinguished academic professional. Antal Lábán in Vienna was 
an accomplished literary historian, who published his Ungarn in seiner Dichtung 
(Hungary in its Poetry) in 1923.
30
 Robert Gragger of Berlin’s Collegium Hungaricum 
was also a literary historian who discovered Hungary’s first written poem Ómagyar 
Mária-siralom (Old Hungarian Lament of Mary), which dated back to the thirteenth 
century. He was the author of a number of books: Molière első nyomai a magyar 
irodalomban (The First Traces of Molière in Hungarian Literature) in 1909; Preussen, 
Weimar und die ungarische Königskrone (Prussia, Weimar and the Royal Hungarian 
Crown) in 1923. In addition he also launched two academic journals (Ungarische 
Jahrbücher and Ungarische Bibliothek) to publicize Hungarian history, art, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
given for the maintenance of already existing institutions and scholarships, was part of the sum. See Ezer év 
törvényei, 1927/XI, accessed May 11, 2010, http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7695. 
 
29 Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék, 135. 
 
30 Ágnes Kenyeres, ed., Magyar életrajzi lexikon, accessed July 22, 2010,  
http://mek.oszk.hu/00300/00355/html/index.html.  
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literature.
31
 Art historianTibor Gerevich led the effort to promote Hungarian culture in 
Rome. He too was an established scholar in his field, whose notable works included 
Tracce di Michelangelo nella scuola di Francesco Francia (Traces of Michelangelo in 
the School of Francesco Francia)  in 1908, A régi magyar művészet európai helyzete 
(The European Place of Ancient Hungarian Art) in 1924 and L'arte antica ungherese 
(Old Hungarian Art) in 1930.
32
 In addition to being experts on their fields, the directors 
of the various academic centers performed the role of modern cultural attachés.
33
  
 Thus the institutions were more than simple dormitories for scholarship holders. 
The Collegium Hungaricum system made an impression on Colonel John A. Baer, US 
military attaché in Vienna. He provided the following summary: 
Under its educational system, Hungary maintains in various foreign capitols [sic], 
organizations called “colleges”, which are really centers for various Hungarian 
activities. According to the information obtainable the purpose of these centers is 
first to give advantage to gifted students by helping them to study in foreign 
universities, and second, to serve as a liaison point through the directors of these 
centers for maintaining contact with the leading intellectuals in the places where 
the centers are located. They are also used for dissemination of information 
concerning Hungary, which is termed in some quarters “propaganda”34 
The colonel’s appraisal was accurate. One of the aims of the Collegium Hungaricum 
system was to promote the historical accomplishments of Hungary, as well as the 
achievements of its arts and sciences. Historian Gábor Ujváry argues that propaganda 
was only the secondary goal of these institutions, for Klebelsberg strongly believed that if 
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33 Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék, 131. 
 
34 National Archives at College Park (NACP), RG 59 (Internal Affairs 864) M1206, roll 6. 
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Hungary was to ascend it needed an educated elite of “European standard.”35 However, 
he also viewed them as the essential representatives of Hungarian culture abroad. In his 
1927 speech during the parliamentary budget debate he argued that it was not the goal of 
the Collegium Hungaricum to conduct some sort of “inferior propaganda.” Nevertheless, 
continues the minister, it is the mission of these institutions to represent the “power of 
Hungarian culture and knowledge” abroad in order to convince Europe of the “injustice 
of Trianon.”36 Klebelsberg continued to bombard the government with requests for 
money until his death in 1932. At the time when his successor Bálint Hóman took over 
the VKM there were three institutions called Collegium Hungaricum (Vienna, Berlin, and 
Rome), a Hungarian-French University Information Institute (Paris), and five lectureships 
at institutions of higher education in Germany, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Poland.  
Despite the untimely death of Klebelsberg, the governmental approach to the 
issue of academic representation remained unchanged. One of the reasons of course was 
that Hóman— trained historian and director of the Hungarian National Library (Országos 
Széchényi Könyvtár) and the Hungarian National Museum (Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum) 
— was a close collaborator of Klebelsberg’s and a trusted specialist in the field of 
cultural diplomacy. Another reason was the realization that the competition was 
unrelenting. A 1933 confidential report states that the “expansion” of Hungarian culture 
abroad is not competitive with the similar undertakings of the “successor states,” 
especially in France. According to the report, Hungary cannot compete with the influence 
                                                             
35 Klebelsberg quoted in Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék, 129. 
 
36 Klebelsberg in Felsőházi napló, 1927. I. kötet, 410.   
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of the Institut d'Études Slaves (Institute of Slavic Studies).
37
 Indeed, the Paris institute 
had been a center for Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and, to a certain degree, Polish cultural 
activity since its establishment of 1919.
38
 Hóman, while not entirely in agreement with all 
that Klebelsberg had done, represented a continuation of a policy that started with the 
inauguration address of the latter, thrived between 1927 and 1932, and continued to grow 
until Hungary entered the war in 1941—and actually even after that. My calculation—
based on the published official budget—indicates the VKM officially received 
approximately 4,900,000 pengő ($11,588,600) between 1927 and 1940. Others, like Iván 
Nagy in his 1936 study, argue that between 1924 and 1935 the Hungarian government 
spent 8,175,000 pengő (c. $19,334,000).39 The discrepancy could be explained by the fact 
that in addition to official government money secured from the yearly budget, there had 
been transactions with private and semiprivate companies for financial support of the 
government programs, such as foreign scholarships. 
40
 Traditional diplomatic work also 
aided these efforts. Under Hóman, Hungary signed cultural and intellectual agreements of 
cooperation with Italy (1935), Poland (1935), Austria (1935), Estonia (1938), Finland 
(1938), Japan (1938 and 1940), Germany (1936 and 1940), and Bulgaria (1941).
41
 These 
treaties were to guarantee a place for the growth of Hungarian cultural representation 
abroad, as they regulated agreements on such matters as textbooks and student 
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38 Institut d'Études Slaves, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.institut-slave.msh-paris.fr. 
 
39 Quoted in Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék, 139.  
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exchanges, as well as institutional representation.
42
 By the time Hungary entered the war, 
the country had developed a remarkable network of foreign cultural and academic 
institutions: no less than sixty-four in fifteen different countries.
43
  
The Hungarian Reference Library in New York City 
The Hungarian Reference Library in New York (hereafter: HRL) was but one of 
these sixty-four institutions. The establishment and day-to-day operation of the HRL 
mirrors the hopes, anxieties, successes, and failures of interwar Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy. The official opening of HRL took place on April 20, 1938 even though it had 
been operating since October 1937. It was the crowning achievement of Hungarian 
cultural diplomacy because since the early 1920s diplomats and intellectuals alike urged 
the creation of an academic and cultural institute to counter the growth of Slavic studies 
in the United States.
44
 
 In 1927 Hungary was in fact very meagerly represented in US academic circles. 
Thanks to John D. Rockefeller’s International Education Board, three Hungarian students 
gained entrance—each with a one year scholarship and $1200 yearly stipend—to US 
universities. Pál Teleki used his personal connections to secure two places for Hungarians 
at the Michigan Agricultural College at East Lansing, Michigan (today known as 
Michigan State University) for the 1924/25 school year. Hungarian language, literature, 
and history were taught at Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania—
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43 Paikert, “Hungarian Foreign policy,” 64; and Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék, 155. 
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albeit entirely funded by the American Reformed Church.  Through the Institute of 
International Education in 1924 Hungary was represented by one single female student at 
Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania. In the 1925/26 school year six female college 
students spent a year at Vassar, Radcliffe (part of Harvard University since 1999), Smith, 
Mount Holyoke, Wellesley, and Teachers College (affiliated with Columbia 
University).
45
 Without a doubt, this is a rather meager list for a country hoping to 
establish its cultural credentials.  
Why and more importantly how, would a country roughly the size (after Trianon) 
of Pennsylvania want to build its cultural and academic standing in the United States?  In 
part, as I mentioned, a competitive spirit motivated Hungarians to establish the HRL. 
First there was the Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Yugoslav cultural and political 
propaganda in the US that presented a problem to the Hungarian political elite. Second, 
there were the activities of those Hungarian intellectuals with left-leaning tendencies, 
who were forced to leave Hungary after Horthy came to power. An internal memorandum 
named Oszkár Jászi as one of those whose actions were deemed “harmful” to the 
Hungarian government’s goal of reconstructing the country’s image abroad.  The 
Hungarian government’s trepidation about harmful propaganda by Hungarians went so 
far that, as early as 1923, Rosika Schwimmer—feminist, and the first female ambassador 
in Hungary under the Károlyi government of 1918—was followed and reported on.46 The 
third reason, according to the same memo, was to nurture the second-generation 
                                                             
45 Zoltán Magyary, “Külföldi magyar tudományos intézetek és egyéb tudományos kapcsolataink,”  A 
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Hungarian-Americans’ links to the Old Country.47 Moreover, the architects of Hungary’s 
cultural diplomatic campaign preferred a grapeshot-like approach, whereby no target was 
too small or too insignificant. If VKM and KÜM worried about the way Hungarian 
literature was taught in Buenos Aires—and indeed,  it was taught there, and the 
Hungarian consulate proudly noted that there was no official representation of the 
successor states’ literature—surely they would want a Hungarian institute in the United 
States.
48
 Finally, Hungarians never forgot the fact that the US Congress failed to ratify 
the Paris treaties—including that of Trianon—and the press, as well as the general public, 
looked toward America with cautious optimism about the possibility of US support for 
Hungary’s revisionist goal.  
The Hungarian ambition to represent the country in academic and cultural circles 
was also part of a general trend in which the United States became a target of 
international cultural diplomacy. The idea of an “information library” came, perhaps not 
that all surprisingly, from Britain. American anxieties about propaganda and its effects 
began as soon as the First World War ended. Many became conscious of the fact that 
during the war British propaganda influenced, some even argued manipulated, US public 
opinion.
49
 The word “propaganda” earned a negative connotation worldwide, or as one 
British Foreign Office official noted, it had a “particularly bad odor,” one that prompted 
his colleagues to eschew the use of the word altogether in favor of the word “publicity.”50 
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One of the ways Britain eased American fears was that the Foreign Office was to be 
“extremely careful to avoid the appearance of propaganda, whether direct or indirect,” 
states Philip M. Taylor.
51
 The British ship Telconia—some claim  it was another  ship—
cut the transatlantic cables between Germany and the United States as soon the war 
started, thus Great Britain in effect had control over the flow of news and information 
coming from war-torn Europe to America.
52
 The British Bureau of Information in New 
York, created in April 1917, was one of the main weapons of British wartime 
propaganda. Additional branches opened in San Francisco, Chicago, and Washington, 
D.C. In order to provide less obtrusive propaganda in 1920 the British Bureau of 
Information was “rechristened” to a more neutral-sounding British Library of 
Information.
53
 By the mid-1930s the library with its sixteen employees had become the 
“semi-official arm” of British diplomacy, according to a Hungarian internal report written 
by József Szentkirályi (later known as Joseph St. Clair), the Deputy Director of HRL.
54
 
The British example was soon followed by similar official and semi-official cultural 
centers and “information libraries” established by France (1925), Germany (1925 and 
1939), Italy (1938). Plans were made by Japan as well (1934).
55
 Among other 
“information centers”—as a 1937 US study compiled by the American National 
Committee on International Intellectual Cooperation designated them—were the Japanese 
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Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, the China Institute, and the American Russian Institute for 
Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc.
56
 The latter, despite its supposed “non-
political character” was in “close contact” with the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations 
with Foreign Nations. The American-Russian Institute maintained a reference library and 
information center, published a monthly paper “Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union, 
which contain[ed] a summary of news events having to do with foreign, domestic, and 
cultural happenings in the USSR, and list[ed]  current books and pamphlets which ha[d] 
to do with the Soviet Union.” In addition, the institute, since its creation in 1926, 
sponsored and gave “lectures, meetings, dinners and exhibitions.”57 Indeed, “educating 
public opinion” in the United States was by no means a uniquely Hungarian undertaking.  
However, the urgency of the Hungarian government to establish its cultural 
presence in the United States was most importantly the result of the changing attitudes 
that originated in the mid-1930s and came to full circle with the Anschluss, the Munich 
Crisis, the Vienna Accord(s), and the outbreak of the Second World War. Contrary to the 
one-sided movement of Hungary’s traditional diplomacy toward Germany, its cultural 
diplomacy remained more universal in scope and continued, and one could argue, even 
increased its efforts to reach out to Western Powers. This time, however, the goals were 
slightly changed. On the one hand, cultural propaganda was to convince the Western 
Powers that the Vienna Awards were just. In order to do so, Hungary aimed to counter 
Romanian and Czechoslovak propaganda in, among other places, the United States. Pál 
Teleki created a special section within the Office of the Prime Minister to conduct foreign 
                                                             
56 Edith E. Ware ed., The Study of International Relations in the United States: Survey for 1937 (New 
York: published for American National Committee on International Intellectual Cooperation by Columbia 
University Press, 1938), 268, 270, and 422. 
 
57 Ibid., 423. 
133 
 
propaganda work in 1939. Its section leader, Domokos Szentiványi, was sent to the 
United States in 1938 to study the situation of Hungarian representation there. Upon his 
return, he argued that “especially in the light of recent developments,” he “found it 
unnecessary to stress the significance” of continuing Hungarian efforts in America.58 
Another important reason behind continuous Hungarian efforts was articulated in an 
internal memo, which, while specifically talking about ongoing attempts to sway French 
public opinion, embodied the thinking of the inner circles around Teleki. Cultural 
diplomacy served as the country’s exit strategy. The memorandum argued that “while the 
defeat of Germany in the war is highly unlikely” the continuation of the Hungarian 
Studies Center in France is vital in order to cultivate the ground for the peace-
negotiations, which will come after the war.”59 Through cultural diplomacy, the 
Hungarian political leadership, with Prime Minister Teleki at the helm, aimed to both 
maintain old relationships and forge new ones. Hungary, despite pulling increasingly 
toward Germany, was not about to burn its bridges to the other Great Powers. 
The HRL started out as a library based on the collection of Károly (Charles) 
Feleky. In 1924 he told the Hungarian reporter Árpád Pásztor: “It was my dream that the 
Hungarian government build a Hungarian House in New York, place my library in it, and 
name me librarian.”60 Charles Feleky was born in Budapest and arrived in the New 
World in 1885. At first he worked as a nightclub pianist, but this was only his first step in 
the American music scene. Not too long afterward he was conducting theater orchestras 
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and touring extensively. During one of his trips he acquired the original pieces of his 
English–language Hungarica collection, which by 1924 grew to 5,500 books and over 
100,000 articles and magazine clippings (by 1930 the collection increased by another 
2,000-3,000 volumes).
61
 His apartment in New York was a “Mecca for students of 
Hungarian and central European affairs” as Stephen Duggan, Director of the Institute of 
International Education described, it years later.
62
 Feleky did not live to see his dream 
fulfilled. He died on October 4, 1930, and left behind an incredible collection, which was 
a result of a lifetime of work and some $32,000.
63
 But the story of his collection had 
really just begun, for his collection was well-known in Hungarian intellectual circles.
64
  
According to Géza Paikert, the Hungarian government’s ambition was to create 
the HRL as a “house of Hungarian culture,” which was to be the nucleus of a “giant” 
scholarly center. This center was to develop into a publishing house and a hub to serve 
the “Hungarian cause”—often-used euphemisms signaling revisionist goals—in every 
“cranny and nook” of the United States.65 In February 1936, Pál Teleki, János Pelényi 
(Hungarian envoy to the US), György Ghika (Chief consular officer, later envoy to the 
US), Ferenc (Francis) Deák (law professor at Columbia), and the earlier mentioned 
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Stephen Duggan (who in addition to being the Director of the Institute of International 
Education, was also the president of the Hungarian-American Society) met to discuss the 
basic structure of the future HRL. Teleki’s note makes it clear that they considered 
various institutional arrangements. One was to establish the Hungarian library with a 
close association to Columbia, similar to the setup of the Deutsches Haus and the Italian 
Library. However, they decided against the idea because they feared the library would 
fall under university control. They also discussed the possibility that the future library 
should be closely associated with the Hungarian-American Society or perhaps with the 
Hungarian embassy itself. They decided that, while the library should be connected with 
both it should have its own building. They even toyed with the idea that the library 
should be housed together with the Hungarian Travel Bureau, but once again they 
decided against the plan, in order to avoid the possible “taste of propaganda.” At the 
same meeting they also discussed the library budget, which they determined to be $6000 
(c. $90,000) per year. The last item on their agenda was the position of director. Here 
they all agreed that this post should not be filled by a professor. Their reasoning was that 
a professor would not commit to the position for the duration desired and, once again, it 
might seem like a propaganda effort.
66
 By this time, informal negotiations between 
Antoinette Feleky (the widow of Károly Feleky) and the Hungarian government, 
represented by László Telkes and János Pelényi, were well underway. 
The VKM section of “Foreign Cultural Relations” officially authorized Pelényi to 
start talks with Feleky’s widow about purchasing the collection. The letter from VKM 
states that the ministry was willing to spend between $14,000 (c. $210,000) and $16,000 
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(c. $240,000) on the collection.
67
 The same message also requested an opinion about the 
possibility of Telkes becoming a candidate for the position of director.
68
 At the same time 
a very telling telegram arrived to the VKM from Chief Consul Ghika in which he stated 
that in “agreement with the envoy it is their opinion that for very deliberate reasons it 
would be surely desirable that the designated buyer of the Feleky collection should not be 
the government.”69 What “for very deliberate reasons” (jólmegfontolt okokból) actually 
means one can only speculate. However, knowing the Hungarian government’s fear of 
being seen as conducting propaganda, it might be reasonable to assume that Ghika 
referred to the aforementioned possibility. The reply telegram from KÜM designating the 
Hungarian National Museum as the buyer seems to make this conjecture even more 
plausible.
70
 The Feleky Collection was acquired in April 1937. After some tense 
negotiations the Hungarian government paid, from the VKM’s budget, $10,000 (c. 
$150,000) up front and committed itself to paying an additional $6,000 (c. $90,000) over 
a ten-year period.
71
 The government also rented a seven-room office on the third floor of 
the Berkeley Building (19 West 44th Street), within walking distance from the New York 
Public Library and other landmarks. The rent was $1,200 (c. $18,000) a year.
72
 The HRL 
was ready to join the cultural and intellectual circles of New York.  Telkes, by then the 
director of the library, drafted a plan for the first year. The library was to: 
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1) Provide up-to-date information about all questions related to Hungary and the 
Danube basin. 
2) Maintain old connections and develop new contacts with American publishing 
companies including, but not limited to printed media. 
3) Keep a watchful eye on all English-language publications related to the region. 
4) Provide aid to Hungarian and American scholars working on the region and 
attempt to establish student and teacher exchange programs. 
5) Organize and support Hungarian exhibits and other cultural events. 
6) Broadcast Hungarian related programming via radio. 
7) Organize book clubs and film-screenings.73 
The main goal was, as Telkes put it, to “avoid even the appearance of political, religious, 
or other similar propaganda . . . with the hope that with strictly scholarly, objective, and 
earnest work,” the introduction of Hungarian culture to the American public would be 
possible.
74
 
It was in accordance with these guidelines that the HRL in New York, led by the 
talented Telkes, became one of the cornerstones of Hungarian cultural diplomacy. Unlike 
the Collegium Hungaricum institutions, whose dual task was to aid the development of 
the future elite of the country and to represent Hungarian culture, the information 
library’s main goal was to propagate Hungarian culture. In the person of Telkes the 
library had an energetic and capable director. Telkes was born in 1902 in Budapest. He 
earned his PhD at Budapest University in law and political science. After practicing law 
in Budapest for some years, in 1930 he moved to the United States, earned a degree at 
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Harvard Law School and worked as a researcher on international law. Later he lectured 
on comparative private law, while at the same time organizing the Hungarian collection 
of the Harvard law library.
75
 
 One of Telkes’s first assignments was to legitimize the HRL as a cultural 
institution. The idea of creating an advisory board peopled with influential US citizens 
whose moral (and at  times financial) support and intellectual gravitas would lend weight 
to HRL was put forward by Telkes as early as July 1937
76
and then once again by Géza 
Paikert in January 1938.
77
 Four months later, by the time the institution opened its doors, 
the advisory board (or Advisory Council as it was called) was in place. The question of 
membership was a significant issue. During correspondence between Telkes and Paikert 
the two discussed the unequivocal influence of scholars on the formulation of public 
opinion and, at times, on the (foreign) policy makers.
78
 In light of their conversation, the 
following list of intellectuals on HRL’s Advisory Council is rather telling. Among its 
members were Edwin M. Borchard (professor of Law at Yale University), Nicholas 
Murray Butler (President of Columbia University), Isaiah Bowman (American 
geographer and one of the chief advisors to President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace 
Conference, one of the directors of the Council of Foreign Relations, and president of 
Johns Hopkins University), Joseph P. Chamberlain (professor of Law at Columbia), the 
aforementioned Stephen Duggan, Robert M. Haig (professor of Economics at Columbia), 
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Manley O. Hudson (professor and Chair of International Law at Harvard University), 
Eldon R. James (Director of Harvard Law Library), Philip C. Jessup (professor of 
International Law at Columbia), Roswell Magill (professor of Law at Columbia), Ernest 
M. Patterson (professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and the president 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science), Lindsay Rogers (professor of 
public Law at Columbia), and  James T. Shotwell (professor of History of International 
Relations at Columbia, former member of “The Inquiry,” and director of the Division of 
Economics and History at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). Indeed, this 
remarkable list of intellectuals clearly illustrates that the relationship between academics, 
public opinion, and policy was not lost on the Hungarians.  
 Telkes hit the ground running. Between August 1, 1937, and December 15, 1937, 
he mailed out 1,691 letters and 3,375 cards advertising the forthcoming opening of the 
library. According to his report, HRL had 1,452 visitors between October and mid-
December of the same year.
79
 He planned to send out 10,000 pieces of correspondence to 
spread news about HRL. Among the first visitors was one Jupiter Doycheff, the 
Bulgarian chief consul at New York, who not only donated relevant books to the library, 
but also stated that he would advise Sofia to establish a similar institution in the 
foreseeable future. Both the consulate and Budapest were satisfied with Telkes and his 
efforts. János Pelényi went as far as to write to VKM that the only criticism he could 
have is that “la mariée est trop belle” (“the bride is too beautiful”) referring to the 
unanticipated momentum and the early success of HRL.
80
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 The official opening of the HRL took place on April 20, 1938. Actually, there 
were two openings. One, the formal one, was for the cultural and political elite, the other 
for the general public. The formal opening included welcoming speeches by Pelényi, 
John H. Finley (editor of the New York Times), Stephen Duggan, and Harry M. 
Lydenberg (director of the New York Public Library) accompanied by the music of Ernő 
Dohnányi. The general opening included a small concert whereby Hungarian and 
Hungarian-Americans performed music by Béla Bartók, Franz (Ferenc) Liszt, 
Tchaikovsky, as well as songs from operettas from Imre Kálmán and traditional 
Hungarian folksongs.  The official brochure answered questions about the utility of HRL. 
It stated that “Hungary has been one of the centers of the diplomatic, economic, scientific 
and artistic activities of Central Europe for centuries. There has hardly been a problem, 
[sic] arising in the Danubian basin which might not likewise be considered as a typical 
Hungarian issue. Hence, the books of the Hungarian Reference Library pertain not only 
to Hungary, but to the Danubian Basin and Central Europe as well.”81 It further stated 
that for those students interested in Hungary, the HRL represented “a virgin field of 
dissertation research.” For “contributors to periodicals, authors and editorial writers” the 
library not only offered “excellent facilities,” but also a place of “authoritative 
information” free of charge.82 Under “special activities,” the pamphlet pointed out that 
there were to be “weekly lectures on timely topics” and that “by means of special exhibits 
and concerts, the art and music of Hungary” was to be represented.83 The New York 
Times quoted Pelényi saying that HRL was to be “an important bond between the cultural 
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lives of Hungary and the United States” because, he continued, it is “not a propaganda 
organization.”84 In actuality, HRL was a propaganda organization, but this propaganda 
was different from that of the propaganda of the Great War. In the Hungarian Reference 
Library propaganda was cleverly disguised as a purely cultural institution, in accordance 
with the practice and understanding of contemporary cultural diplomacy. 
 HRL received even further attention as Budapest grew ever more anxious about 
the rise of Czechoslovak and Romanian propaganda in the United States. After the 
Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia’s cultural and political propaganda intensified in the 
United States, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Hungarian government circles. An 
internal memo entitled “Counter-balancing Czech propaganda in America,” called for 
greater representation of Hungary through all available outlets.
85
 Another confidential 
report from the consulate emphasized the role and influence of Edvard Beneš, who took 
up a position as a visiting professor at the University of Chicago.
86
 The Romanian 
government also reorganized its propaganda. On October 3, 1939, Romania established 
its own Ministry of Propaganda.
87
 At the same time the Foreign Ministry of Bucharest 
instructed the Romanian embassy staff in Washington D.C. to carry out a campaign to 
counter Hungarian propaganda in the United States.
88
 Prime Minister Ion Antonescu even 
proclaimed that “propaganda to be ‘a new army’ upon which ‘the future of the state 
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depended.’”89 Hungarian fears were further fueled by rumors that the Romanian 
government had budgeted one million dollars for the 1939-1940 New York World’s Fair. 
The entrance of the Romanian pavilion was decorated with a sign stating that “Roumania 
has over 20,000,000 people completely united in language, tradition and culture.” It was 
reported that Consul Popovici promised that the pavilion was only the beginning of 
Romania’s new focus on propaganda in the US, for his government was planning to 
establish a propaganda bureau in order to “present Romania to the Americans as they 
wanted and not the way the Hungarians like to see it.”90 
 Telkes and the HRL, with the sound support of Budapest, worked vigorously to 
gain the support of the US public.  He utilized all available outlets and personal 
connections to conduct cultural propaganda. Between November 1937 and March 1939, 
HRL organized forty-seven lectures, exhibits, and concerts.
91
 Telkes gave talks at HRL, 
Yale, and Harvard on various topics ranging from “1000 years of Hungarian Culture,” to 
“Hungarian Heroes of the American Revolution and of the Civil War,” to “Hungary and 
her Music.” Invited American specialists and professors also gave public lectures. A few 
representative titles included “A College Professor Sees Hungary” by Professor Clarence 
A. Manning of Columbia and “Hungary’s Place in Music History” by Marshall 
Bartholomew of Yale. Other talks were designed to boost Hungary as a tourist 
destination, such as “How to get around on little money in Hungary.”92 
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 In January 1939 Telkes reported that that the number of inquiries— letters, phone 
or in person—were increasing significantly (up to one thousand per month) since the 
Munich Agreement put the region in the center of political commentaries. 
93
 Utilizing the 
upsurge of interest in things related to East and Central Europe, Telkes was able to secure 
a contract with the WQXR radio station in New York to broadcast a special half hour of 
Hungarian musical programming every Friday from 8:30 PM to 9:00 PM. It included 
various musical scores from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.
94
 Using his 
personal connection to Olin Downes, music critic of the New York Times, who was 
responsible for the musical programming at the World’s Fair, Telkes successfully placed 
Hungarian music in the program of the New York World’s Fair. The HRL also organized 
film-screenings and Telkes made a lucrative deal with the Hamburg-American Line to 
produce and show a short film about Hungary, as a tourist destination, during the ships’ 
transatlantic voyages.
95
 The same company also aided Telkes’s effort to promote the 
International Summer University of Debrecen and its satellite campus in Keszthely (a 
picturesque little town at Lake Balaton). As a result of his efforts there were 40,000 
brochures promoting lectures on Hungarian culture, history, and language for potential 
study-abroad students.
96
 To be sure, students remained one of the main focuses of 
Hungarian efforts; many times it was put forward that cultural propaganda should be a 
long-term commitment. Along with the HRL outreach campaign that targeted campuses 
nationwide, VKM successfully negotiated a position for József Szentkirályi (deputy 
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director of HRL) to teach introductory Hungarian language and literature courses at 
Columbia. Some of the more unusual actions Telkes and the HRL took were convincing a 
company specializing in greeting cards to print 200,000 Christmas cards with a wintry 
scene depicting the Hungarian parliament and the Danube with the caption “Christmas on 
the Beautiful Blue Danube of Budapest”—free of charge.97  
 Telkes and company seized every opportunity to put Hungary in the public eye.  
When Hungary was celebrating its “National Protestant Day” the Hungarian Royal Postal 
Service issued a series of five stamps to commemorate the country’s Protestant past. It 
was an opportunity—according to Telkes—to educate the American public about the 
Protestant past of Hungary. Swiftly he and his staff composed an English-language 
information guide to the stamps, made copies of them, and sent them to newspapers and 
magazines.
98
 It was a rather successful campaign. According to Telkes, over thirty 
newspapers and magazines took note of the stamps and the event. One of the newspapers 
that picked up the story was the New York Times, which published an article telling the 
stories of Hungarian students (Péter Meliusz Juhász and Mátyás Dévai Bíró) who had 
studied in Wittenberg and were among  the first religious reformers in Hungary, Gáspár 
Károli who first translated the Bible into Hungarian, in 1590, Albert Szenczi Molnár who 
translated the Psalms into Hungarian, Gábor Bethlen who was a famous Hungarian 
Prince of Transylvania and benefactor of Protestants, and Zsuzsanna Lórántffy, the first 
lady of Hungarian Protestantism.
99
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 The success of HRL as a cultural outpost in the US is remarkable, especially in 
the light of unremitting financial problems. Between 1937 and 1939 the Hungarian 
government budgeted $605 (c. $9075) per month to operate HRL.
100
 In comparison, the 
Italian Information Library reportedly worked with a budget of $1,500 (c. $22,500) per 
month budget.
101
 Despite some rumbling discontent from certain intellectuals in Hungary, 
the government was very much satisfied with the work of HRL. Nothing illustrates their 
appreciation more than the government plan of 1941 that included the hiring of staff, 
enlargement of the library, the purchasing of additional books, and a new budget that 
called for nearly $2,000 (c. $300,000) per month.
102
 Hungarian cultural diplomacy was 
not to be outshined in the United States. The future of HRL indeed looked bright. 
Until 1941 Hungarian cultural diplomacy enjoyed the full support of the 
government. However, Hungarian cultural diplomacy lost one of its earliest, most ardent 
and influential supporters, when Prime Minister Pál Teleki committed suicide. HRL 
continued to operate even under ever-more-difficult circumstances, publishing a number 
of books and pamphlets. Szentkirályi edited a number of works: Colonel Michael de 
Kovats: American Revolutionary War Hero (New York, 1940); and Béla Bartók: His Life 
and Music (New York: 1940); and Hungary: Past and Present (New York: 1941). 
Another undertaking was to compile an “American-Hungarian Register,” collecting 
biographical data on about one thousand people.
103
 But once Hungary declared war on 
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the United State, the US State Department ordered all Hungarian official government 
agencies and organizations to be closed. Afterward, Hungarian interests were represented 
by the government of Sweden. The HRL was notified of its official closure on January 
28, 1942. Subsequently the library’s collection was seized by the Alien Property 
Custodian. The Feleky Collection was transferred to Columbia, while the rest of the 
holdings were relocated to a Manhattan warehouse. The collection would be reunited in 
1953 when the Library of Congress acquired it.
104
 Telkes, who had become a US citizen, 
remained in the country. He actually sued the Hungarian National Museum for severance 
and other payments. Subsequently he worked for the US State Department, the World 
Bank, and the United Nations. Deputy Director Szentkirályi also remained in the United 
States and as Joseph St. Clair worked at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey.
105
 
HRL’s once so promising enterprise came to a rather sad end. 
 
Academic Publishing 
“The power that makes the trigger-finger hesitate, or obey, is more powerful than 
armed force. It controls it. The power is the Power of the Word: the Word of 
Persuasion—the Word of Command. Words are weapons. We must not despise words 
and the use of words. Words win wars.” Thus wrote First World War veteran turned 
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pacifist, John Hargrave.
106
 Indeed, the influence of words on public opinion cannot be 
underestimated—especially that of the written word, and especially the written word of 
the erudite and respectable. If words are bullets, then the firearms are books, journals, and 
newspapers. Behind all these “firearms” are the shock-troops of propaganda, scholars and 
journalists. In order to provide a full picture of the significance of scholarly publications, 
this section will build on and expand upon some of the materials already introduced in 
chapter 1. First, I will reintroduce R. W. Seton-Watson and his wartime journal The New 
Europe.
 107
 Second, I will discuss the ways that this weekly review influenced the 
development of interwar cultural diplomacy in Hungary and the successor states. And 
finally, I will focus on the development of Hungarian scholarly publications in the service 
of cultural diplomacy and the challenges that these efforts confronted.   
It was on October 19, 1916, that the first issue of The New Europe, a weekly 
review founded and financed by R. W. Seton-Watson, was published. He and his 
collaborator Wickham Steed were joined by an illustrious list of domestic and foreign 
scholars and politicians: Emile Boutrox (Académie Française), Ronald M. Burrows 
(King’s College, London), Jovan Cvijić (Belgrade University), Octavian Goga 
(Romanian Academy), Take Ionescu (Romanian minister without portfolio), Nicolae 
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Iorga (Bucharest University), and Tomáš G. Masaryk (formerly professor at Prague 
University). According to its mission statement the weekly was  
devoted to the study of foreign politics and the problems raised by this war [WW 
I]. Its foremost aim is to further and consolidate that entente cordiale of allied 
publicists, which must accompany the wider political entente, if the Allies are to 
think and act in harmony, and to help forwards the formation of a sane and well-
informed body of public opinion upon all subjects affecting the future of Europe. . 
. . After our armies have won the war, our statesmen will have to win the peace, 
and their task will, indeed, be difficult, unless public opinion is alert, organized 
and eager to support them . . . our methods will be frankly critical and vigilant. . . 
.An integral victory such as alone can secure to Europe permanent peace . . . [and] 
the emancipation of the subject races of central and south-eastern Europe from 
German and Magyar control, such must be our answer to the Pangerman [sic] 
project of “Central Europe” and “Berlin-Bagdad.”108 
Seton-Watson and his colleagues made it clear that their aim was to shape public opinion. 
They wasted little time in creating the image of a belligerent Hungary. Seton-Watson and 
his colleague not only wrote about the war-guilt question but also paid special attention to 
demolishing any lingering British sympathy toward Hungary. On account of the 1848 
Revolution, the memory of Lajos Kossuth and the idea of liberal Hungary still had some 
traction—though not nearly as much as Hungarian leaders believed it had. By placing 
Hungary squarely alongside Germany, illustrating Hungary’s responsibility for the war 
was one of the best ways to destroy any lingering positive sentiment toward Hungary.  
And the contributors were by no means timid about addressing their readership directly:      
I think you, British reader, will be astonished. You, whose ideas about the 
Hungarian people were so high! You, in whose mind passes the heroic personality 
of the fighter for freedom, Lajòs [sic] Kossuth, whose memory is so popular in 
England! But, quantum mutatus ab illo! [How he changes from what he once 
was!] How little the Hungarians of the last decades resemble Kossuth. I think he 
would be ashamed of them if he had lived in present times. Hungary of to-day is 
not the classical country of freedom which exists in your imagination! Prussia and 
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Hungary are the only two countries in Europe whose ideal is domination by force 
and by oppression of other people. Not in vain is Count Tisza [Prime Minister of 
Hungary during WW I] the best friend of Kaiser William and their sinister acts 
are closely connected in the responsibility of this war.
109
 
Dissemination—5,000 copies a week—of The New Europe continued until October 28, 
1920. The end of the war did not stop Seton-Watson and his collaborators from 
continuing their work to try to convince the British public about the wretched character of 
the Hungarians. On the contrary, The New Europe warned against Hungarian propaganda, 
which, it claimed, was launched “with the intention of saving something of the 
illegitimate patrimony of the now defeated Magyar oligarchy for their successor, the 
would-be democratic government of Hungary.”110 It further argued that while it might be 
true that public opinion was once quite so “gullible” that it could have been misled by “an 
astute propagandist,” the editors of the journal hoped and believed that this was no longer 
true, “and even the most sentimental British humanitarian has learned enough during the 
war to enable him to descry a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”111 As peace talks began, R. W. 
Seton-Watson tightened the screws even more, and while he continued to warn against 
Hungarian propaganda efforts, he addressed the question of territorial settlement directly. 
From the “Magyar oligarchs who are pulling the wires in every Western capital,” wrote 
Seton-Watson,  
it is impossible to expect an honest acceptance of the status quo . . . the Magyar 
aristocracy will never voluntarily renounce its dream of hegemony and will 
always seek allies for the reversal of present conditions. It has been weighed in 
the balance and found wanting, and the peace of Europe demands that it 
[Hungary] should be reduced to complete and permanent impotence. Hungary has 
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no future save as a mainly peasant community, content to live in peace with its 
neighbours and renounce its evil dream of racial hegemony.
112
 
 By the time the last issue appeared Hungary had signed the Treaty of Trianon. Romania 
and the newly-established Czechoslovakia, together with Yugoslavia, emerged as victors 
of the Great War. One might have thought that it was time for scholars to return to their 
ivory towers. However, exactly the opposite took place. 
In 1922 R.W. Seton-Watson, in his expressively entitled lecture (The Historian as 
a Political Force in Central Europe) declared that “finally the Great War brought home 
to the general consciousness the need for mutual interpretation between nation and 
nation, and at the same time the crying need for a basis of sound historical knowledge in 
the statesmen who settle the world’s affairs.”113 He viewed history, especially that of 
Central Europe, as a discipline with a dual task. One the one hand, it was about “the 
scientific and critical treatment of historical subjects.” On the other hand, it also belonged 
“to the field of practical politics.”114 Yet for the generation of East and East-Central 
European scholars and politicians his message carried no revelations. As historian Andrea 
Orzoff points out, “wartime triumph left” the likes of Masaryk and Beneš “certain that 
their cosmopolitan enlightened interpretation of Czech history and nationalism had 
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always been right.
115
 Not surprisingly, Czechoslovak leaders’ “concerns with 
propaganda, information, and the press were central to their postwar vision.”116 
Masaryk and others deliberately cultivated relationships with Western elites. The 
Czechoslovak leadership understood that the newly established country was vulnerable to 
its neighbors and their revisionist goals. More specifically, the Czechoslovak elite hoped 
to convince the Western powers to view their country as the keystone of European peace, 
in direct contrast to the Hungarians’ attitude that it “serves to feed the germs of distrust 
and uncertainty throughout Central Europe . . . [for] in this way is [no] universal peace in 
Central Europe to be secured.”117 Beneš and those around him recognized the 
incomparable value of Western public support. The importance attached to the positive 
portrayal of the country abroad can be illustrated by examining the institutionalization of 
these efforts. 
The Third Section of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry was responsible for both 
domestic and foreign propaganda. The primary task of the Third Section was to gather 
information and to target Western public opinion. What messages were to be distributed?  
The centerpiece of Czechoslovak cultural diplomacy was the “Czechoslovak modern 
national myth.” According to this myth, Czechoslovakia was rescued from the repression 
of Habsburg German-speakers, and after 1918 the new state of Czechoslovakia emerged 
and “made itself an island of democratic values, rationalism, and fair-mindedness” in the 
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much-troubled region of East Central Europe.
118
 Through the state-owned publishing 
house Orbis, the Third Section published academic journals and weeklies, such as the 
French-language L’Europe centrale, the German-language Prager Presse, and the 
English language Central European Observer.
119
 In addition, the Third Section was 
responsible for inviting and entertaining influential foreigners, overseeing radio and film 
production, and becoming involved in newspaper publishing as well as directly 
supporting—morally and financially—foreign journalists, correspondents, and 
academics. To be sure, the Third Section was “paying for positive opinion.” For example, 
the Third Section had twenty-six French newspapers, press agencies, and radio agencies 
on its payroll. It is estimated that in 1933 alone Czechoslovakia spent eighteen million 
French francs on international propaganda.
120
 
The Romanian political and intellectual elite also appreciated the power of 
scholarly propaganda. They showed their appreciation to those who worked tirelessly to 
create a positive atmosphere around Romania. For example, R. W. Seton Watson was 
rewarded and honored by the Romanian Parliament.
121
 After the First World War 
Romania’s newly acquired frontiers became the target of three different revisionist 
campaigns.
122
 It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that if the leitmotif of Hungary’s 
diplomatic effort was to revise the Versailles system then Romania’s was to maintain it. 
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On this issue all the warring factions of Romanian political life—with the exception of 
the Communists—would agree.123  
Under the direction of Nicolae Titulescu (until 1936) the country’s foreign policy, 
described by one British Foreign officer as “very much a one man show,” sought  to 
promote the idea that Romania’s territorial integrity was the key to future peace and 
stability not only in the region, but in Europe as a whole.
124
 In order to sway public 
opinion, Titulescu employed every weapon in his arsenal. It was a wide-ranging arsenal, 
which he successfully deployed during the Paris Peace Conference and continued to use. 
He maintained personal relationships with Western political and public figures, as well as 
journalists (both at home and abroad) and scholars whom he “subsidized” from a “secret 
fund of the Foreign Ministry.” R. W. Seton-Watson was among those who received 
regular payments from the Romanian government.
125
 
Soon after its first edition, in May 1934, the Revue de Transylvanie became one of 
the most important Romanian conduits to the West. This French-language journal was 
published by ASTRA (the Transylvanian Association for Romanian Literature and the 
Culture of the Romanian People). Historian Paul E. Michelson argues that the journal 
was an example of an activity he calls “militant scholarly patriotism.”126 The creator and 
director of the journal was Silviu Dragomir, professor of history at the University of Cluj 
and, rather tellingly, a one-time deputy of the Romanian Parliament who was later a 
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member of the Goga-Cuza government. He was one of the leading contributors to 
Romanian efforts to counter Hungarian revisionist propaganda, and as such, he was the 
ideal candidate to direct the journal. The journal operated until 1944 and “poured forth 
some 3600 pages explaining, defending, and promoting a Romanian perspective on issues 
related to Transylvania.”127 Perhaps not at all surprisingly one of the first of Dragomir’s 
polemics was designed to discredit István Bethlen and his writings and lectures on the 
behalf of the cause of Hungarian revisionism.
128
 Even as traditional diplomacy turned 
toward Germany—mainly to counter Hungary—the journal continued to publish 
scholarly articles and propaganda pieces in a scholarly camouflage. The “Transylvanian 
Question,” as Holly Case illustrates in her excellent study, remained the source of 
tension, as intellectuals—both Romanians and Hungarians—continued to publish 
materials (historical, ethnographical, and anthropological studies with maps and 
statistics) attempting to legitimize their claim to the region.
129
  
This was the nature of the competition in which Hungary found itself. Unlike their 
Czech and Romanian counterparts, Hungarian diplomats and scholars had little or no 
experience with cultural propaganda. In the beginning, while the Hungarian political elite 
was busy setting up the basic organs of the government, private groups took on the 
challenge of cultural propaganda. The situation was made more difficult by the country’s 
diplomatic isolation from the rest of the continent.  In order to appease the Western 
powers and secure much-needed loans, the Hungarian government officially shelved the 
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question of territorial revision. For example, by order of KÜM territories lost to Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria could not be referred to as “occupied 
territories” (megszállott területek). The reasoning behind the decree was that any and all 
expressions and terms that might suggest that Hungary did not recognize the Trianon 
Treaty would be harmful to the country’s international relations.130 Nevertheless, the 
Hungarian government did pay for propaganda. Strictly in an unofficial capacity, KÜM 
and VKM financially supported various nongovernmental and private agencies/societies. 
According to an unwritten agreement on the division of labor, the government conducted 
no official propaganda, while various societies—emphasizing their non-affiliation with 
official government organs—carried out the majority of cultural and political propaganda 
work.
131
 Bethlen and his government were indeed very worried about avoiding the charge 
of propaganda. It was a position that was not always easy to defend. An exchange in the 
Hungarian Parliament between deputy József Pakots and István Bethlen illustrates very 
well that not everyone agreed with the official policy of the government. Pakots 
challenged Bethlen about the lack of KÜM involvement in Hungary’s revisionist 
propaganda. Bethlen retorted that the various organs of KÜM were not designed to 
conduct propaganda. Furthermore, continued the prime minister, if the organs of KÜM 
were to involve themselves with propaganda they would only end up “discrediting and 
compromising” the Hungarian diplomatic corps in the eyes of various foreign 
governments.
132
 In this way the government washed its hands of all aggressive revisionist 
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propaganda, which, though supported, was not organized by the administration. On 
occasion the government still found itself deeply embarrassed by the conduct of various 
irredentist groups and revisionist organizations.  
One of the most prolific nongovernmental organizations was the Tevél. It was 
established in November of 1918, and except under the Béla Kun regime, continued its 
work until May 1921, when the government suspended the society. During this period, 
Tevél published no less than 440,000 items of propaganda in French and English. Then 
Foreign Minister Miklós Bánffy argued that Tevél not only incited Hungarians–especially 
the youth—in the successor states, but also created a dangerous international climate. The 
government made an unsuccessful attempt to coordinate the activities of the various 
groups under the umbrella group of the Társadalmi Egyesületek Szervezetének Központja 
(TESZK—Central Organization of Social Groups) under the direction of Pál Teleki.133  
Two of the best organized, government-supported organizations were the Magyar 
Külügyi Társaság (MKT—Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs, founded 1920) and the 
Magyar Revíziós Liga (MRL—Hungarian Revisionist League, founded 1927). Both of 
these associations aimed to put propaganda on a scientific basis. Unlike their right-wing 
and counter-revolutionary predecessors these organizations clearly enjoyed the moral and 
unofficial financial support of the government. The MKT at home aimed to educate 
Hungarians about the art of foreign policy making. Abroad it tried to impress upon 
foreign audiences the worthiness and legitimacy of Hungary as a European country. The 
MKT mission statement reads as follows: “the members of the Hungarian nation must be 
prepared for a campaign of conquest [hódító hadjárat], and it will be the difficult 
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undertaking of Hungarian society to put the necessary arms in the hands of the warriors 
of this campaign, whose duty will be the winning of minds and hearts of the various 
nations, because the order of today [and tomorrow] will be based on the minds and hearts 
of nations.
134
 In order to accomplish the ultimate goal of the society, that is to “secure the 
place of the Hungarian nation [among the company of free nations] that is its due thanks 
to its thousand-year old traditions, to its role in safeguarding Western civilization, and 
establishing and protecting Western culture in the Carpathian Basin”135, the MKT was to 
work closely with, but nominally independently of the KÜM, in representing the interests 
of Hungarian foreign policy at home and abroad. The Magyar Revíziós Liga (MRL) took 
on the actual propaganda work both at home and abroad. While closely connected with 
the government, MRL was an umbrella organization consisting of thirty-five societies 
and associations.
136
 The two organizations, but especially MRL, published numerous 
essays and studies and sponsored and organized lecture tours, but Bethlen and company 
still felt the need for more and better scholarly propaganda.  
The challenge of publishing quality scholarly publications was the governing 
motive behind the establishment of the Magyar Szemle Társaság (MSZT—The Society 
of the Hungarian Review). The society, with close official and semi-official ties to the 
government, was established in 1927. Nothing is more telling of the significance that was 
attached to the success of this society than the fact that Prime Minister István Bethlen 
was its president. The society’s journal, Magyar Szemle, was edited by the most 
prominent Hungarian historian of the era, Gyula Szekfű. The society and a journal has 
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been accused of being little more than the mouthpiece of the government. This accusation 
was not without foundation. Among the board members were some of the most well-
known figures of Hungary’s political and intellectual elite. This conservative group 
included Bálint Hóman (historian and later minister at the VKM), Gyula Kornis 
(historian and state secretary at VKM), Gusztáv Gratz (historian and deputy at the 
Hungarian Parliament), Ferenc Herczeg (novelist and president of MRL), and Benedek 
Jancsó (historian, literary scholar and an expert on Romanian irredentism). These were 
just few of the people who contributed to the success of this monthly journal which, 
according to some estimates, had over three and a half million subscribers.
137
  Hungary’s 
only foreign-language scholarly journal was the Ungarische Jahrbücher, and the society 
was clearly aware that Hungary needed to target the intellectual elite of France and the 
English-speaking countries as well. They were especially taken by the perceived success 
of Czechoslovak cultural diplomacy and they pointed to the publications by Orbis with a 
mixture of admiration and jealousy.
138
 Others, such as Elemér Radisics, pointed out that it 
was unreasonable and absolutely unnecessary to continue publishing propaganda in the 
Hungarian language, for there was no need to convince Hungarians about the injustices of 
the status quo.
139
 Furthermore, Radisics argued, not only was it not enough to translate 
(mostly badly) Hungarian publications, but one had to provide facts in an objective, yet 
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enjoyable fashion. Moreover, he urged his countrymen to follow the advice of Sir 
Campbell Stuart and pay the utmost attention to the psyche of propaganda’s target group 
as well as to the psyche of the opponents.
140
 By the beginning of the 1930s Hungarian 
foreign publications began to appear in all the major Western capitals.  
Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie (1932) and the Hungarian Quarterly (1936) were the 
crowning achievements of the Hungarian government’s efforts to present the Hungarian 
past and present to a foreign audience in a positive light. As early as 1923, Zoltán 
Baranyai, Hungarian representative at the League of Nations, called for an end to the 
publication of “pamphlet-like and occasional” French language propaganda and called for 
scholarly, yet accessible, publications.
141
 The Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie (NRH) was 
established in 1932, with the active support of Bethlen, as a successor to the prewar 
Revue the Hongrie. The NRH’s yearly budget was 66,000 pengő (c. $155,660). Half of 
the money came from the KÜM. The remainder was provided by other government 
organs, private individuals and groups. After 1933 even the French Foreign Ministry 
contributed to the costs of the publication of the journal.
142
 Despite various governmental 
changes the publication continued and enjoyed the continuous financial and moral 
support of the various Hungarian governments until 1944. In order to legitimize the 
journal as a scholarly and objective publication rather than a propaganda tool the editors 
György Ottlik and József Balogh recruited foreign authors to contribute. Among those 
                                                             
140 Ibid. Radisics most likely was referring to Sir Campbell Stuart’s Secrets of Crewe House: The Story of a 
Famous Campaign.  
 
141 MOL, K67, 4. csomó, 1. tétel (March 10, 1924).  
 
142 Henri de Montety, “A Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie: a magyar külpolitikai gondolkodás tükre,” in A 
magyar külpolitikai gondolkodás a 20. században, ed. Pál Pritz (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 
2006), 179-180. 
160 
 
who supplied pieces were Nicholas M. Butler, Édouard Herriot, and Salvador de 
Madariaga.
143
  
On June 10, 1935, some of the most influential political, intellectual and industrial 
leaders of the country gathered to address the burning need to launch an English-
language journal and publish a new History of Hungary. The Hungarian Quarterly (HQ) 
was to address this need. Bethlen, who presided over the initial meeting, justified the 
initiative with the following argument: 
The written informative work, which we have conducted among the Anglo-Saxon 
nations in the past one-and-the-half decades, was extremely deficient, and more 
then more than once, it was simply harmful. Instead of stylistically and 
grammatically accurate [nyelvi formában biztos], sober, and objective informative 
works, there have been hybrid and short-lived printed organs written in poor 
English. To replace these publications with a journal that is edited with integrity, 
written with excellent English, presented in an appealing way, and skillfully 
disseminated, is a national interest of the first order [elsőrendű].144 
Among those who were present on the meeting were (in alphabetical order): József 
Balogh, István Bethlen, Pál Biró (industrialist), Ferenc Chorin (industrialist), Prince 
György Festetich, Gusztáv Gratz, Count Béla Hadik, Béla Imrédy (president-director of 
the Hungarian National Bank, later Minister of Finance and Prime Minister), Baron 
Móric Kornfeld (industrialist and politician), Gyula Kornis, Zoltán Magyary, Bishop 
László Ravasz (prominent leader of the Reformed Church and member of  Parliament), 
Zsombor Szász (diplomat and publicist),Gyula Szekfű, Pál Teleki, Lajos Walkó (Minister 
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of Commerce and later Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Count István Zichy (historian 
and head of the Hungarian History Museum).
145
 If some of the names seem familiar, this 
is certainly no accident. Indeed, official—or rather semi-official—Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy was the work of a small group of influential people, the leading members of 
Hungarian political, intellectual and economic life. The close cooperation of these people 
made the HQ possible in the first place.
146
 The HQ was to have a 42,000 (c. $99,050) 
pengő annual budget. Bethlen solicited 40 percent of the funds by asking “national 
business circles”— the Hungarian National Bank, the Association of Savings and Loan 
Banks (Takarékpénztárak és Bankok Egyesülete), and the National Union of 
Manufacturers (Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége) — for monetary contributions. The 
remaining sixty percent was to come out of the KÜM budget.
147
  
Once the necessary funds were available, the Society of the Hungarian 
Quarterly—as the group of people behind the publication was known—launched its 
campaign to legitimize the journal as a genuine scholarly periodical. Utilizing money and 
personal connections, advisory boards were set up both in England and the United States.  
Major Edward Owen Rutter, historian and novelist, was named as HQ representative in 
London, at a remuneration of £200 per annum. In the US Francis Deák became the 
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interim representative of the journal.
148
 Through various media HQ also recruited some 
influential Americans to serve as members of the US advisory board, including George 
Creel and John F. Montgomery (US ambassador in Budapest), most of whom would 
serve on the HRL advisory board a few years later as well. In addition, to counter any 
possible accusations of propaganda and government involvement, HQ recruited 
Columbia University Press as the American agent for the periodical. Through Bethlen’s 
personal invitation, Nicholas Murray Butler wrote the opening article in the first issue. 
From the beginning Balogh, as the chief editor of HQ, travelled to England to enlist 
influential Englishmen. He invited prospective contributors to Budapest, organized social 
functions in their honor, took them to the country estates of the Hungarian aristocracy, 
and arranged audiences for them with the leading political figures of the country. His 
efforts paid off, for he secured articles written by some of the highest members of English 
society, including Lord Allen of Hurtwood, Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the Viscountess 
Snowden, Sir john Marriott, Admiral Mark Kerr, Sir Charles Petrie, Lord Stamp, H. W. 
V. Temperley and Lord Gorell, to name just a few.
149
 
Bethlen and company also made sure that there was an internal monitoring system 
that oversaw all foreign publications. In the case of the HQ, Bethlen made it clear that he 
did not want to see any competition for the journal. The Danubian News, which was a 
MRL publication, presented a particular problem since its “style” did not fit the ideals of 
official circles. Bethlen called for the discontinuation of the publication, or as he put it “if 
for some unforeseen reason that were not possible” the journal must change its profile 
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entirely.
150
 The KÜM and its special section were especially keen to monitor any and all 
publications worldwide that were relevant to the region.
151
 The same group also oversaw 
Hungarian publications abroad making sure that their message was aligned with the 
wishes of the government. For example, HQ editor Balogh’s letter to KÜM illustrates 
that the various topics were to be approved by the government organ. Among the 
questions were 1) Can the idea of territorial revision based on historical justification be 
discussed? 2) To what degree is criticism of Germany and German policies allowed? 3) 
Should the question of Ruthenia, Ukraine, and Polish-Hungarian borders be debated? 4) 
Should the issue of nationalities in Hungary (especially that of Germans) be discussed? 5)  
How advisable was it to discuss the subject of cooperation between the small states of 
East and South-East Europe?
152
 Indeed, after 1927, once Hungary openly admitted its 
“peaceful revisionism” campaign, the government did its utmost to design, control, and 
disseminate a positive image of the country. In the next section, I will discuss the chief 
themes of the HQ and Hungarian scholarly publications in general.
 153
  
International recognition of the historical deeds of Hungary was seen as vital to 
legitimating Hungarian revisionist claims. All the publications and lectures were 
designed to convince educated foreign elites of Hungary’s credentials as a European 
country, moreover one whose contributions were crucial to the development of Western 
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civilization.  In this appraisal of Hungarian history there was no room for Árpád, nor was 
there any discussion about mythical bloodline between Magyars and Attila the Hun. The 
basic idea was to represent Hungary as the architect and guardian of European culture in 
the Carpathian Basin. Count Albert Apponyi—one of the Hungarian delegates at 
Trianon—summed up this idea in the following way: 
The Hungarian nation had and has a lofty world-historic mission, determined by 
the achievement and tendencies of thousand years, the fulfillment of which it has 
been obstructed and weakened by the catastrophe of Trianon. The mission was, 
and still is the defence and the peaceful extension of the higher standards of 
Western life, by political and military, as well as by cultural efforts, according to 
the requirements of the age. The Trianon mutilation has detached from the West 
territories it had already conquered, and throw them back into semi-Oriental 
conditions, imperiling thereby existing Western cultures in these territories, and 
slackening the progress of those who do not yet possess such a culture, because 
they no longer feel the stimulus of its rival power. The mutilation of Hungary, the 
weakening of the Hungarian nation, is a loss to the great intellectual and moral 
interest of mankind, a loss without compensation.
154
 
 The foundation of its position as a country with cultural superiority, the argument ran, 
was a result of Hungary’s thousand-year-long historical and cultural development. “Does 
it [Hungary] posses such qualities, can it point to such achievements, that it may be 
expected to offer some characteristic contribution to the moral and spiritual riches of 
humanity? Would humanity be poorer, were there no Hungarian nation? To these 
questions we may boldly and confidently reply in the affirmative,” wrote Apponyi in 
1928.
155
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 The idea of Hungary’s mission “civilizing mission” remained a central theme of 
arguments made on the pages of journals and in the lecture halls. It was a way to provide 
a universal meaning to Hungarian nationalist claims. In 1942, Sándor Márai, the 
Hungarian novelist and public intellectual, explained the “civilizing mission” of Hungary 
and its place within Europe: 
We believe that the sole historical means of subsistence for Magyars is for them 
to consciously accept and demand this leading cultural and economic role . . . the 
Magyar nation in Southeast Europe is the balancing force whose useful and 
beneficent effects no new power constellation can do without. . . . No one can 
deny that the Magyars have a calling, the supreme sense of which is that they 
should allow the free expression of talents and abilities of all nationalities that live 
here within the framework of the Hungarian state. . . . And just as it is an 
undeniable fact that Hungary was, for centuries, the eastern bastion of Western 
culture, so too is it undeniable that this Western Christian culture continues to 
radiate most shiningly in Southeast Europe, to the present day, within the 
boundaries of historical Hungary. 
156
 
Central to this argument was the supposedly unique Hungarian ability to form an 
enduring political nation in the Carpathian Basin. Gyula Kornis addressed this issue on 
the pages of HQ. He argued that the Hungary’s “mission” and raison d’être was to “bring 
about an advanced state of culture in the Danubian region.” He explained that “no matter 
what our conception of culture and its components—religion, law, ethics, science, art—
they can thrive only in proportion to the political and stateforming [sic] power of the 
nation in question.” To him Hungarian legitimacy was rooted in the fact—a fact that is 
questioned by others, as we will see—that “until the tenth century no race had been able 
to obtain a permanent footing” in the region. This was an achievement accomplished only 
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by the Hungarians, continues Kornis, who in turn “reorganized” the territory, “reclaimed” 
the “barren lands,” and made it part of “civilized Europe.”157 
Hungary’s ties to Western Christianity were another dominant argument to prove 
the country’s European character. Ferenc Eckhart in his 1932 A Short History of the 
Hungarian People emphasized the decision of St. Stephen to accept Roman (Catholic) 
Christianity instead of the Eastern Church. The argument states that because of St. 
Stephen’s religious policy the conversion —admittedly “achieved largely by force and 
not by persuasion”—saved Hungary from the fate of becoming “Slavic.”158 The KÜM 
ensured that all Hungary’s diplomats could act as historians abroad. Among the topics 
was Hungary as the true “scutum fidei” (Shield of Trinity or Shield of Faith). According 
to this view, Hungary’s role as the Eastern bastion of Western Christianity against the 
Mongols and Turks exemplified the Europeanness of the country.
159
 A memorandum 
entitled “Guidelines for contact with Americans” (“Irányelvek az amerikaikkal való 
érinkezésre”) deemed the subject of “Hungary’s historical role as the protector of 
Western culture and Christianity” an “effective” topic. The instruction cautioned would-
be diplomats to make audiences aware that “the reason Western European culture could 
develop in peace” was the “five centuries long” sacrifice of the Hungarian nation.160 
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Diplomats and scholars alike searched for historical subjects to prove Hungary’s 
supposed democratic and liberal character in order to counter charges made against it. Pál 
Teleki went back to 1222 to illustrate this point. In his lecture tour he asked the following 
question:  
All of you are familiar with the Magna Charta of King John as the keystone of 
constitutional freedom in England. You may be less familiar with the fact that 
among the continental nations Hungary was first to obtain a similar solemn pledge 
for the respect of civic liberties. I speak of the Golden Bull [Aranybulla] of King 
Andrew, given in 1222.  Here begins a very marked analogy in the development 
of Hungarian constitutional life. . . . If we speak of democracy in those remote 
times, [and] we surely find there the origins of the most inspiring ideals of our 
own time. 
161
 
If the Golden Bull was not enough, there were the examples of the struggles of Ferenc 
Rákóczi and Lajos Kossuth –“two of the great champions of Hungarian liberty”—against 
the Habsburgs to illustrate the Hungarians’ devotion to liberty and European ideals.162 
Similarly great emphasis was placed on historical connections between Hungary and the 
West.  Studies, such as that of Alexander (Sándor) Fest, aimed to illustrate, for example, 
that despite the geographic distance there were 900-year-old “political and spiritual links 
between England and Hungary.”163 Others, like Georg (György) Lukács addressed 
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France, while others, such as Eugene (Jenő) Pivány, wrote about Hungarian-American 
links.
164
 
Despite the fact that government circles took charge of publications not 
everybody was happy with the outcome. Some questioned the target of the cultural 
propaganda and argued that the “continuity of Hungarian culture” and the preservation of 
the “Hungarian national idea” were the most important challenges. Hence they insisted 
that cultural policy should first and foremost aid and support those three million 
Hungarians who after the treaty became minorities in the successor states.
165
 Historian 
and favorite pupil of Gyula Szekfű, Domokos Kosáry, questioned the approach and use 
of historical tropes. In a letter from London to his former advisor he challenged the logic 
of relying on what he sarcastically called the “wondrous resemblance” of the English 
Magna Charta and the Hungarian Aranybulla. “It is something that here and today they 
[the English public] would not believe even if it came from the Archbishop of 
Canterbury,” wrote Kosáry. He similarly dismissed some unsubstantiated notions about 
America gaining its name from the Hungarian warrior-king St. Imre (Emeric).
166
 Kosáry 
argued instead that similar to the approach of Marc Bloch—Kosáry had attended Bloch’s 
lectures in Paris—he would prefer the idea of a “histoire comparée de l’Europe Centrale.” 
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He argued that that every nation could write its own history, but only a comparative 
history of the region would truly illuminate the historical role of Hungary.
167
 
Hungary was not the only East-Central European nation that deemed history a 
useful weapon in its cultural diplomatic arsenal. While Hungarians maintained that they 
built a state on previously “barren” land, the Romanian historians countered it with a 
theory of their own. Vasile Pârvan in his Dacia: An Outline of the Early Civilisation of 
the Carpatho-Danubian Countries, building on the earlier works of Petru Maior, stressed 
that there was continuity both of race and of culture in the Danubian region from as early 
as circa 1500 B.C., when the people who were later known as Getae or Dacians settled 
there. The Dacians in turn became romanized and they are, the argument runs, the ethnic 
ancestors of the Romanian nation.
168
 Another thesis about continuity was put forward by 
Nicolae Iorga, Pârvan’s mentor. Iorga—one-time Prime Minister and Minister of the 
Interior, historian and Rector of the University of Bucharest—viewed southeastern 
Europe in general, and Romania specifically, as “the spiritual and institutional 
continuation of Byzantium.”169 He argued that the Byzantine ideals, church, and 
civilization were preserved and protected by various Wallachian and Moldavian princes, 
such as Constantin Brâncoveanu and Nicholas Mavrocordat. To Iorga, the synthesis of 
Byzantine high culture and traditional Romanian culture and the supposed continuity of 
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its ancient past made Bucharest “the true intellectual capital of South Eastern Europe.”  It 
was an idea which he advocated throughout various publications and during his American 
lecture tour.
170
 Iorga’s lectures were indeed excellent tools of Romanian cultural 
diplomacy. A Hungarian diplomat, after attending on of Iorga’s lectures in Geneva, 
reported back to KÜM that the lectures were simply “gripping.”171 Iorga’s towering 
intellect certainly helped to present Romania, in the words of R. W. Seton-Watson, as the 
“Latin sentinel upon the Danube.”172 
Czechoslovak cultural diplomacy also paid a great deal of attention to historical 
studies. In this historical construction the quintessential Czechoslovak characteristic was 
humanism (humanita), which was embodied by President-Liberator Masaryk. Humanism 
became the lynchpin that connected present Czechoslovakia with its Bohemian historical 
past, a quality that needed to be publicized worldwide.
173
 Masaryk spoke of this in his 
Conversations with Karel Čapek:    
As far as our national programme is concerned, remember what I told you with 
regard to the development of Europe, and to our own history, that is that we must 
take a hand in world politics, and consequently be in lively and friendly contact 
with other nations. Our national revival is a child of Enlightenment and of late 
Romanticism, it sprang from humanitarian ideals of the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries which were broadcast in France, in Germany, everywhere, 
Humanity – that is indeed our national programme.174  
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A contemporary Hungarian observer argued that despite some domestic disagreement on 
the recent development of Czechoslovak historiography, there was a unified message that 
historical studies transmitted toward the West. After reviewing Kamil Krofta’s works, he 
concluded that, in this view, Czechoslovakia was portrayed as the “chosen nation” of 
humanity, of freedom of thought and religion, while its history was presented the 
accumulation of struggle and of martyrdom in the service of human rights and 
democracy.
175
  
Of course, Hungarians were not the only ones keeping an eye on the literature of 
the competition. Romanians and Czechoslovaks kept tabs on Hungarian publications. 
Interestingly enough, they all thought that the others had the upper-hand. All the 
countries sought to recruit foreign scholars in order to disprove one another’s claims. The 
two towering figures in the field of East-Central European history, R. W. Seton-Watson 
and C. A. (Carlile Aylmer) Macartney, wrote reviews and opinion pieces—not to 
mention entire monographs—in support of Romanian/ Czechoslovak, or Hungarian 
historical interpretations, respectively.
176
 Seton-Watson in his influential Treaty Revisions 
and the Hungarian Frontiers continued to discredit Hungarian claims, historical and 
otherwise, for the just cause of revisionism.  His work was written in reaction to István 
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Bethlen’s 1933 British lecture tour, which indeed raised public interest in the Hungarian 
Question.  The insert quoatation from Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, in the second 
page of the publication set the tone for his argument: “Heaven grant us its peace, but not 
the King of Hungary’s.”177 The well-selected quote was followed by a sophisticated 
argument in which Seton-Watson rejected claims for the Allies’ culpability for the 
destruction of Austria-Hungary and refuted the “myth of incompetent experts.”178 He 
emphasized the role of Magyarization, in the past and the present, not leaving out the 
question of Hungarian Jewry, including the 1920 Hungarian Numerus Clausus.
179
 In sum, 
Seton-Watson concluded that Hungarian revisionist aims were dangerous to even 
consider at this time.  
Criticism of Hungarian academic propaganda was not limited to the continent. 
When Francis Deák wrote his analysis of Hungary’s role at the Paris peace conference—
actually, in his interpretation, the lack of Hungary’s role—American historian Bernadotte 
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E. Schmitt harshly criticized it. According to Schmitt, who once was courted by the 
Hungarians, Deák’s account was much to be welcomed and his “yeoman work in 
collecting the materials” was much appreciated. However, after pointing out certain 
issues with the piece, as she saw it, he concluded that “Mr. Deak, in short, despite his 
parade of scholarship, remains very much a Hungarian propagandist.”180  
Criticism aside, Hungarian scholarly publications and lectures continued to 
“educate” foreigners about the just cause behind Hungarian revisionist aims. Not even the 
outbreak of the Second World War entirely stopped these efforts. A Companion to 
Hungarian Studies was published in 1943, for example. In its preface István Bethlen 
stated:  
The Companion to Hungarian Studies has been produced to meet a practical need. 
In recent years the editors of The Hungarian Quarterly have found by experience 
that it is difficult, if not impossible to ask foreign experts to write on Hungarian 
questions because the information necessary to them on the subject of Hungary 
and the Hungarian people is almost entirely in the Hungarian language. . . .The 
Companion to Hungarian Studies is therefore intended to supply this need . . . 
[with the] hope that this book, written and edited in time of war, will one day be 
read in time of peace by all who are interested in the problems of Central 
Europe.
181
 
The Companion was to serve the Hungarian cause in the upcoming treaties after the war. 
Once again, the political and intellectual elite of Hungary were to be disappointed.  
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Conclusion 
Hungarian, Romanian, and Czechoslovak intellectuals and politicians mobilized 
their respective countries’ cultural capital in order to gain essential Western support for 
their foreign policy goals. The borders between scholarship and politics evaporated as 
scholars became members of parliaments and politicians found themselves in lecture 
halls. In this mobilization academic institutions became fortresses, scholarly publications 
turned into weapons, and scholars left their ivory towers to become warriors. The 
Hungarian political elite believed that cultural propaganda’s central aim should be to 
enlighten the foreign public about past and present Hungarian cultural and historical 
achievements. 
Despite political changes, government support for securing venues by which to 
present the Hungarian point of view remained constant. Notwithstanding the country’s 
economic problems, the political elite organized and financed cultural and academic 
centers, established scholarly journals, and arranged lecture tours in the hope of 
influencing international public opinion.  In order to appear as a quintessentially 
European country that was the key for further development of the region, scholars 
presented arguments about the country’s cultural superiority, its historical civilizing 
mission, its historical and cultural connections to Western Civilization, and its sacrifices 
in the name of Christianity and Western ideals. In this field of cultural production the 
political elite’s control was nearly total. There was no room for amateurish propaganda, 
just as there was no place for works propagating an Eastern orientation of Hungary. The 
government’s commitment to this form of cultural diplomacy was unwavering, as 
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politicians and intellectuals continued their worldwide efforts to construct and promote a 
positive Hungarian image abroad.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
PRESENTING HUNGARY AND GATHERING FRIENDS:   
TOURISM AND ITS IMAGERY 
 
“Tourism is the best foreign policy” 
                                                                                        (Archduke József Ferenc, 1927)
1
 
 
On June 20, 1927, in the Upper House of the Hungarian Diet during the budget 
debate, Archduke József Ferenc (1895-1957) rose to speak: “Revered House, tourism is 
the best foreign policy.” He continued: “It is the best foreign policy, because it garners 
friends for the country by acquainting [others] with our domestic reality. Secondly, it 
allows us to speak about ourselves in a way that enables those abroad [külföld] to become 
acquainted with us, which helps us to remove their misconceptions [regarding our 
country].” He went on to point out that advancing and promoting the state of the tourist 
industry was the best way to confirm and support the political goals of the Bethlen 
cabinet and to battle against the “international smear campaign” (rágalomhadjárat) that 
aimed to destroy the country’s reputation.2 The majority of Hungary’s political elite 
shared his opinion. Politicians and industry experts agreed that tourism and the related 
industries were more than an economic concern. Oszkár Bársony—chief executive of 
IBUSZ (Idegenforgalmi Beszerzési Utazási és Szállítási Rt.), the Hungarian national 
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travel agency—voiced similar views. He averred that in the postwar international climate 
the Hungarian leadership had to pay attention to the political utility of the tourist industry 
because “the tourism sector has developed into a political weapon, which—without 
harming others—has  become the most instrumental mechanism of the campaign that 
seeks to enlighten foreigners [about the character of the country].”3 Another captain of 
industry, Béla Marko, director of the Budapest Metropolitan Tourist Office 
(Székesfővárosi Idegenforgalmi Hivatal) went even further and stated that “foreign 
tourism is the most direct and most effective way to inform others about the worth and 
value of the nation, hence it is the strongest weapon of propaganda.”4 
In this chapter I argue that the tourist industry played a pivotal role in Hungary’s 
cultural diplomatic campaign. In this respect Hungarians were not alone. It may be true 
that originally travel was simply a means to advance trade and commerce, but with the 
development of mass tourism in the twentieth century the nature of travel changed 
forever. People from various social backgrounds, not just the wealthy and the privileged, 
traveled to see sights, experience something new, learn, or simply have fun. Upon their 
return home they talked and wrote about what they saw. The experience of the tourist 
became an indicator of the host country’s level of civilization and culture. Therefore as 
public opinion came to matter more and more to states so did the national image that 
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tourism helped to create. Tourism has the ability to identify, (re)construct, and promote a 
certain national narrative or, as Rudy Koshar argues, it can be a “building block of 
national identity.”5 Thus it does not come as a surprise that interwar governments 
recognized the political and ideological utility of tourism. No longer simply an economic 
concern, travel and leisure-related industries became too valuable to leave to business 
interests alone. Indeed, as a US Government study testifies, by 1930 there were about 
fifty national governments that to one degree or another actively participated in the 
promotion of the industry.
6
 Professor A. J. Norval—who was commissioned in the late 
1920s by the South African government to produce an international and national survey 
of the state of the tourist industry—concluded:  
In view of the national importance of the tourist industry to any country at 
all interested in its development and in view of its bearing on national life 
economically, sociologically, and politically, no government can neglect 
the control and direction of its tourist traffic and the formulation of a 
clearly defined tourist policy directed toward the development of tourist 
traffic from foreign countries.
7
  
Shelley Baranowski and Victoria de Grazia have closely examined the two clearest 
examples of governmental control over tourism—Germany’s Kraft durch Freude and 
Italy’s Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro movement.8 However, unlike these organizations, 
                                                             
5 Rudy Koshar, German Travel Cultures (Oxford, UK and New York: Berg, 2000), 10. Also see Joshua 
Hagen, Preservation, Tourism and Nationalism: The Jewel of the German Past (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006). 
 
6 Herbert Max Bratter, “The Promotion of Tourist Travel by Foreign Countries” in U.S: Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Trade Promotion Series No. 113 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), iv. 
 
7 A.J. Norval, The Tourist Industry: a National and  International Survey (London: Sir Issac Pitman and 
Sons, Ltd., 1936),152.  
 
8 Shelley Baranowski, Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich 
(Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), and Victoria de Grazia, The Culture 
179 
 
the interwar Hungarian political elite, supported by the tourism industry, was not 
primarily seeking to promote domestic tourism. Their agenda was to promote Hungary as 
a travel destination to foreigners. In this the Hungarian model is closer to Italy’s 
government-founded ENIT (Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche) and the Soviet 
Union’s efforts through its All Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS).9 This 
chapter explains the ways that the Hungarian political, cultural, and industrial elite 
reorganized the country’s nascent tourist industry in order to use it as a tool in their 
campaign to convince the West of the necessity and just nature of their revisionist claims. 
The chapter comprises four parts. The first part tells the story of the nineteenth-
century beginnings of the Hungarian tourist industry. During the period, tourism already 
had a dual function. On the one hand, it was, and remained, a money maker. On the other 
hand, it also contributed to the Hungarian politicians’ aim to define Hungary in 
opposition to Austria, and as such it was part of a larger nation-building project. The 
second section illustrates the challenges faced by post-First World War Hungarian 
tourism. In addition, it also examines the government’s effort to gain control of the tourist 
industry and utilize it in its cultural diplomatic campaign. The third part introduces the 
ways that the question of Hungarianness and the mental mapping of Hungary as a tourist 
destination overlapped with one another. In in it I show that the Hungarian elite 
simultaneously sought to promote the country as a modern, progressive and 
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unquestionably European. Yet Hungary was also a place that was uniquely defined by the 
traditions of the countryside. Sometimes it was both at once. The last section focuses on 
1938 (the Year of St. Stephen), which I see as the beginning of a decline of the tourist 
industry and its service to cultural diplomacy. 
 
The Hungarian Tourist Industry before the First World War and the Image of 
Hungary  
Prior to the 1867 Ausgleich, the Hungarian tourist industry was almost non-
existent. Since the middle of seventeenth century the sons (and to a lesser degree the 
daughters) of the English (and later on other Western European) upper-classes traveled to 
the continent. The Grand Tour, as the activity became known, usually followed the Paris-
Turin-Florence-Rome-Naples-Venice-Vienna-the Rhineland-Low Countries route. 
Hungary was not among the usual or even desirable destinations. Nor was Hungary a 
popular destination as the tourist industry began to thrive in Western Europe during the 
nineteenth century. On the contrary, as one French traveler noted in 1818 as he reached 
Vienna from Paris, he came across a clerk who upon learning of his desire to continue his 
travel to Hungary “repeatedly exclaimed, striking his head in astonishment: ‘Von Paris 
nach Ungarn! From Paris to Hungary!’”10 Those who visited the country (among them a 
large number of female travelers), acknowledged its natural beauty but often provided a 
harsh depiction of it. Julia Pardoe’s 1840 The City of the Magyar cautioned that “all 
persons travelling in Hungary must make up their minds resolutely to fling from them 
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every feeling of hyper-fastidiousness, both as regards to roads, horses, drivers, and 
accommodation; to brave delay, disappointment, even danger, and to prepare themselves 
to do battle with inconvenience of every description.”11 
The birth of the Hungarian railway (July 15, 1846), the subsequent 1856 opening 
of the Vienna-Pozsony (today Bratislava in Slovakia)-Pest railway line, and the 1867 
Ausgleich gave new hopes to the nascent Hungarian tourist industry that remained 
unfulfilled. With the 1868 establishment of the Royal Hungarian State Railways or MÁV 
(Magyar Királyi Államvasutak) the government took charge of the railways and began 
the organization of the tourist industry. Yet the traveling public’s image of Hungary 
continued to be rather negative. In 1866 one of the most influential British monthlies, 
MacMillan’s Magazine, published an article “Glimpses of Magyar Land.” The author’s 
view of Hungary was discouraging: “When you have travelled over a dozen miles in 
Hungary you have seen the country. Such was the assurance I received from everybody; 
and my subsequent experience confirmed its truth. Hungary has one singular 
recommendation, as a land to travel in, namely, that is contains absolutely nothing.”12 In 
addition, the “strange-sounding un-European names” of towns and places made the 
author uneasy, and he only felt relief when he saw the lights of Pesth (Pest in nineteenth-
century German spelling). Still, he was not impressed by Hungary’s largest city either. 
He wrote (quite sarcastically): “Pesth has the merit of not having anything much to offer 
in the way of sights.”13 The American 1877 edition of A Satchel Guide for the Vacation 
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Tourist in Europe concluded that in Budapest “the churches and the public buildings are 
of no particular interest.”14 
Indeed, as József Böröcz’s quantitative analysis of contemporary guidebooks 
shows, Hungary was barely on the “mental map” of Europe.15 What little “imagination” 
existed offered a mental picture of Hungary as a country more oriental the occidental, a 
country where gypsies, aristocrats, and peasants lived in a fairytale-like harmony. The 
Puszta (the Hungarian Plains) was where Westerners discovered what they saw as the 
real essence of Hungary. French travel writer Victor Tissot’s Unknown Hungary paints 
the following picture, which is worth quoting at length.  
On the wide staircase, leading to a room raised seven to ten feet above the one 
which we were, stood three young girls dressed in the Hungarian national 
costume. The outline of their graceful figures showed to advantage under the 
rékli, a jacket embroidered  with braid and silver buttons, and ornamented with 
flowers, of leather work, something like a hussar’s cloak, and lined with sheep-
skin with its warm soft wool. Their petticoats, fastened over this, descended 
puffed out in a thousand plaits like pipes nearly to the ankles, clothed in well-
fitting stockings, their feet being shod in shoes, whose high heels were destined to 
keep time in cadence to the evolutions of the czardas. . . . These three girls were 
of a fresh and striking beauty. Their large brown eyes with their fringed lashes 
had all the calm depth of those of Orientals, and their rosy lips, showing white 
teeth, smiled with all the spirituel gaiety which is one of the charms of a 
Hungarian woman. 
The young peasants came down to the lower floor, and the judge good-
humouredly detailed to me, one after the other, the various parts of their costume. 
           “And now,” he said, pulling out his watch, “let us go to the Gipsies.” 
Amongst the Gipsies! . . . Free as a bird, a traveler like the wind, the Gipsy goes 
as the humour may take him, in the direction of his will or fancy. What does he 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
14 Quoted in József Böröcz, Leisure Migration: a Sociological Study on Tourism (New York: 
Pergamon/Elsevier Science Ltd, 1996), 23. 
 
15 Böröcz, Leisure Migration, 32-39. Böröcz’s analysis is based on weighted representation of various 
countries in the  Appleton’s European Guide Book Illustrated and A Satchel Guide for the Vacation Tourist 
in Europe published between 1870 and 1925. 
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require to make him happy? A brunette companion, the sun, a carpet of grass, a 
boundless horizon, a murmuring of a stream in the moss, a little of the poetry of 
savage life, which make city life seem monotonous and sad in comparison. There 
where he can find pasture enough for his horses, and wood enough for his fire, he 
pitches his cloth tent, and spends his days lying on his back or on his face, 
smoking his pipe, “as tranquilly as if he wanted  nothing in the wide world,” and, 
whilst he watches the smoke dispersing in the air, dreaming ineffable dreams. . . . 
In his apparent misery this Mohican of Europe remains a millionaire of illusion, 
of gaiety, of good humour . . . this is the Gypsy’s home, the land of his adoption! 
and where could he find it better than in the immense steppes of Hungary, where 
he can travel whole days without meeting a living creature except the eagle, 
swans, flights of ducks, and troops of wild horses? Like the Bedouin, whose 
brother in vagabondage and poetry he is, the Gypsy cannot settle down. . . .
16
 
Tissot’s picture, in which he transformed the Hungarian countryside into the land of 
“beautiful women, fine horses, good wine, and gypsy music,” would remain the standard 
motives of Puszta Romantic for years to come.
17
 
While the tourist industry continued to be the primary focus of private enterprises, 
by the last decades of the nineteenth century governmental circles had also started to 
become more aware of the economic, social, and political advantages that tourism could 
offer. Private organizations aimed to organize and promote Hungarian hot springs and 
spas, Budapest, Lake Balaton, and the Tatra Mountains to both domestic and foreign 
audiences. Among those targeting the domestic traveler were the Carpathian Association 
of Hungary (Magyarországi Kárpátegyesület) established in 1873 and the Spa Joint-Stock 
                                                             
16 Victor Tissot, Unknown Hungary, trans. Mrs. A. Oswald Brodie (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 
1881), 26-28. The translation was based on the fourth (!) French edition. But the original was only a year 
earlier, 1880. Italics in the original. 
 
17 On the role of East and Southeastern Europe in Western imagination, see Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern 
Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994) and Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
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Company of Almád (Almádi Fürdő Részvénytársaság).18 The next landmark decision was 
connected with Under-Secretary Gábor Baross, who during his lifetime earned the 
nickname “Iron Minister” because of his commitment to the development of the 
Hungarian railway system. His involvement signaled the beginning of state interest in 
tourism. Under his sponsorship the First Hungarian Ticket Bureau (Első Magyar 
Menetjegy Iroda) was established in 1884 in order to coordinate train travel.
19
 The real 
breakthrough was the government-sponsored 1885 National Exhibition in Budapest, 
which was considered by Oszkár Bársony to be the birth of the Hungarian tourist 
industry.
20
 That year 66,773 foreign visitors came to Budapest.
21
 Nevertheless, industry 
experts realized the need for further reforms and improvements. In order to promote 
Budapest as a tourist destination a special committee put forward a fifteen-point program. 
1) Produce descriptions in various foreign languages about Budapest. 
2) Place reviews of Budapest in foreign newspapers. 
3) Place a review of Budapest in the Baedeker guide. 
4) Produce photos of Budapest and distribute them abroad, with special emphasis 
on the East.  
                                                             
18 On The Carpathian Association of Hungary and subsequent Magyar Tourist Association and their role in 
the nationalization of the tourist industry, see Alexander Vari, “From Friends of Nature to Tourist-Soldiers: 
Nation Building and Tourism in Hungary, 1873-1914,” in Turizm: the Russian and East European Tourist 
under Capitalism and Socialism, ed. Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 64-81.  
 
19 Lajos Kudar, Az IBUSZ históriája (Budapest: IBUSZ Igazgatóság, 1992), 6. 
 
20 Quoted in Márta Jusztin, “‘Utazgassunk hazánk földjén!’: A belföldi turizmus problémái a két 
világháború között Magyarországon,” Korall, Vol.26 ( 2006): 190. 
 
21 Statistic from Béla Tausz, A magyar idegenforgalom története és jövő célkitűzései (Budapest: MIÉSZ, 
1942), 11. A word of caution is necessary about these and the statistics that follow. For the most part these 
numbers will represent visitors only to Budapest; there was no effort made to collect data for the rest of the 
country. 
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5) Find means to get favorable ticket circulation—both in price and duration— 
on those railway and nautical lines that connect the East and the West through 
Budapest. 
6) Advertise travel deals. 
7) Publish foreign language guides. 
8) Publish and distribute information pamphlets about conditions and prices of 
hotels, restaurants and transportation. 
9) Produce maps of Budapest. 
10) Regulate hotel room prices. 
11)  Provide foreign-language-speaking (nyelveket beszélő) museum guides.  
12) Produce foreign language catalogues of the treasures of the museums. 
13) Establish clubs, recreational and holiday sites.  
14) Provide moral and financial support for festivals. 
15) Establish the Budapest Metropolitan Museum.22 
The program was developed by the private factor and sought the rapid professionalization 
of the tourist industry. Establishing the infrastructure and service industry necessary for 
the further development of tourism was the organizers chief concern. The program also 
made it clear that tourism was driven by economic concerns, hence that promotion of 
Hungary in the East among the wealthy sons and daughters of the Russian nobility.   
While it is hard to argue with the predominance of economic considerations in the 
development of nineteenth-century Hungarian tourism, it was also became an essential 
component of the nation-building project in which Hungary sought to differentiate itself 
from its Austrian counterpart. Hungarian efforts were in tune with the nineteenth-century 
                                                             
22 József Klaudy, Az európai legelső nemzeti utazási iroda története (Budapest: IBUSZ kiadás, 1943), 18-
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zeitgeist and its “international exhibitionary complex”23—as sociologist Tony Bennett 
referred to it—whereby each nation “started to construct heritage and tourist attractions in 
contrast and comparison with others.”24 One of the milestones of Hungarian attempts to 
define national essence was the 1896 Millennial Exhibition in which the country 
celebrated its one thousand year history. Private interest and state concern coincided in 
organizing a celebration that would put the country on the map of Europe—figuratively 
and literally. One of the exhibition’s main goals was to signal the cultural independence 
of Hungary from Austria.
25
 The exhibition was also noteworthy because it represented 
the kind of duality between traditional and modern that would define Hungary’s image 
construction for decades to come. On the one hand, a visitor would have gazed upon the 
colorful traditional folk heritage of the nation that openly celebrated its Eastern, some 
would say Oriental roots. Indeed, organizers of the exhibition not only embraced the 
“exotic island of Europe” representation of the country but actually promoted it.  In the 
center of celebration was the overshadowing figure of Árpád. The leader of the Magyars 
and his seven chieftains were memorialized in the epic painting of Árpád Feszty and the 
monumental statues of the Millennium Memorial on Budapest’s Heroes’ Square. In the 
                                                             
23 Tony Bennett quoted in Mary Neuberger, “Introduction: Exhibiting Eastern Europe,” Slavic Review 69, 
no. 3 (2010), 539. 
 
24 Orfar Löfgren, “Know Your Country: a Comparative Perspective on Tourism and Nation Building in 
Sweden,” in Being Elsewhere: Tourism, Consumer Culture, and Identity in Modern Europe and North 
America, ed. Shelley Baranowski and Ellen Furlough (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
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25 For more on the 1896 Millennial Exhibition see András Gerő, Modern Hungarian Society in the Making: 
the Unfinished Experience (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1995) and 
Dorothy Barenscott, “Articulating Identity through the Technological Rearticulation of Space: the 
Hungarian Millennial Exhibition as World’s Fair and the Disordering of Fin-de-Siècle Budapest,” Slavic 
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latter, which historian András Gerő refers to as the “national altar,” the figure of St. 
Stephen (together with some historical figures of the Habsburg House) was relegated to 
the back of the exhibition.
26
 Nor did St. Stephen fare better in exhibition’s official picture 
guide. The publication, issued in four languages, did not even include the name of 
Hungary’s first king.27 On the other hand, however, the organizers made every possible 
effort to showcase the modern, progressive, and determinedly European charter of the 
country, for they sought to illustrate that Hungary was equal in every aspect to Austria. 
Visitors of the celebration could travel on the first underground railway in continental 
Europe, take a stroll on Budapest’s recently completed main boulevard, the Andrássy 
Avenue, and view Hungary’s new Parliament building. News of the exhibition, which 
was opened by Emperor Franz Joseph, made it to the most important newspapers from 
Vienna to Chicago. The arrival of 93,408 foreign visitors to Hungary in 1896 
nevertheless did not live up to the hopes of its organizers, who had hoped for a better 
showing.
28
 Nor did it alter the foreign image of Hungary. The British monthly review, 
The Nineteenth Century, devoted a lengthy essay to the event. While there were certainly 
positive elements and even some optimism about the country’s future, the otherwise very 
friendly piece was not without stereotypes and judgmental attitudes.  It began by stating 
that even those who knew that a certain country called Hungary existed “somewhere in 
Europe or near Europe—public consciousness was really not quite clear about that”—
they were mostly familiar with four things: Hungarian wines, Hungarian music and 
                                                             
26 On the changing utility of the Millenium Memorial see András Gerő, Képzelt történelem (Budapest: 
PolgArt, 2004), 203-240. 
 
27 See Gyula Laurencic, Az ezeréves Magyarország és a milleniumi kiállitás (Budapest: Téka, 1990) 
Reprint of the 1896 original. 
 
28 Tausz, A magyar idegenforgalom története, 11. 
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musicians, Hungarian flour, and Lajos Kossuth.
29
 In his view the Hungarian is rhapsodic, 
for the “Magyar will spend fifteen hours in wild dancing, drinking, and rollicking to the 
bewildering music of his national airs  but on sobering up he will go to the council-
chamber of his country and discuss in gravest manner the topics of national or local 
policy.”30 It was not the glowing image Hungarians were hoping for. Even more 
discouraging for the organizers was the fact that Budapest was far from ready to welcome 
masses of tourists as infrastructural issues—such as the quality and quantity of 
accommodation—surrounding the exhibition indicated.31  
To remedy these problems then Prime Minister Kálmán Széll organized in 1900 a 
symposium “What needs to be done to attract foreigners to Hungary?”32 The same year 
saw the first Hungarian work on tourism and the establishment of the Royal Hungarian 
Automobile Club (Királyi Magyar Automobil Club). In 1902 the Central Ticket Bureau 
(Központi Menetjegyiroda) was established. This entity merged the different bureaus of 
the Royal Hungarian State Railway, Thomas Cook, and Wagons-Lits. 1902 also was the 
birth year of the predecessor of IBUSZ, the Tourism and Travel Company Incorporated 
(Idegenforgalmi és Utazási Vállalat). To aid the development of the industry Hungarian 
efforts especially targeted Russia. The idea was to present Hungary to the Russian nobles, 
who flocked to Europe, as more than just a transit country but rather as a destination. 
Accordingly, the first travel bureaus were opened in St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa, and 
                                                             
29 Emil Reich, “Hungary at the Close of her First Millennium,” The Nineteenth Century, vol. 39 (Jan.-June, 
1896), 837. 
 
30 Ibid., 838. 
 
31 Jusztin, “Utazgassunk,” 191. 
 
32 Tausz, A magyar idegenforgalom története, 12.  
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Warsaw.
33
 Improvements continued as Budapest organized its first Spring Trade Fair 
(Tavaszi Vásár) in 1906, which was the predecessor of the Budapest International Trade 
Fair (BNV—Budapesti Nemzetközi Vásár). In 1908 the establishment of the Permanent 
Medicinal and Thermal Bath Association of Budapest (Budapest Állandó Gyógyfürdő 
Bizottsága) sought to organize and further develop Budapest’s spa culture.34 
The outbreak of the First World War naturally slowed the progress of the tourist 
industry everywhere. While no exception, Hungary still attempted to advance travel and 
leisure related activities. Among them the most significant was the 1916 establishment of 
the Budapest Metropolitan Tourist Office (Székesfővárosi Idegenforgalmi Hivatal), 
followed by the National Tourism Bureau (Országos Idegenforgalmi Iroda), established 
by then Prime Minister Sándor Wekerle which sought to gain government control over 
the industry.
35
 However, the reality of war circumscribed possibilities. The organization 
was aborted and with that the advancement of Hungarian tourism and related industries 
came to a temporary halt.  
Between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1910s the Hungarian tourist industry 
developed from its embryonic stage to an industry of national interest. The once private 
enterprise became something that concerned the state, for the leadership realized the 
potentials of tourism in regard to nation-building. During the first decades of the 
twentieth century government officials and tourism experts and government officials 
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alike grew more and more wary of the nation’s foreign image.  A 1903 pamphlet of the 
Central Ticket Bureau already signaled the changing attitudes toward the significance of 
tourism. Tourism, the pamphlet stated, was an industry with “patriotic and national 
importance.” It further argued that the would-be visitors’ personal experience will alter 
the “oblique and false” foreign views of Hungary.36  It was an argument that would 
continue to serve as the foundation for the rationale behind the postwar Hungarian 
government’s efforts to reorganize and take control over the tourist industry.  
 
The Reorganization of Hungarian Tourist Industry after the First World War 
37
 
In addition to the country’s international isolation, economic devastation, and 
political unrest, Trianon had turned Hungary into—as contemporaries referred to it— a 
“sehegye, setengere ország,” meaning a country without mountains or sea. The 
Hungarian tourist industry lost, apart from Budapest, its most desirable tourist 
destinations. Hungary lost its access to the Adriatic Sea, the Tatra Mountains, and the 
Carpathians. More illustrative of the challenges that the tourism sector faced was that pre-
Trianon Hungary (without Croatia) had 203 spa and medicinal bath resorts, whereas after 
the treaty only sixty-three remained. Before the treaty the country had boasted thirty 
                                                             
36 Quoted in Klaudy, Az európai legelső, 25. 
 
37 Here the historian faces a very daunting task. With the exception of Márta Jusztin’s dissertation there has 
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Hungarian Ministry for Commerce—were destroyed during the Battle of Budapest in 1945. The entire 
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mountain retreats; after 1920 only two remained.
38
 Béla Markos, director of the Budapest 
Metropolitan Tourist Office drew a connection between the deficiencies of the tourist 
industry and the outcome of Trianon. “It has been stated many times,” argued Markos, 
“that if we had paid more attention to the tourist industry and to foreigners . . . if we had 
served the aims and objectives of our national propaganda with the necessary 
purposefulness—if even we had had these sorts of objectives—Trianon could not have 
happened.”39 As the country started to recover, so did the tourist industry. The dual goals 
were to transform tourism into a financially solid element of the economy and to utilize it 
in the country’s ongoing cultural diplomatic endeavors that sought to alter the image of 
Hungary abroad and consequently to revise the treaty. These goals motivated the 
development in which the state reorganized and centralized Hungarian tourist industry. 
The first stage in the restoration of tourism and its shift from private enterprise to 
state-industry began as soon as the domestic political and economic situation was 
stabilized. The first attempt to revive Hungarian tourism was linked with one of the most 
respected political and public figures of contemporary Hungary, Count Albert Apponyi. 
The Spa City Budapest Association (Budapest Fürdőváros Egyesület) was established in 
1922 under his presidency. Archduke József Ferenc followed Apponyi in the presidency 
of the association that sought to develop Budapest’s spas and thermal baths.40 The first 
attempt to organize the various tourist-related groups into one umbrella organization was 
the founding of the Union of Hungarian Tourist Interests (Magyar Idegenforgalmi 
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40 Tausz, A magyar idegenforgalom története, 13. 
 
192 
 
Érdekeltségek Szövetsége) in 1925. The same year saw the publication of the first tourist 
propaganda pamphlet as well. However, while influential politicians contributed to these 
developments, most of these efforts came from the private sector. The most significant 
milestone in the state’s advancement in Hungarian tourism happened in 1926 when the 
Hungarian government, through the medium of the Royal Hungarian State Railway 
Company, purchased 80 percent of the Tourism and Travel Company Incorporated’s 
shares.
 41
 The timing is not accidental. It was not until 1925 that the government was able 
to create a balanced budget and stabilize the economy by introducing a new currency. 
The new company, IBUSZ, was the first step in the state centralization of the tourist 
industry. In these efforts the Hungarian government followed examples provided by the 
ever-growing number of nations that decided to take ownership (to varying degrees) of 
their tourist agencies: the Austrian ÖVB, the Czechoslovak Čedok, the Polish Orbis, the 
Yugoslav Putnik, and the Romanian Sardev.
42
 
IBUSZ was a majority-owned government agency, or as Minister of Commerce 
Tihamér Fabinyi referred to it, “eighty percent government owned, but hundred percent 
government regulated,”43 and as such enjoyed enormous benefits.  One member of the 
Hungarian Diet aptly characterized IBUSZ in the following manner: to outsiders it was a 
private enterprise, while to insiders it was a state-collective enterprise (állami közüzem).
44
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IBUSZ enjoyed a monopoly on domestic railway ticket sales, and it was shielded against 
foreign competition, including take-over bids by the Wagons Lits-Cook. It purchased and 
incorporated other companies with profiles from transport through advertising and 
publishing not to mention yacht-building as well as candy and chocolate production. 
Finally, IBUSZ also enjoyed a monopoly on selling newspapers, magazines, tobacco 
products, chocolate, candy, and fruit on trains and railway stations.
45
 
IBUSZ and other organizations began to represent Hungarian interests abroad. 
The country joined AGOT (Association des Grandes Organisations Nationales de 
Voyages et Tourisme), an international organization that sought to promote tourism and 
business cooperation (in 1933 IBUSZ director Oszkár Bársony was the president of the 
organization). Hungary sent representatives to the 1928 Conseil Central du Tourisme 
International conference that was held in Brussels. In the same year Hungarian delegates 
reached agreements with Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia about promoting the 
region as a whole at the Middle European Travel Convention in Prague.
46
 At this point 
economic concerns seemingly overshadowed tourism’s utility in cultural diplomacy. 
The 1929 establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Tourism (Parlamenti 
Idegenforgalmi Bizottság) was a further indication that the government indeed viewed 
tourism as political tool. Among its members one finds present and future Prime 
Ministers (István Bethlen, Gyula Gömbös, Kálmán Darányi, Pál Teleki, and Miklós 
Kállay) and members of the influential nobility (Count Móric Esterházy, Count Sándor 
Festetics, and Archduke Ferenc József). However, the world-wide Great Depression had 
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a negative impact on the government’s plan to further centralize the industry. Yet this by 
no means meant that tourism received less attention. On the contrary, tourism and IBUSZ 
received criticism.  A 1933 parliamentary debate between Egon Turchányi (member of 
the parliament) and Tihamér Fabinyi (minister of commerce) was representative of the 
importance that was attached to the question. Turchányi questioned IBUSZ’s monopoly 
and also the company’s commitment to foreign propaganda. He argued for the need of 
government control over the industry similar to that found in France, Italy, and Germany. 
Reading the parliamentary minutes illustrates that both parties were indeed very familiar 
with and referred to the works of industry experts, such as Robert Glücksmann, Arthur 
Bormann, Angelo Mariotti, and Maximilian Klafkowski, when they reasoned that “the 
question of tourism cannot be organized in a healthy and economic way” if there is no 
single permanent entity that oversees all aspects of the industry.
47
 In his response 
Minister Fabinyi, while defended IBUSZ activities, acknowledged the need for some 
reorganization and pointed out that the issue of tourism was very seriously regarded in 
government circles not least because of its political utility that would enable Hungary “to 
gain friends” who, on returning home, would “preach” and help Hungarian justice (i.e. 
the revision of Trianon) to prevail.
48
 Jenő Czenner, both a politician and industry expert, 
discussed the issue in a similar vein. In his article “Tourism as an instrument of our 
foreign policy,” published in Külügyi Szemle (Foreign Review), he argued as the title 
suggests that “tourism is an indispensable instrument of foreign policy.” He defined the 
role of tourism as one of the most important tools for improving Hungary’s image in the 
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court of international public opinion. He acknowledged the “smart” propaganda of the 
Soviet Intourist and the German Railway Information Bureau, yet he warned against the 
misuse of tourist propaganda. He believed that while tourist propaganda was one of the 
remaining forms of acceptable propaganda, he maintained that it still had to be done in a 
way that ensured it would not feel and look like direct propaganda.
49
 In another article he 
offered further justification for the government’s centralization of the industry. The 
military analogy he employed to describe the past achievements of tourism and its future 
role is telling of the mindset of not only the author but perhaps all of those involved in the 
industry’s reform. In 1934 he wrote: “The work done until now can be compared with 
irregular forces’ guerilla warfare which was able to break down the resistance. Now 
draws closer the territorial occupation, which requires a standing army, a qualified officer 
corps, and a forceful general who can establish a front and can organize the 
occupation.”50  
As soon as Hungary recovered from the economic crisis—not least thanks to trade 
agreements signed with Germany—the second phase of tourist industry’s centralization 
began. The Hungarian Royal Ministry’s 11.001/1935 order on the matter of the regulation 
of tourism sought to create a central body to oversee the industry and to ensure its 
cohesive development. This central institution was the Hungarian National Tourism 
Bureau (Országos Magyar Idegenforgalmi Hivatal). The OMIH, as the organization 
became known, operated under the aegis of the Ministry of Commerce. Its first president, 
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Géza Tormay, was appointed by the Ministry of Commerce and the Cabinet Council. 
51
 
Paragraph three of the OMIH order made it clear that all tourism-related activity—both at 
home and abroad—belonged to the sphere of the organization.  The following seventeen-
point regulation shows that the government aimed to centralize and regulate all aspects of 
the industry. The Bureau was tasked as follows: 
1) To regulate the work and agenda of all tourism-related authorities, institutions, 
associations, and societies to make certain that their efforts are coordinated. 
2) To oversee the budget and development program of all tourism-related and 
government-supervised institutions. 
3) To manage, inspect, and facilitate tourism activities at the county, town, and 
village level. 
4) To ensure that places, collections, institutions, folk art manufactured goods and 
other products with significance to tourism are readily available and of a quality 
worthy to represent the national culture. 
5) To supervise all tourism-related investments. 
6) To ensure that significant sport and touristic events, congresses, cultural 
festivals, exhibitions, hunting and fishing prospects and all other possible tourism-
related occasions are serving the enhancement of tourism. 
7) To assure that the preconditions and prospects are available for greater foreign 
purchase of folk, craft, and industrial goods. 
8) To supervise the quality standards of the food and beverage trade and to 
support its further development. 
9) To conduct tourism propaganda abroad, to direct other entities’ similar efforts, 
to study and utilize instruments of modern propaganda. 
10) To establish tourism propaganda bureaus abroad, supervise them and relocate 
or close them as appropriate.  
11) To ensure cooperation with tourism-related organizations abroad. 
12) To generate an annual budget and plan designed to further develop the tourist 
industry. 
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13) To review public transportation plans related to the tourist industry. 
14) To supervise the work of domestic travel agencies and other tourist 
propaganda bureaus.  
15) To supervise the work of tour guides and pay attention to the quality of their 
vocational training. 
16) To collect and process tourism-related data and information. 
17) To develop tourism-related training and literature.
52
 
This seventeen-point program, unlike the end of nineteenth-century’s fifteen-point 
program, made it clear that the government had general control over the tourism industry. 
From building infrastructure through regulating the service industry to overseeing 
propaganda the government gained power to manage the industry as a whole. The dual 
nature of the industry—economic and cultural diplomatic—was addressed in the structure 
of the organization. The OMIH was organized into two departments. One was to oversee 
the economic aspects of the industry, while the other was to supervise its propaganda.  
Without question the latter—which is most germane to the argument of this study—
required further attention and investment. Accordingly, as the program illustrates, the 
government sought to standardize the production of propaganda, paying due attention not 
only to quantity but quality as well. Indeed, foreign propaganda for Hungarian tourism 
needed all the help it could muster, for the foreign image of Hungary continued to be less 
than desirable.  
 
Tourism Propaganda and the Constant Problem of Image 
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“[There] are so many strange and exaggerated stories afloat about Hungary and 
her people, that a few remarks on this subject cannot be omitted” states the 1927 
government-sponsored guidebook, Budapest: All that is Interesting in the Hungarian 
Capital.
53
 The guidebook—published for an American audience—was especially critical 
of Victor Tissot’s above-mentioned characterization of Hungary. “The naïve impression 
contained in M[onsieur] Tissot’s book on Hungary are [sic] still accepted in some 
countries,” reads the travel guide. It continues by stating that “not long ago, a French 
Minister, asking about Hungary, enquired whether the streets of Budapest were yet clear 
of the ‘csikós’ (horsemen of the plains). This is equivalent to asking an inhabitant of New 
York whether cowboys are still lassoeing [sic] wild cattle on Broadway or Fifth 
Avenue!”54 Was there ever such a French minister? Perhaps there was not. Yet, this 
snippet represents the fears and anxieties that Hungarians felt about their image, which, 
one might add, were not entirely without foundation. In one of the era’s most popular 
American travelogues, the Carpenter’s World Travels series, Frank G. Carpenter painted 
a romantic, yet rather medieval picture of Hungary. Unlike Czechoslovakia, which was 
“the land of the peasant whose greatest men have sprung from the soil and whose people 
believe in democracy,” Hungary was the “land of the aristocrats where nobility still 
rules.”55 Through his photos and descriptions the reader learned of a romanticized and 
mystical Hungary that is “home of the fortune-telling gypsies, who ply their trade in the 
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cities.”56 On the other hand this is a country where medieval conditions are still present 
for the same “wanderers” (Gypsies) who live in the countryside, “where they are noted 
for letting their children go naked, even in cold weather” and where “under the watchful 
eye of the noble owner . . . gangs of men and women bend their backs at work in the 
fields from dawn until dark.”57 Not unlike his nineteenth-century French counterpart 
Victor Tissot, Carpenter too had something to say about the female population of the 
country. He writes: “The people of Budapest show everywhere evidence of the blending 
of the East and the West . . . the faces show the mixture of races, but the life and the 
fighting spirit of the Magyar are everywhere predominant. The women are especially 
beautiful; more beautiful, I think, than any I have seen elsewhere. They have olive 
complexions, dark, luxuriant hair, and great dark eyes. They walk with a swing, and they 
have fine figures.”58 
To counter the negative and/or stereotypical representation of the country the 
Hungarian Foreign Service founded a number of foreign travel writers who were 
politically reliable yet credible enough to write travelogues and guides about Budapest 
and Hungary. “Those who come to Budapest will not, we think, quarrel with the 
statement that it is one of the most beautiful and attractive Capitals of Europe” writes 
Clive Holland in his 1935 Hungary: The Land and Its People.
59
 His book was very well 
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received by the Hungarian authorities who ordered hundreds of copies placed in various 
embassies and cultural/educational institutions worldwide. Only a few pages in the files 
of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry archive remain as evidence that Holland was hired by 
the ministry; worked directly with László Bárdossy, who six years later would become 
the prime minister of Hungary; was provided with a car and chauffeur, accommodations, 
food and beverages for two; and aided in every possible way to write his book.
60
 
Similarly, when Hubert Hessel Tiltman approached the London embassy for support of 
his new guidebook on the “unknown Europe,” his request was well received. The 
decision’s impetus is telling of the Hungarians’ mindset. First, Tiltman was a relatively 
known author. Second, while the KÜM disapproved of some of his earlier books, such as 
The Terror in Europe which was critical of the white terror of the Horthy regime, and 
Peasant Europe which was deemed too “radical,” he was nevertheless seen as someone 
who was a “friend of revision,” for he was “clearly aware of the injustice of the peace 
treaties.” In addition, from the viewpoint of the KÜM he was acceptable because—
according to the KÜM—while he had friendly relations with Czechoslovak circles, he 
“could not stand the Romanians”, and was a persona non grata in Yugoslavia. With this 
sort of letter of recommendation Tiltman could arrive in Hungary and enjoy both the 
financial and moral support of the government.
61
 
In addition to recruiting and paying off foreign writers, the KÜM also played a 
pivotal role in the establishment of travel bureaus abroad. It facilitated the OMIH, 
IBUSZ, and various other state-owned (and related) organizations’ efforts to compete for 
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foreign tourists. By the mid-1930s Hungary had turned its attention mainly toward the 
West and had bureaus in Vienna, Berlin, Rome, Venice, Milan, Paris, London, Brussels, 
Ankara, Cairo, Sofia, and New York.
62
 The New York office was especially important to 
Hungary for two main reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, the United States was one of 
the key targets of Hungarian cultural diplomacy from the beginning because the US never 
ratified the postwar treaties and its support for Hungarian revisionist aims was essential. 
Second, the American tourist was the prime target for all nations involved in tourism, for 
they had the most money to spend. According to a US government study, in 1929 alone 
American tourists spent $839,000,000 (c. $10.7 billion) on foreign travel.
63
 Hungary 
received $1,063,000 (c. $13,500,000) of this amount.
64
 The small East and East-Central 
European countries, despite the obvious negative impact of the Great Depression, became 
new, hitherto undiscovered destinations for American tourists. This was something that 
even caught the eye of The New York Times. In 1930 the newspaper reported that as “the 
dollar travels further” and “as more governments offer new attractions” so does “Mid-
Europe draw a tide of tourists.”65 In 1934 when the Hungarian Tourist Bureau opened its 
doors in the R.K.O. Building of the Rockefeller Center, it was done with the stated goal 
of improving Hungary’s (tourist) image in the USA. According to the report sent to the 
Washington embassy, in 1935 the office answered 1500 written queries and provided 
3,000 people with information.
66
 Among the office’s activities were lectures in the largest 
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US cities, publicity via newspapers and magazines, film and radio presentations, and the 
organization of exhibitions. In addition, the bureau oversaw the distribution of 
propaganda materials from the Cunard White Star ships to university libraries. In 1937 
alone the office sent out 120,497 pamphlets and 3,353 posters to travel agencies, 
libraries, and schools in the Americas.
67
 In addition, both KÜM and the OMIH put 
pressure on the government to offer special exchange rates in the form of travel coupons, 
and finally to offer free visas to American travelers. The results were impressive. 
Between 1934 and 1937 the number of Americans who visited Budapest grew 260 
percent, from 2,595 to 12,936.
68
 
KÜM and its ambassadorial staff were also essential to the building and 
safeguarding of Hungary’s image abroad, both as a tourist destination and in general. A 
1934 KÜM order called upon all embassies and consulates for the “most effective 
support” of tourist propaganda. The KÜM staff also monitored all Hungarian related 
publications, measured their effectiveness for positive propaganda, and served as the first 
line of defense against negative publicity. For example, when Bernard Newman, who 
toured the Danube region on bicycle published The Blue Danube, the London embassy 
pointed out to KÜM its possible use for propaganda. The KÜM deemed the book “good,” 
but decided that it had no potential for either political or tourism-related propaganda; 
hence it did not order it for mass distribution.
69
 They also oversaw the quality and 
subject-matter of propaganda that originated from Hungary. It was an especially serious 
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concern, for despite strenuous efforts the quality and the production of Hungarian 
propaganda materials remained disorganized. 
According to Béla Mátéka, secretary of the Budapest Metropolitan Tourist Office, 
the first large-scale Budapest propaganda pamphlet was produced in 1925 with 200,000 
copies.
70
 By 1937 the same office produced 1,103,102 pieces of propaganda in eleven 
languages. They mailed this astonishing number of materials (weighing 20,291 kilos or 
44,640 pounds) in 49,479 parcels worldwide.
71
 Likewise, IBUSZ also increased its 
propaganda budget. In 1932 43,000 pengő (c. $99,437) were set aside for propaganda; by 
1936 the company spent 226,000 pengő (c. $523,148) on advertising.72 The number of 
magazines and newspapers also skyrocketed. The Idegenforgalmi Újság (Tourist News, 
established in 1924) was amongst the first to target foreigners already in Hungary. A 
paper that started out as an in-house information pamphlet for the Grand Hotel Royal 
grew into a magazine published in Hungarian, French, and German, with information 
useful for all travelers. The Budapester Fremdenzeitung (established in 1928) began by 
providing information for tourists in German, English, and French. After its 
reorganization in 1935 the magazine included surveys and short studies of Hungarian 
history, art, music, and even gastronomy.
73
 Others publications followed, such as the 
Idegenforgalmi Kurír, a free weekly magazine—produced in four languages—that was 
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mailed to 3,000 addresses in Europe and the United States.
74
 But perhaps the most 
representative and the highest in quality of all these publications was the Hungaria 
Magazin (1936-1944), a joint venture of IBUSZ and the Royal Hungarian State Railways. 
Hungarian efforts began to pay a dividend. The number of foreigners staying in 
Budapest hotels and pensions between 1927 and 1937 rose 93 percent from 94,869 to 
182,747. These numbers include those coming from former Hungarian territories as well 
of those arriving from further afield. The number of those tourists originating from 
outside of the boundaries of the former kingdom went up from 60,400 to 149,580, which 
is an impressive 148 percent increase.
75
 The average time spent in Budapest also 
increased from 2.5 nights to 3.27.
76
 In addition, according to the same statistics from the 
Hungarian Economic Research Institute, an estimated additional 56,391 visitors stayed in 
private Budapest accommodations in the year 1937.
77
 Figures show that in 1937 the 
twelve most significant nations for the Hungarian tourist industry were Germany (30,938 
visitors), Austria (29,069), Czechoslovakia (20,680), Romania (17,662), Great Britain 
(15,815), the United States (12,936), Italy (9,130), Yugoslavia (8,135), France (7,964), 
Netherlands (4,776), Poland (3,515), and Switzerland (3,463).
78
 As the statistics illustrate 
the Hungarian tourist industry experienced positive growth. By 1937 the once nonexistent 
industry produced forty million pengő (c. $111,111,000), which represented seven 
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percent of the country’s total exports.79 Tourism was making a substantial contribution to 
the Hungarian economy. 
Despite the industry’s economic success not everyone was pleased with the image 
that tourism created and promoted. Debate raged on the pages of the Magyar Szemle 
discussing the pros and cons of Hungary’s tourist image.80 More and more people—
politicians, industry experts, and public intellectuals—continued to question the quality 
of Hungarian tourist propaganda, and most importantly the message it carried. There 
were calls for the creation of a Hungarian Baedeker, one that was free of clichés.
81
 János 
Pelényi, the Hungarian Ambassador to the United States voiced his disappointment with 
the quality of Hungarian tourist propaganda in a private letter to Nándor Zichy (director 
of OMIH’s propaganda division). He maintained that Hungary needed better 
representation of its culture in the United States than the folk-dolls, gourds, and 
embroidery that Washington received as propaganda material. According to Pelényi this 
material belonged “in a low-end Rathskeller [German word designating a cellar-pub]” 
and simply put, “it would have been better to throw the money out of the window without 
much ceremony, than to spend’’ it on this sort of advertisement.82 The real question that 
the Hungarian tourist industry faced was not about its economic viability, but its utility in 
Hungary’s cultural diplomatic efforts.  
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The image of Hungary abroad—what kind of image should Hungary build?—was 
a divisive issue. As the industry became more and more politicized, the question of 
tourism turned into the question of national character, and hence competing visions of 
Hungarianness that focused on ideals, places, and symbols. Sándor Karácsony, in his 
aptly-titled essay “Hungarianness as a problem for tourism” (A magyarság, mint 
idegenforgalmi probléma), argued that “if we want them [foreign tourists] we must have 
something to show them and something to tell them.” “Unfortunately,” he continues, “we 
do not even know ourselves.”83 The section that follows aims to illustrate the lack of 
consensus on this issue and seeks to answer some of the following questions: What were 
the competing visions for the national brand “Hungary”? In which ways did the 
government create and promote these rival perceptions? To what degree were those 
Hungarian stereotypes produced by Hungarians themselves? 
 
The Tourist Image of Hungary: Competing Mental and Physical Landscapes  
Interwar Hungary’s tourist image had three main components. First, there was 
modern, Western, and progressive Budapest. Second, there was the traditional, Eastern, 
and romanticized countryside. The third and final element was what one could call the 
“rest,” which was characterized by a mixture of occidental and oriental, a blend of “old 
and new,” including Lake Balaton, Lillafüred, and some of the largest towns of the 
countryside. These were much more than simple geographical destinations. Each of these 
places represented a different vision of Hungary. Each of these places identified, 
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(re)constructed, and promoted different—and often seemingly conflicting—national 
narratives to answer the question about the essence of Hungarianness. Government and 
the private sector sought to find a balance in which all three representations were 
presented in order to appeal to the greatest number of tourists. 
Representing the modern, cosmopolitan, fashionable, and unquestionably 
European Hungary, Budapest was, and remains, the center of the Hungarian tourism 
industry. As Robert Nemes illustrates in his The Once and Future Budapest, Budapest 
was the “holy city” for nineteenth-century Hungarian nationalists when they aimed to 
make Buda-Pest a wholly Magyar city, the symbol of magyardom.
84
 The growth and 
development of the city cannot be divorced from the awakening Hungarian national 
consciousness. In 1720 the population of Buda and Pest was a mere 11,000. By 1831 the 
number of inhabitants had grown to 103,000. In 1867 Buda and Pest boasted 280,000 
people, making the twin cities the seventh largest metropolis in Europe. In the last year 
war, Budapest’s population stood at 933,000. Between 1867 and 1914 Budapest was the 
fastest growing city in Europe.
85
 It was the center of industry, culture, and politics, but 
many Hungarians felt ambivalent about their booming capital. According to historian 
John Lukacs’s analysis, “the elements of a fatal discord and division between the urban 
and the populist, between the commercial and the agrarian, between the cosmopolitan and 
the nationalist, between the non-Jewish Hungarian and the Jewish-Hungarian culture and 
civilization of Budapest were already there” in 1900.86 But, continues Lukacs, the “break 
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had not yet come,” for the time period was the peak of industrialization and capitalism 
and as Budapest grew as a center of commerce, finance, and industry the “coexistence” 
between the leading classes remained mutually beneficial.
87
 As the rift grew so did the 
differences and disagreements between capitalist, modern, and cosmopolitan Budapest 
and the agricultural, semi-feudal, and traditional countryside. Along with the cultural 
fissure developed a political one as Budapest became the symbol of the liberal Left (often 
even of the radical Left) and the rest of the country was seen as the fortress of the 
conservative Right.  Once the “holy place, the Mecca of Hungary”, Budapest was seen by 
some, like Dezső Szabó and Miklós Bartha, as the “fever-ridden Sodom.”88 
The final break with Hungary’s liberal past came in the wake of the First World 
War. After the short-lived regime of Count Mihály Károlyi and its dream of a democratic 
Hungary, Béla Kun and his 133 days of Bolshevik dictatorship further exacerbated 
already existing political and cultural divisions. Budapest and its progressive liberal 
population—mostly Jewish—became the scapegoat for all the damage and harm that had 
befallen the country, from losing the war through red terror to foreign occupation.
89
 The 
counterrevolutionary forces gathered in the southeastern city of Szeged. In their new 
Christian Hungary there was no room for “sinful Budapest.”90 
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On the November 15, 1919, Admiral Miklós Horthy arrived in Budapest at the 
head of his troops, riding a white horse. It was a symbolic move, for in the Hungarian 
mythology the white horse plays a central role. According to legend, it was a white horse 
that the Magyars gave in exchange for their land in the Carpathian Basin. Árpád, the 
chieftain who led and settled the Hungarians in 896, was often represented riding a white 
stallion. This was the establishment of a new Hungary and Admiral Horthy, addressing 
the crowd and the mayor of Budapest, left little doubt about how he felt about the city. 
Mr. Mayor! In the name of the Hungarian national Army, I offer you my sincere 
thanks for the warm welcome. Today, on the threshold of this city, I am not 
prepared to speak in conventional phrases. My sense of justice compels me to tell 
you plainly what is uppermost in my mind in this moment. When we were still far 
distant, when our hope of returning to this poor, ill-fated city, arms in hand, was 
the merest of glimmers, we cursed and hated her, for from afar we saw only the 
mire into which she had sunk and not the persecution and martyrdom which our 
Hungarian brethren were suffering. 
The Hungarian nation has ever loved and admired Budapest, this city which, in 
recent months, has been its degradation. Here, on the bank of the Danube, I 
arraign her. This city has disowned her thousand years of traditions, she has 
dragged the Holy Crown and the national colours in the dust, she has clothed 
herself in red rags. The finest of the nation she threw into the dungeons or drove 
into exile. She laid in ruin our property and wasted our wealth. 
91
  
Yet, Horthy and company were also “ready to forgive” the “misguided city if she will 
turn from her false gods to the service of the Fatherland.”92 One of main services 
Budapest was to carry out was to become a destination for tourists worldwide and to 
present to the world the “best of Hungarian virtues,” as Horthy demanded. But what were 
those Hungarian virtues? What form would those virtues take? After all, if the goal of 
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Hungarian cultural diplomacy was to represent Hungary as a progressive and modern 
country with European qualifications, there was no other place like Budapest to show it. 
Despite Horthy’s misgivings about the character of Budapest, the city barely broke with 
its prewar traditions and continued to be a symbol of modernity.  
From the beginning IBUSZ, OMIH, and their counterparts produced a plethora of 
new nicknames for the capital: “the Queen of the Danube,” “the Pearl of the Danube,” 
“Spa City Budapest,” and “Fashion Town Budapest.” Béla Mátéka’s manuscript tells the 
story of the birth of the brand-name “the Queen of the Danube.” Venice was referred to 
as the “Queen of the Adriatic,” and Stockholm was known as the “Venice of the North,” 
but what about the Danube Mátéka asked. While Vienna was a larger city, its 
geographical location on the river was not like Budapest’s. Linz and Passau enjoyed very 
fine settings, but they were too small, while Belgrade—according to Mátéka—could not 
compete with Budapest as a “metropolis?”93 One of the immediate concerns of industry 
experts was to promote Budapest in Vienna. Vilmos Kovácsházy, a member of the 
Budapest Metropolitan Council, pointed out that in 1928 Vienna’s tourist traffic was five 
times that of Budapest. He argued that the most pressing issue was to convince those 
tourists visiting Vienna to continue their journey to Budapest.
94
 In 1931 the Budapest 
Tourist Office opened its doors in Vienna. The office had a dual function. On the one 
hand it was a place for ticket purchases, money exchange, and other administrative tasks. 
On the other hand it was a center of propaganda. The office placed travel posters in 
railway stations and wagons, (promoting the BNV and St. Stephen’s Week in August), 
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placed travel ads in newspapers and travel brochures, and gave talks promoting Budapest 
using slides and films. In 1936 alone the office placed 284,851 pieces of propaganda 
material and gave seventy-four talks to 11,252 people. According to the office’s records, 
in 1936 alone, 24,773 people from sixty-two countries visited the office and received 
information. The office organized 134 bus tours to Hungary for 10,856 people in the 
same year.
95
  
In propaganda Budapest was represented as a modern health spa and bath 
destination. The Hungaria Magazin cover from 1937 unites two of the main 
characteristics of “Spa City Budapest:” healing and enjoyment (see Figure1). Budapest’s 
spa culture dates back to Roman times. Aquincum—as the settlement was known in 300 
AD—was the capital of the Roman Pannonia. According to excavations, Aquincum 
boasted twelve baths, all of which were destroyed after the fall of Pannonia. During 
medieval times the development of the thermal baths continued. The zenith of the 
development of bath and spa culture was reached under the 145 years of Ottoman rule. 
The occupying Ottomans did not destroy the baths. Rather, they were committed to 
develop them further. The growth of spa culture persisted under the Habsburgs, but most 
of the development occurred in Northern Hungary (Trencsénteplic and Pistány [Pöstyén], 
both in today’s Slovakia). By the nineteenth century spas were destinations for the 
nobility and for the wealthy seeking remedies for their health problems and for those 
simply seeking pleasure.  
                                                             
95 Vilmos Kovácsházy, Budapest székesfőváros idegenforgalmi propagandája Bécsben (Budapest 
Székesfőváros Házinyomdája, 1937), 4-27. 
212 
 
As mentioned earlier, most of Hungary’s spas were lost after the Trianon Treaty, 
thus Budapest once again became the center of attention.  “Let Budapest be the grand 
center of culture, art, and commerce, and most importantly let it be a world-famous spa 
city, which it is destined to be by nature,” said Archduke József Ferenc, president of the 
Budapest Spa City Association.
96
 In order to gain control over the use and development 
of thermal baths Law XVI of 1929 was passed. The distinguished between medicinal and 
(leisure) baths. The former designation required the approval of a healthcare professional. 
The government proposed the establishment of a body to oversee all aspects of the 
operation of spas, including the regulation of the expansion and establishment of new 
spas. It also gave the government body the right to expropriate lands where new thermal 
sources were located. To promote the development of new establishments the 
government also offered twenty years of operation free of tax to new investors. The 
Hungarian government followed the examples provided by French, Italian, Swiss, 
Austrian, and German authorities in this field. Under the direction of the new official 
body, the National Committee for Springs and Bath Resorts (Országos Forrás- és 
Fürdőügyi Bizottság), and the Central Committee of Budapest’s Medicinal and Holiday 
Resorts (Budapesti Központi Gyógy- és Üdülőhelyi Bizottság) Budapest’s spa culture 
continued to grow and modernize. By 1930 there were thirteen thermal baths in Budapest 
providing between thirteen and fifteen million gallons of thermal water daily. The Central 
Committee and the OMIH sponsored the visits of foreign journalists and doctors, hosted 
tourism and medical conventions (such as the 1929 International Exhibition of 
Balneology and Tourism), and placed promotional materials in newspapers, medical and 
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tourist journals.
97
 In addition to exhibitions and fairs (such as the “Das Bad von gestern 
und heute” exhibit in Zurich and the Brussels World’s Fair) they also utilized tools of 
modern propaganda, such as radio and film.
98
 The “Three Health Weeks in Budapest” 
program was especially successful and by 1936 the visiting of Budapest spas was in the 
ascendant, while other historical baths in Europe (Baden bei Wien, Karlsbad, Wiesbaden, 
or Marienbad) were losing tourist traffic. For the political and industrial elite Budapest’s 
success as a spa destination showed the nation’s success as a modern and progressive 
country. Perhaps the best praise and validation of Budapest as a “Spa City” came from 
Gaston Gerald, the French Minister of Tourism (and later the founder of the 
Commanderie des Cordons Bleus de France): “Not every nation has the good fortune to 
win through tourism . . . but for the Hungarians nature gave everything to make their 
country one of the centers of European tourism. The beauty of Budapest and its health 
spas are without equal in the world. Every time I am here I feel that I am at the edge of 
the West, at the last stronghold of the West.”99 
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Figure 1. Hungaria Magazin (July 1937). Source: Library of the  
Hungarian Parliament (Országgyűlési Könyvtár) 
 
Budapest had something else to offer for visiting tourists, something that the 
small spa towns of Europe could not compete with: a vibrant nightlife. As the cover art 
for Hungaria Magazin shows the city offered sophisticated dancehalls accompanied by 
the backdrop of the Budapest’s nightlights (See Figure 2). Although I am not certain that 
the cover art represents an actual place, or simply an artistic rendition of the message, in 
reality, the city certainly offered a seemingly limitless variety of busy coffeehouses, bars, 
and nightclubs, from the ordinary through the sophisticated to the risqué. Budapest’s 
nightlife had something to offer to everyone. One of the staples was the EMKE bar where 
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the patrons could enjoy both Gypsy music and jazz. Hungarians often spoke out against 
the predominance of Gypsies in travelogues about Hungary. The above-mentioned Victor 
Tissot made a point about the presence of Gypsies—similar to their “Bedouin 
brothers”—and their culture. Yet, before one blames Tissot’s characterization on 
Westerners’ orientalism, one must read—with stylistic, grammar mistakes, and all—the 
ways Hungarians presented the Budapest scene themselves.  
We must admit that Budapest has also fallen victim to the dancing and jazz band 
epidemic now raging all over the world, although there are ample opportunities in 
Budapest, before the jazz band period, to have really good time with traditional 
gipsy music. There certainly is no another city like Budapest with good gipsy 
bands in every Hotel, Restaurant and Café. 
In many localities the gipsies, those brown-faced descendants of the Pharaohs, 
supply dancing music for the five o’clock teas every afternoon, but the jazz bands 
are even more numerous.
100
 
The undisputed king of 1930s Budapest nightlife was the Arizona Nightclub. The 
establishment catered almost exclusively to foreign tourists. Its fame carried it to the 
pages of Life magazine and an Irish travelogue (entitled: Ilonka Speaks of Hungary: 
Personal Impressions and Interpretation of the National Character) devoted an entire 
chapter to describing a night at the Arizona. The nightclub opened at 10.00 p.m. daily; 
from 11.00 p.m. to 4.00 a.m. there was a cabaret and revue show offering variety 
performances on a revolving stage. Among them one could find African-American jazz 
standards, striking Hawaiian music, Portuguese fado from a “forgotten opera called 
Blanco y Negro,” “exotic ballet,” “acrobatic dancers”who were “apparently naked except 
for the gold paint which covered them” trapeze artists, and a Folies Bergère-style 
performance aptly titled “The Blue Danube.” The small dance stage was crowded with 
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patrons quenching their thirst with premium liquors, wine, and cocktails. Among the 
most popular cocktails was “The Prince of Wales” (apricot brandy, Canadian rye whisky, 
bitters, a splash of water and sugar, garnished with orange peels), rumored to have been 
invented by the Prince of Wales, who before becoming King Edward VIII visited the 
country on numerous occasions. 
101
  
The municipal government made sure that the city presented its best face after 
dark. The Chain Bridge, the Parliament building, the Royal Castle, Heroes’ Square, and 
the Fisherman’s Bastion—among others—were all illuminated nightly. The city also paid 
special attention to public safety. In addition to the regular police force, the municipal 
government continued to improve the street-lighting in the city. In 1926, Budapest spent 
529,582 pengő (c. $1,249,000) on public lighting. By 1938 the annual cost was up to 
nearly one and a half million pengő (c. $4,166,000). As one member of the city 
government said, this sort of improvement was absolutely necessary for a city that wants 
to claim the status of a metropolis, for in the grand cities of the world “lighting has the 
same role as the reflector-light has on a stage, it bathes the main characters in light. 
[Since] Budapest, the Queen of the Danube, is this sort of leading character among the 
metropolises of Europe; it must be bathed in a sea of light before the world.”102 To be 
sure Budapest offered the kind of nightlife and entertainment that was on a par with 
Berlin or Paris. 
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Figure 2. Hungaria Magazin (November 1940). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
Budapest was also promoted as a city of fashion. This promotion was centered on the 
alleged beauty and modernity of the women of Budapest. Yet the representation of the 
women of Budapest remained rather ambivalent. On the one hand, the cosmopolitan, 
progressive, and in all respects Western image of Budapest’s female population served to 
illustrate the modernity of the city as well as the country. Instead of an image of the 
Hungarian as sexist, male chauvinist, and womanizing, Hungary’s intellectual, and to a 
certain degree political, circles aimed to construct an image of a society where women 
were independent and progressive. As the travel magazine cover art illustrates, the 
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Budapest woman was not only attractive and stylish, but as she smokes her cigarette she 
also representated the modern, emancipated women of her time (See Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Hungaria Magazin (November 1937). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
In order to further this image, the government sponsored various international gatherings, 
such as the Eighth World Congress of the International Federation of Business and 
Professional Women in1938.
103
 However, the magazines and travel brochures also 
continued to impress upon the readers the image of a beautiful and sensual Hungarian 
woman. Here are a few sentences from the aforementioned travel guide, published by the 
Budapest Municipal Tourist Office: 
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Good-looking women of all classes are to be found in the crowds: elegantly clad 
ladies of the highest aristocracy, not less handsome women of the wealthy middle 
class, fashionable actresses, representative members of the plutocracy, business 
girls, midinettes and stylish mannequins, all mingle in the delightful kaleidoscope 
for the onlookers, walking aimlessly up and down . . . watched and criticised by 
the men of leisure of the corresponding classes.
104
 
Budapest, together with is baths, nightlife, and beautiful women, was presented—
and was— a cosmopolitan and modern city. Yet it was also the capital city of Hungary, 
and there were tours and activities designed to illustrate the historical nature of the city. 
The tours and publications emphasized the “storied and heroic struggle” of the 
Hungarians that highlighted the achievements of St. Stephen and Budapest’s role in the 
defense of the Christian West against the Ottoman Empire. The St. Stephen’s Day 
celebration in August and the spring festivals gained more and more notice abroad. 
Automobile and bus tours were also carefully laid out on a roadmap whereby the visitor 
would not see the shadier side of the city, its working districts, and its deprived outskirts. 
The IBUSZ’s discounted tour “Three Days in Budapest” was especially successful and by 
the mid-thirties Budapest indeed featured on the great itineraries of European travelers.  
The countryside, almost in direct opposition to Budapest, promoted a different 
face of Hungary. The promotion, much based on the Puszta Romanticism of the past, 
intended to endorse the romantic, traditional, and one could argue exotic Eastern features 
of Hungary. As already discussed earlier, many in Hungary viewed the essence of 
Hungarianness as something rooted in the countryside and its people. Intellectuals, artists, 
and politicians all spoke out against the fast pace of modernization. Their anxiety about 
the disappearance of rural life, its traditions, and its part in the national character made 
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them oppose nearly everything that Budapest stood for. The Hungarian poet and novelist 
Gyula Illyés even stated that Budapest was not in Hungary. In his view only God knew 
where Budapest belonged:  based on who was making the claim, it might have been 
positioned above, under, or next to the country, but not within Hungary.
105
 Their response 
was to rescue rural life by refashioning and presenting at as something uniquely 
Hungarian. 
The quintessential physical landscape of Hungarianness was the Great Plain of 
Eastern Hungary, the Alföld. Cultural anthropologist and ethnographer Tamás Hofer 
argues that in the early- to mid-nineteenth century, “when Hungarians worked out their 
modern national identity, they wanted most of all to be different from Austrians. If the 
Austrians idealized the Alps’ mountainous peaks, then the Hungarians chose the flatness 
of the Great Hungarian Plain as their ‘national landscape.’” 106 Perhaps nothing illustrates 
this distinction better than the first two stanzas from Hungary’s revolutionary writer, 
Sándor Petőfi, in his 1844 poem Az Alföld.With your pines, with your scenic regions, 
Rough Carpathians, you are nothing to me! 
Perhaps I am amazed by you, but I do not like you 
And my imagination does not roam your mountains-valleys. 
 
Down in the ocean smooth regions of the Alföld 
I am at home; my world is there. 
If I see the endlessness of the plains 
My eagle soul escapes from its prison.
107
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The Great Hungarian Plain—and Eastern Hungary in general—was seen by many as the 
home of Hungary’s native lesser nobility, a historical Hungarian class. Amongst the most 
famous of this stratum was Lajos Kossuth, who was born in Monok, in the Tokaj region. 
Eastern Hungary, and especially the Hungarian Plains, was associated with the East more 
than just in terms of geographical proximity. The East of Hungary was often associated 
with the Reformation and the religious and national struggle against the Catholic 
Habsburg dynasty. (Interestingly enough, Transylvania was the other place that earned 
similar accolades—for similar reasons—in Hungarian imagery.) The peasantry, the 
herdsmen, and the shepherds were other dominant features of the Great Plains (See 
Figure 4). In this imagery they were the ones despite modernization who were able to 
retain the original essential Eastern traits of the Magyars. The crown of Eastern Hungary 
was the Hortobágy, the Puszta. This natural grassland stood as an antithesis to noisy, 
hectic, and enclosed Budapest and it was presented in Hungaria Magazin’s English-
language article as the “empire of quiet, rest, and freedom.”108 
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Figure 4. Hungaria Magazin (December 1941). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
For some interwar industry experts and intellectuals the Puszta and its people 
symbolized the uniqueness and individuality of Hungary and Hungarian culture. It was 
presented as a time-travel-like experience whereby the “desk-bound spirit of the slave-
driven town dweller finds utter peace in the intense silence and the feeling of boundless 
liberty.”109 It was promoted as a haven for hunters and lovers of nature. In many ways the 
Hortobágy was represented as the Wild West—or rather the Wild East—of Europe. It 
was untouched by modern life, and the land—like its people—preserved its pristine 
natural beauty. The countryside was steeped in Christian tradition—notwithstanding 
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confessional divisions—and stood in contrast to Budapest’s secular, cosmopolitan, and 
Jewish characteristics. Here the traveler would not find the crowded and noisy coffee 
houses of Budapest. One would not drink champagne and cocktails. Instead one would 
find the csárda (village tavern) where the locals gathered to drink the wines of the plains. 
If the cowboy was the quintessential inhabitant of the American Wild West, then the 
csikós was the living embodiment of Hungary’s Wild East.  Even color had the function 
of intensifying and illustrating the gap between Budapest and the countryside. The 
extravagant collage of colors stood as an obvious contrast to the drabness of the city. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the folk costumes of the women of countryside 
who in every way was the antithesis of the women of Budapest (See Figure 5). She, 
unlike her Budapest counterpart, was represented as one that content with traditional life 
and in harmony with nature.   
The matyó people, with their highly ornamented and vibrantly-colored dresses, 
became the ideal type of what Hungarian propaganda experts wanted to represent as 
Hungary’s unique folk culture.  Mezőkövesd was the town at the center of the matyó 
tradition, even if this tradition was the product of the late nineteenth century. The timing 
is not really all that surprising. The matyó tradition might not enjoy the universal 
recognition of the kilts of the Scottish Highlands, but nevertheless it too is the result of 
the Europe-wide mass production of tradition. As Hugh Trevor-Roper, Terence Ranger, 
and Eric Hobsbawm have shown, most of the folk traditions we think of as timeless 
representations of a certain national group were in fact “invented” and “discovered” in 
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the late nineteenth to early twentieth century as part of converging social and political 
movements connected with the nation-building project.
110
 
 
Figure 5. Hungaria Magazin (November 1939). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
In 1857 the clothing of Mezőkövesd generally speaking became representative of the 
simplicity of the Hungarian peasant class and eschewed colors almost entirely. By the 
1885 National Exhibition the Mezőkövesd folk culture, with its highly ornamented 
dresses and “oriental cacophony of colors”—as contemporaries described it— was one of 
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the central pieces of the display.
111
 There were three reasons behind this metamorphosis. 
The first underlying cause was the nineteenth-century Hungarian nationalists’ desire to 
emphasize the distinctiveness of the Magyars vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups, mainly 
the Austrians. Second, it was a response to modernization and modernity that was 
associated with the newly developing bourgeoisie, who in general was of non-Magyar 
origin. And lastly, there was the peasants’ own striving to enrich their culture with colors 
and ornaments hitherto characteristic of the Magyar nobility. According to national 
activists, at the heart of the Hungarian distinctiveness were the “folk soul” and its “Asian 
love of pomp.”  As Tamás Hofer argues, “colourful clothing, richly elaborated wedding 
rituals and other village festival . . . were turned into supposed proofs of Asian or Eastern 
identity.”112  
In post-Trianon Hungary politicians, intellectuals, and tourism professionals 
certainly appreciated the value of folk culture and tradition. In 1921 the Catholic prelate 
and parliamentary delegate Sándor Giesswein stated that it was everyone’s duty to “dig 
up and preserve the traditions of the past.” As an example he offered Mezőkövesd and 
Sweden. During his visit to Sweden he had been duly impressed by the fact that the 
women of Sweden did not follow the latest Parisian fashion trends, but instead preferred 
their folk costumes to be their everyday clothing. He went on to argue that this sort of 
commitment in Hungary could only be found in Mezőkövesd, where folk traditions and 
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craftsmanship was still alive. To further the development he even suggested making folk 
craft mandatory in schools for both girls and boys. 
113
  
 In a special symposium organized by the progressive literary journal Nyugat 
(interestingly enough “Nyugat” means “West” in Hungarian) intellectuals and industry 
experts gathered to discuss the state of Hungarian tourism.  It was here that the 
contemporary literary giant Zsigmond Móricz also argued for the necessity of 
reevaluating the role of the countryside in Hungarian tourism. While he was somewhat 
ambivalent about the idea of mass tourism—he referred to it as a mass epidemic—he too 
realized its value and argued that in order to incorporate the countryside into the tourist 
itinerary, it needed investment. According to his evaluation, the habit of “blasting the 
visitors by showing our Trianon wounds” would not be beneficial, for sympathy cannot 
be earned this way. Instead, he put his faith in the supposed hospitality of the 
Hungarians—which he maintained was a national trait going back to the times of St. 
Stephen—as the basic building block of tourism.114 
Once again, Béla Mátéka’s manuscript provides evidence for the first steps that 
were taken to incorporate the countryside into the tourist flow. In 1923 the village 
association of Mezőkövesd decided to organize a day of exhibitions and culture. The 
organizers contacted Mátéka at the Budapest Metropolitan Tourist Office. With  
considerable difficulty Mátéka gathered about thirty foreigners and took a train ride to the 
village. They enjoyed day-long festivities that included meals and wine in the csárda, 
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gypsy music, and matyó dance.
115
 After this modest beginning Mezőkövesd and the 
matyó soon became an important  stop for the thousands of travelers who took the 
reduced-price train service (filléres vonatok) arranged by IBUSZ —based on the Italian 
model of treno popolare—to this and other provincial destinations to experience the 
tranquility of the countryside and its peasant weddings and harvest festivals. 
Despite this relative success, critics did not fail to point out that the picture of the 
Great Plains was highly romanticized and very unrealistic. The brochures and propaganda 
failed to mention the poverty and shortages that also characterized the region. In 
Mezőkövesd, for example, the Hungarian Royal Railways and the Budapest Metropolitan 
Tourist Office opened a guest hostel—Matyó House—which claimed to offer an 
“authentic” matyó experience for 60-70 tourists per night. Opponents of such projects 
referred to it as a “Potemkin Pub” and argued that this and similar developments did not 
address the real-life problems of country folk. Instead, they exacerbated existing 
problems by commercializing traditional lifestyle, which critics feared would ultimately 
lead to the disappearance of real traditions.
116
 
The third component of the tourist image of Hungary focused on the Lake Balaton 
and, to a lesser degree, the provincial cities of the country.  This image aimed to combine 
progress and modernity with natural beauty of the countryside. Lake Balaton—“the 
Hungarian Sea”— is the largest freshwater lake in Central Europe. It is approximately 
forty-eight miles long and its average width is about six miles. Its average depth is about 
ten feet (the deepest point is about forty feet) which makes it possible to enjoy the lake 
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from the end of May to the end of September. The growth of beach culture around Lake 
Balaton lagged behind that in other countries. While the English seaside, for example, 
experienced a major transformation at the end of the eighteenth century, the first 
organized attempt to transform Lake Balaton took place only in 1873 under the auspices 
of the Spa Joint-Stock Company of Almád (Almádi Fürdő Részvénytársaság).117 The 
completion of the Southern Line (Budapest-Zagreb-Rijeka railway connection that 
included the entire southern shore of the lake) in the same year helped the development 
of the region, but for the most part the growth remained sporadic and ad-hoc. It was it the 
late 1880s that the first major hotels were built in Siófok, which became a desirable 
destination because its proximity to Budapest (less than two hours by train). The first 
scientific attempts to study the lake were a result of the 1891 establishment of the 
Hungarian Geographic Society’s Balaton Committee (Magyar Földrajzi Társaság Balaton 
Bizottsága) under the leadership of Lajos Lóczy. In passing one may note that one of 
Professor Lóczy’s most ardent geography students was Pál Teleki, later Prime Minister. 
Nevertheless, until the end of the First World War there was little to no sustained 
government interest in the lake. 
With Trianon Hungary lost its connection to the Adriatic (and hence to the resort 
towns of the Istria), and Lake Balaton gained more and more significance. Between 1921 
and 1927 the number of villas around the lake grew from 1,960 to 3,236. Simultaneously 
the development of beach culture and Balaton’s tourism came into the government’s 
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focus. By 1928 the government financed the building of the Balaton highway, opened 
new harbors and a regular ferry service, and established a permanent research institute for 
the scientific study of the lake at Tihany.
118
 In order to regulate and enhance the 
development of beach culture around the lake the Council of Ministers established the 
Royal Balaton Management Committee (Királyi Balatoni Intéző Bizottság or Kirbib) in 
April 1928. The president of Kirbib, Lajos Körmendy Ékes, pointed out the two main 
goals of the committee. First, they wanted to improve the quality of the settlements 
around the lake. This ambition required a great deal of new investment in the 
infrastructure (water and drainage systems, road building, and the establishment of new 
harbors, as well as new hotel developments) and agreed guidelines for all waterfront 
development. The second issue Kirbib sought to address was the issue of prices. While 
certainly cheaper than the Italian or French Riviera, the prices around Lake Balaton were 
comparatively higher than anywhere else in the country. Because of the short season 
restaurant and hotel owners aimed to “make up” for lost time with higher prices, which 
according to Körmendy Ékes, harmed both domestic and foreign tourism.
119
 The 
development of the 125-mile-long waterfront around the lake greatly benefited from the 
regulations of the earlier mentioned Law XVI of 1929, which gave control to a 
government sanctioned body to designate and appropriate land for holiday resorts. 
By the late 1920s and early 1930s governmental and industry circles alike had 
very high hopes for Lake Balaton. The once-unimportant body of water and its environs 
were now a “national treasure” comparable in significance only to Budapest.  The 
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question of Lake Balaton was widely discussed in the Parliament as well. Members of 
Parliament argued that the development of Lake Balaton as a resort area would enable 
foreigners to view Hungary as nation with a highly developed culture rather than the land 
of the Puszta and a people of shepherds.
120
 They demanded the modernization of hotels—
some even went as far to insist that the perfect model should be the Lido of Venice and 
its Grand Hotel Excelsior.
121
 The government allocated an annual 150,000 pengő (c. 
$353,775) for fifteen years to finance the expansion of the lake. Parliamentary members 
also demanded better propaganda for the lake and berated Hungarian newspapers and 
film stars for promoting foreign destinations, such as Biarritz and Monte Carlo on the 
French Riviera or San Remo in Italy, instead of Lake Balaton.
122
 
“Sport in Sonne, Luft und Wasser” (sport in sun, air, and water) reads the German 
tagline promotion of the special Balaton edition of Hungaria Magazin. Indeed, the 
promotion depicted Lake Balaton as the “playground of Hungary” where all sort of 
sports—from waterskiing to sailing to car racing and tennis—were available (See Figure 
6). The photo collage of beautiful bikini-clad women—with the tagline “She…and the 
Balaton”—also hinted at the promise of romantic encounters. 123 But Balaton was not 
only promoted to those of healthy and beautiful bodies. On the contrary, the supposed 
“invigorating” medical benefit of the Balaton—similar to the likes of a “gigantic 
bathroom with radioactive waters”— made the lake perfect for the “frail and sick” and 
                                                             
120 Képviselőházi Napló, II. kötet, 1935, 377 (June 6, 1935). 
 
121 Képviselőházi Napló, XVII. kötet, 1927, 342 (February 7, 1929). 
 
122 Ibid. 
 
123 “Sport in Sonne, Luft und Wasser,” Hungaria Magazin (May 1938), 10-13.  
 
231 
 
was advertised as the “best possible remedy for weak children, according to the new 
English-language bulletin of the Hungarian National Tourist Board.
124
 Lake Balaton was 
also publicized as a paradise for amateur pilots and car enthusiasts. The Royal Hungarian 
Automobile Club organized tours to the Balaton with guaranteed quality service and the 
best prices in selected gas and service stations. (A small notice warned that in Hungary 
the rule was “keep to the left and overtake on the right.)  
 
Figure 6. Hungaria Magazin (May 1938). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
Along the shoreline the larger cities of Siófok, Balatonfüred, and Keszthely 
offered cultural and culinary programs to visitors. The latter, Keszthely—also known as 
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the “Capital of the Hungarian Sea”—resurrected its nineteenth-century, several week-
long cultural festival, the “Helikon” (named after the mythic Mount Helicon, home of the 
Greek muses).  The city—which was dubbed by Hungarians the “Hungarian Zurich” and 
“Little Weimar”—also offered summer seminars and shorter holiday courses to 
foreigners on a variety of topics. Among the courses, which were presented in English, 
German, French, and Italian, were “Hungary and European Culture,” “Periods of 
Hungarian Humanism,” or “The Hungarian Spirit in Our Epic Poems.”125 In 1934, the 
local newspaper proudly exclaimed in a headline: “We are starting to be fashionable.”126 
Indeed the following year the town reported a 240 percent rise in tourist traffic.
127
 
 Balaton was also promoted as a destination for a newly developing type of 
tourism: village tourism. The Országos Magyar Weekend Egyesület (National Hungarian 
Weekend League) and the Kirbib published material to educate those involved in this 
emerging facet of tourism. While the main target of village tourism was Hungarians, it is 
safe to say that English-language articles such as the “Romance of Lake Balaton” aimed 
to promote a different, more traditional and more relaxing side of the Hungarian Sea.
128
 
This promotion focused on the surrounding “beautifully wooded slopes, valleys, and 
vineyards” of the northern slopes and the natural settings of the lake. 
Various travel organizations, led by IBUSZ, organized excursions and longer 
tours to the Balaton. They offered “two for one” coupons and prearranged discounted 
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trains to various destinations on the shoreline. According to the local Keszthely 
newspaper, in 1932 two specially-discounted trains brought 1,738 passengers to the 
town.
129
 Balaton was represented in the various travel exhibitions and world’s fairs as one 
of the centers of Hungarian tourism. Travel posters and brochures in various languages 
promoted Lake Balaton as the beach destination for all. Romanticized, poetic descriptions 
of its beauty appeared in magazines. Scientific works on its flora and fauna were 
translated and distributed worldwide. Works of József Egry, painter of Balaton 
landscapes, found their way to galleries and exhibitions from New York to Berlin.  
The available statistics offer a somewhat misleading picture. According to 1932 
statistics, during the year 2,395 foreigners spent 93,220 nights at the lake. By 1937 the 
number of foreign tourists grew to 13,084 and the nights spent grew to 175, 125.
130
 
However, despite the growing number of beach-goers and the unquestionable 
improvements made, the Balaton’s tourism remained hampered by problems of 
insufficient infrastructure, seasonal limitations, and an inadequate level of beach culture. 
As a tool of foreign policy, the Balaton’s contribution, while not entirely insignificant, 
did not lived up to its billing either. The Kirbib also realized the need for future 
development and in 1938 it worked out a five-year plan. It called for the restructuring of 
the region’s agriculture, modernization of transportation (bus lines, airport, and shipping), 
expansion of infrastructure (roads, harbors, and hotels), preservation of cultural and 
historical sites, and the establishment of museums and cultural centers. The entire plan 
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called for an investment of twenty million pengő. Yet, because of the changing political 
climate and the looming war, this grand plan was not realized.
131
 
Of course, there were other places in the countryside that enjoyed the benefits of 
tourism. For example, the mountain resort of Lillafüred, which was a personal project of 
Prime Minister István Bethlen—and thus a rather controversial topic in Parliament—was 
established to fill the void of the lost resorts of the Tatra Mountains. The grandiose plan 
called for the drilling of a thermal spring and for the organization of an international film 
festival, neither of which was fully realized. The city of Szeged in 1931 organized its first 
Open Air Performance. Over the years the festival gained a European-wide reputation, 
and like its model, the Salzburg Festspiele, entertained large audiences. The repertoire 
during the early years included Imre Madách’s drama The Tragedy of Man (Az ember 
tragédiája), Zoltán Kodály’s folk opera Háry János, or performances of Puccini’s 
Turandot. The KÜM press division provided tickets and transportation for the foreign 
media that included representatives from Reuters, The New York Times, Neues Wiener 
Tagblatt, and the like.
132
 Yet perhaps the most prominent cultural diplomatic 
achievement was the Fourth International World Scout Jamboree that was held in 1933 at 
the Royal Palace of Gödöllő.  This was quite a coup for the Hungarians since after 
England (twice) and Denmark, Hungary was only the third country to organize this 
international gathering. Newspapers worldwide reported that the nearly 30,000 scouts 
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were welcomed by Regent Horthy and the founder of the Scouts, Lord Baden-Powell, 
and Chief Hungarian Scout Pál Teleki.
133
 
The three different landscapes and the meanings they carried divided intellectuals, 
politicians, and tourism experts alike, yet under the government’s watchful eyes all three 
images of Hungary—and visions of Hungarianness—were utilized. The government 
aimed to assist the development of all three with various degrees of financial, legislative, 
and moral support.
134
 An undated pamphlet titled “Fairy Tales Become True: Come and 
See Hungary” from the Hungarian embassy in London gives a sense of the types of 
propaganda that resulted of the negotiation of images and ideals:  
It is hard to avoid using what may seem extravagant language when writing about 
Hungary. Europe is awakening to the fact that Hungary is an inviting and 
rewarding field of travel for tourists seeking something new and different in the 
way of holiday experience. 
Hungary was once a powerful and big country. Now she is dismembered, reduced 
to one third of her prewar size, yet in spite of this, the Magyars have preserved the 
nation’s age old traditions, intellectual supremacy and moral integrity, thus 
maintaining their spiritual unity with Western Civilization. 
In order to become acquainted with Hungary, a country as yet insufficiently 
known, one has to study the history of the country to learn the special character of 
Hungary’s culture. 
Creation of art, natural beauty; the modern life of Budapest, the world’s greatest 
health resort; the unique vision of the Hungarian prairie, the gay colours of the 
picturesque national costumes and, last but not least, the proverbial Hungarian 
hospitability await you, thus making your holiday a delightful and never to be 
forgotten experience. 
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So come to Hungary and prepare for a voyage such as you have never before even 
dreamed of.
135
 
From the late twenties on—despite the universally negative effects of the Great 
Depression –the Hungarian tourism industry steadily expanded. By the mid-1930s it 
started to show that, the continuing discussion and negotiation of the “real” Hungarian 
tourist image notwithstanding, the tourist industry was indeed more than just an 
economic concern. The crowning achievement of Hungarian tourism and the ultimate 
representation of the country was to take place in 1938, designated as the Year of St. 
Stephen to commemorate the 900th anniversary of the death of Hungary’s first king.  
 
1938: Hopes, Disappointments, and Change 
Tourism professionals and politicians alike looked forward to 1938 with much 
hopes that were ultimately unfulfilled. What was to be a crowning achievement actually 
signaled the beginning of decline and yet another restructuring of the Hungarian tourist 
industry. In accordance with shifting national priorities, it was no longer Árpád and his 
chieftains that represented the image of Hungarianness.  It was the figure of St. 
Stephen—Hungary’s first warrior-king— that became the central historical figure worthy 
of celebration (See Figure 7). The Year of St. Stephen was designed to be the ultimate 
display of Hungary’s bona fides as a European nation and the definitive demonstration of 
its Christian character. It was to prove that Christianity was one of the key elements of 
Hungarian national identity. Regardless of confessional divisions between the largely 
Protestant eastern Hungary and the majority Catholic population of the West, Christianity 
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had a unifying impact by focusing on the country’s role in defending Western (European) 
Christendom against the tides of non-Christian invaders. Christianity was also closely 
connected with the question of Hungary’s European credentials. The decision of its 
founder and first king, St. Stephen, to accept the crown from the Catholic Pope linked 
Hungary forever to Western Christendom—so the argument went.  This was to be a year 
of religious and secular celebration of Hungary, seeking to gain international attention for 
the country.  
 
Figure 7. Hungaria Magazin (August 1938). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
 
The central event of the celebration was the Thirty-fourth International 
Eucharistic Congress in Budapest. The first main gathering of the world’s Catholics to 
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celebrate the Eucharist was held in 1881 in Lille, France. After Fist World War the event 
had been hosted by Rome, Amsterdam, Chicago, Sydney, Tunis, Dublin, and Manila.
136
 
The idea to hold the Eucharistic Congress in Hungary was born in 1929. The main 
organizer of the event was Cardinal Jusztinián Serédi, Archbishop of Esztergom and 
Primate of Hungary. He recalled that his “struggle” to secure Hungary as the host of the 
1938 congress was especially difficult for the country behind him was not a massive 
nation, but a “small and humiliated” one. In addition he feared the “unchristian-like 
behaviors” of other nations, particularly those of the “successor states,” for he believed 
that they would be able to “scuttle” (megfúr) the Hungarian plans with the assistance of 
France.
137
 Both secular and religious leaders realized the significance of the event. 
Zsigmond Mihalovics, canon and the director of the congress, first and foremost 
emphasized the importance of the event in the fight against atheism—perhaps a barely- 
concealed reference to Bolshevism. Yet he also pointed out that Hungary must make the 
best of this “special propaganda occasion” for “never before have we had a similar 
occasion to showcase ourselves to foreigners in a more sympathetic way.”138 In 1937 
Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi and Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya visited Adolf 
Hitler. On this occasion Darányi informed Hitler that it was the wish of Regent Horthy —
although he was himself a Protestant—that Hitler should not put any obstacles in the way 
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of German pilgrims wishing to attend the congress. The Führer’s answer was evasive and 
conditional on the state of the relationship between Nazi Germany and the Vatican.
139
  
The opening ceremony in May was attended by Hungarian as well as international 
religious and secular leaders. Among them of course were Regent Horthy and his wife, 
who as a Catholic was also the patroness of the event, and Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli as 
the representative of the Holy See. Cardinal Pacelli—who after March 1939 was better 
known as Pope Pius XII—in his opening remarks paid tribute to Hungary as the shield of 
Christendom and defender of Christian civilization. In his speech the Cardinal also 
emphasized that once again Christendom was in danger and called for its defense 
“against the leaders of religious negation and of social revolution” following the example 
of Hungary’s earlier struggle against the Turkish infidels.140 The clear danger was 
Bolshevism. However, in the wake of the Anschluss, which had taken place just two 
months earlier, the looming danger of Nazi Germany too was considerable. Once again, I 
think Hanebrink is correct in arguing that both Hungarians and the Vatican judged the 
Budapest Congress “as an event at once anti-Communist and antifascist.”141 The 
Eucharistic Congress came to end on May 28, 1938. The following day saw the official 
launch of the Year of St. Stephen.  
St. Stephen’s Year—which included the traditional St. Stephen’s Week and St. 
Stephen’s Day—cannot be divorced from the celebration of Hungarian statehood. 
Despite its  religious overtones it was also a secular celebration of the ideals and history 
of the Hungarian Kingdom and its first king. The patron of the 1938 festivities was 
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Regent Horthy. These festivities were central events in Hungarian tourism as well. The 
programs of 1938 were designed to satisfy tourists of every kind. They  included the 
gathering of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta led by Grandmaster  Prince Chigi 
Albani della Rovere, the International Hungarian Pilot-Picnic, but the highlight of the 
celebrations took place in August. 
Much of the program of 1938 was the continuation of earlier established practices 
of the traditional August 20 St. Stephen’s Day festivities and those of the 1930 St. Imre’s 
Year. St. Imre, or Emeric, was the son of St. Stephen. He died at the age of twenty-four in 
a hunting accident.  The year 1930, the 900th anniversary of his death, was designated the 
Year of St. Imre, which in many ways was a “dress rehearsal” for the 1938 celebration of 
St. Stephen.  It included the performances of the Gyöngyös Bokréta (Pearly Bouquet), a 
performance group entirely devoted to the preservation and promotion of folk-culture. 
The group, which was established in 1931, enjoyed the moral and financial support of the 
government. Year after year the dance performances were one of the central programs of 
the August celebrations. In a way they brought the traditions, sounds, and colors of the 
countryside to Budapest. In August 1938 the group—which included sixty different 
ensembles with 1,400 performers—gave twelve performances.142 In many ways 
throughout the years the St. Stephen’s Day celebration changed in purpose and objective.  
According to August 1927 statistics, there were 15,139 domestic guests, from the “lost 
territories” 3,210, and 6,629 foreigners were registered in the hotels and pensions of 
Budapest. In contrast, ten years later there were 7,653 domestic guests, from the “lost 
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territories” 3,084 and 28,068 foreigners in the same Budapest venues. 143 The absence of 
domestic visitors was something of which contemporary experts were keenly aware. 
Behind the transformation were the rising prices of Budapest accommodations and the 
tourist organizations’ concentrated foreign propaganda. The Hungarian celebration of 
Hungarianness ironically became a spectacle for foreigners. Different ideas were thrown 
around on how to bring back the people of the countryside. This and similar ideas maybe 
behind the fact that in 1938, while the already popular fireworks and procession of the 
Holy Right (the mummified right hand of St. Stephen) were retained, they also sent the 
holiest relic of the Hungarian Catholic Church on a cross-country tour  for the first time 
in its history. In the ultimate show of governmental participation, the House of 
Parliament temporarily relocated to Székesfehérvár, which was the ancient royal seat of 
the Hungarian Crown and the final resting place of  fifteen Hungarian kings (albeit not to 
St. Stephen). It was here that the members of the Parliament proclaimed Law XXIV of 
1938 which made August 20 a national holiday in order to commemorate the life and 
works of St. Stephen “the creator of the Christian Hungarian state, who laid the 
foundation of the nation’s European mission.”144 Indeed, this was the main message of 
the celebrations. Just like the holy year itself it too had a dual message—both religious 
and secular. On the one hand, it aimed to illustrate the Christian character and traditions 
of the country, while, on the other, it aimed to emphasize the nation’s equally important 
European character to foreigners and domestic audiences alike.  
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Despite governmental support and the best efforts of the various tourist 
organizations, 1938 failed to bring the desired results. In 1938 the number of foreign 
visitors in Budapest declined by 20 percent. At the same time the Lake Balaton region 
experienced a 60 percent decline in the number of visiting foreigners. In the rest of the 
countryside the number of foreign visitors dropped by 30 percent. Especially problematic 
was the decline in Western tourist traffic: from Austria (-48 percent), Great Britain (-48 
percent), France (-42 percent), Germany (-28 percent) and the United States (-23 
percent). As a result, the overall revenue from foreign tourism fell from the previous 
year’s 38.3 million pengő (c. $106,388,888) to 28.8 million (c. $80,000,000).145 
Consequently, the tourism industry’s investment in the St. Stephen Year did not yield an 
acceptable return. For example, a confidential report prepared by the OMIH stated that 
the exceptional expenditures of the St. Stephen Year and the Eucharistic Congress nearly 
bankrupted the organization and consumed the entire annual budget of the 
organization.
146
 
The drastic decline of tourism was a continent-wide phenomenon, which can be 
best explained by the volatile state of international relations. Nazi Germany’s annexation 
of Austria, the growing tension in the Sudetenland, and overall fears and rumors of a 
coming war resulted in a general anxiety about foreign travel. Hungary was especially 
impacted by this because of its geographical location. Vienna, which in the past was 
“jumping-off point” to Hungary for many Western tourists was lost as such. In addition, 
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the impact of the 1937/1938 economic recession and the subsequent currency 
devaluations made travel less affordable.  
However, there were two developments that gave reason for cautious optimism 
and served as impetus for some major restructuring of the Hungarian tourism industry. 
First, with the First Vienna Award (November 1938) parts of the Felvidék (Upper 
Hungary) returned to Hungary. With this decision—or dictate as some would argue—the 
Hungarian tourist industry was given new possibilities. The Hungaria Magazin did not 
waste much time and immediately started the foreign and domestic promotion of the 
region. 
 
Figure 8. Hungaria Magazin (April 1939). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
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  On the cover of the April 1939 Hungaria Magazin one can see a picture of a 
Hungarian soldier, with a flower arrangement on his helmet, as he marches toward a 
medieval castle that looks like the castle of Krasznahorka or Krásna Hôrka, which after 
Trianon belonged to Czechoslovakia until the decision made in Vienna in 1938 (See 
Figure 8). This cover art also signaled the second changing trend of Hungarian tourism: 
its new emphasis on the domestic market. The newly reacquired territories and the 
growing numbers of domestic tourists led to new debate about a need to prioritize the 
domestic traveler even on the expense of its foreign counterpart.  
Discussions about changes necessitated by the recent developments reached the 
highest levels. The parliamentary exchange between Count György Apponyi and the 
Minister of Commerce and Transportation, Antal Kunder, illustrates the tension. Apponyi 
expressed his concerns about the new direction of the tourist industry in which the 
domestic market would have priority over the foreign market. He argued that the focus 
hitherto on tourism’s foreign propaganda was correct, because it enabled the country to 
“vindicate the just nature of its cause [i.e. revision of the treaty].” While he agreed with 
the necessity for governmental oversight, Apponyi rejected the idea that the government 
should follow the examples provided by the German Kraft durch Freude or that of the 
Italian Dopolavoro and change its focus to promote domestic working class tourism at the 
expense of the foreign promotion. He also voiced his dislike of the organizational and 
personal changes that had taken place within the leading organs of the Hungarian tourist 
industry, which he believed were the result of an unofficial arianization of the industry.
147
 
In his reply Minister Kunder aimed to reassure the House that the government sought to 
improve both domestic and foreign tourism. He categorically rejected the idea that any 
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kind of arianization was taking place within the leading organs of the industry. While 
there were no Jews among those who had lost their position within the OMIH, he would 
not explain the circumstances behind the personnel changes.
148
 One can only speculate 
about the real reasons, but it is important to note that nearly two months after this 
exchange the Second Hungarian Jewish Law (Law IV of 1939) limited to 6 percent the 
number of Jews allowed to be employed in the public and governmental, as well as in 
certain intellectual, sectors. The above-mentioned confidential OMIH report testifies to 
some of the organizational and rationality changes that the government sought to deploy 
in order to address the impact of the new political climate. The highest organ of 
Hungarian tourism was to be the newly established Tourist Propaganda Work 
Association (Idegenforgalmi Propaganda Munkaközösség), which oversaw and regulated 
the entire industry’s propaganda both home and abroad. The report acknowledges a 
number of challenges, among them: the war-like atmosphere, political aversion, currency 
issues, passport and visa difficulties, the absence of American travelers because of the 
New York World’s Fair, covert governmental restrictions on foreign travel, and rumors 
and anxiety in general.
149
 
Indeed, Hungarian tourist propaganda had not given up foreign tourists.  The new 
campaign aimed to restore confidence in Hungarian travel by emphasizing the peaceful 
characteristics of the country. Tourist propaganda, much like cultural diplomacy in 
general, also targeted the US public. A special edition of the Hungaria Magazin 
distributed at the New York World’s Fair aimed to convince the American reader that 
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Hungary was the European Maryland. In this Maryland, which suffered throughout its 
“glorious history of 1000 years,” now only “the ancient stones recount the history of the 
past,” for “the people themselves think only of the future: a future of freedom in a 
peaceful Europe.”150 The cover art of the magazine, depicting a Hungarian woman 
dressed in folk clothing setting the dove of peace free, sought to reinforce this message of 
peacefulness (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Hungaria Magazin (Special Edition, 1939). Source: Library of the Hungarian Parliament 
While tourism propaganda and cultural diplomacy continued to promote the idea 
of Hungary as a peaceful and European nation, actual foreign policy took a more and 
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more belligerent stand. In March 1939 Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. 
After the August 1940 Second Vienna Award, which granted Hungary Northern 
Transylvania, Hungarian troops marched into the region. As a recent work by Balázs 
Ablonczy indicates, tourism played an important role in the Transylvanian nation-
building efforts in which the Hungarian government sought to repatriate Transylvania 
back to the Hungarian imagination.
151
 As Hungary entered the war, Hungarian tourism 
promotion became limited and inward looking. Just as cultural diplomacy lost reason to 
exist, so did the foreign promotion of Hungarian tourism. 
 
Conclusion 
 “No nation can live without the aspiration of greatness, wrote Hungarian writer 
and public intellectual, Sándor Márai in 1938.
152
 After the First World War one of the 
ways Hungary sought to establish its greatness was through a cultural diplomatic 
campaign that utilized the recently-born tourist industry. In Hungary, just as in many 
other nations worldwide, governmental circles, intellectuals, and industry experts realized 
that tourism was more than just an economic factor. Even before the war, as Hungarian 
tourism was in its embryonic state, there was cooperation between the private sector and 
governmental administration, for tourism contributed to Hungarian nation-building 
efforts. After the war, as the government recognized that tourism also could be utilized as 
a potent yet nonconfrontational weapon of propaganda the collaboration between private 
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sector and the government became even more pronounced. However, at this time the goal 
changed. The new objective had more to do with the foreign promotion of Hungary. 
Tourism was seen as an essential component of foreign policy, a tool of cultural 
diplomacy. While the relationship between the private and government sectors was 
mutually beneficial, the latter began to take charge of the tourist industry as soon as the 
economic and political situation allowed it.  
Hungarian tourism promotion had to address two related problems. On the one 
hand, the country’s foreign image was either negative or it was based on stereotypes 
steeped in nineteenth-century Puszta romanticism. This was a source of concern, for 
cultural diplomacy’s key argument was that Hungary was a modern and progressive 
country, and as such the region’s best representative of European values. On the other 
hand, industry experts and government officials also had to account for the different 
domestic visions of Hungarianness. Competing visions and beliefs of Hungarianness—
often with roots in the country’s past— were mapped onto various landscapes. As a 
result, different geographical settings acquired different meanings. In the end, Hungarian 
tourism promoters utilized three different landscapes and connected them with different 
meanings in order to attract as many visitors as possible. In this process Budapest became 
the symbol of Hungary’s European character, the emblem of progress, modernity, and 
cosmopolitanism. The Great Hungarian Plain and its people, in contrast, were the 
physical representatives of the country’s Eastern and “Oriental” past, as well as its 
conservative and traditional character. The culture and natural beauty of the countryside 
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was to illustrate the uniqueness of Hungary.
153
 The third landscape—the rest, which 
included the Lake Balaton—was presented as an amalgam of the modern and the 
traditional. While Budapest remained the undisputed center of Hungarian tourism, the 
Great Plains, the Balaton, and the some other destinations also began to contribute to the 
growth of Hungarian tourism. Between 1927 and 1938 the Hungarian tourist industry—
despite the negative impact of the Great Depression— experienced rapid growth as the 
country became one of the popular European destinations. The looming threat of war and 
worsening economic situation made 1938—which was designated as a special year for 
the Hungarian tourist industry as it was the secular and religious celebration of the 
nation—a failure. During the subsequent years as Hungary edged closer and closer to the 
abyss of war, the function and governing motif of the tourist industry also changed. 
Ultimately, the war almost completely destroyed a once promising industry. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BECOMING AUDIBLE AND VISIBLE: RADIO BROADCASTING AND 
CINEMATIC PRODUCTION IN THE SERVICE OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 
 
“I was not serious about this. Everything that we do is politics in any case,  
but at least we deny it.” 
                                                                                           (Miklós Kozma, 1929)
1
 
These two sentences, written by Miklós Kozma’s upon his return from an 
international radio conference held in Constantinople where he argued for the need to 
keep radio broadcasting apolitical, provide the basic argument for this chapter. He typed 
these two sentences in parentheses after the official summary of his trip. The first 
sentence referred to the official position that he took on the international stage: radio 
broadcasting must be kept apolitical. He was surely not serious about it, for he, and most 
everybody else, believed that radio was a political tool. This conviction was not limited to 
radio but also influenced cinematic production. His two-sentence notation essentially 
affirmed, that in the post-First World War international climate, no cultural production 
was apolitical. Early twentieth-century technological advances made in radio and cinema 
provided new weapons to those in charge of Hungarian cultural diplomacy. Miklós 
Kozma was one of these people. He was what today one might call a media tycoon. He 
was in charge of the Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI—Hungarian Telegraph Bureau); 
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founder and majority owner of the Magyar Telefon Hirmondó és Rádió Rt (MTHR—
Hungarian Telephone News Service and Radio); and creator of the Magyar Filmiroda 
(MFI—Hungarian Film Bureau).  He was also a politician. Between 1935 and 1937 he 
was the minister of interior, then, for a short time in 1940-1941, governor of Carpatho-
Ukraine. However, while Kozma’s role in Hungarian cultural diplomacy is undeniable, 
this chapter is not all about him.
2
 Instead I want to illustrate the ways that the Hungarian 
political elite reorganized and utilized the modern mediums of radio and cinematic 
production in the campaign that aimed to further establish the country’s European 
credentials.  
While the chapter examines radio broadcasting and cinema production separately, 
the basic questions they raise are the same. What steps did the government take to 
provide the necessary technology and infrastructure? In what ways did the international 
events aid or challenge the ways in which the Hungarian political and business 
professionals sought to redefine the nation’s foreign image? What message did they seek 
to distribute and how did they do it? To what degree did domestic discussion of 
Hungarianness inform the decision of this message? In other words, the chapter looks to 
go beyond the sound of the radio and the frame of the picture. Having said this, the 
chapter also has its limitations, the most obvious of which is to not include feature films 
in my examination of cinematic production. The first reason for this exclusion is a 
pragmatic one, for I do not believe that I could have done justice to such a complex issue 
as interwar Hungarian feature film production in the space allotted. The second reason is 
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that feature films’ primary target audience was domestic and its main purpose was to 
entertain. Kulturfilme, and to a certain degree newsreels, were made directly in service of 
informing foreign audiences and enhancing Hungary’s image abroad. As such they were 
essential components of Hungarian cultural diplomacy. 
 
Radio Broadcasting: Providing Voice for a Nation  
“Little copper threads are nation builders … the annihilation of space and time in 
the transmission of intelligence is a basic thing in the progress of the world,” reads the 
1922 The Complete Radio Book.
3
 In the case of Hungary the history of these “little 
copper threads”—the basic materials for early radio receivers—goes back to 1903. It was 
the year that the Hungarian government purchased the country’s first radio transceiver. 
The first experimental connection was achieved with antennas placed between the 
smokestacks of the Manfréd Weiss Works and the United Incandescent Lamp and 
Electrics Company. The reception was not good because of the proximity of the electric 
streetcars. Nevertheless, the experiment aroused the interest of military and government 
circles both in Budapest and Vienna, marking the beginning of the government’s long-
standing attention to the potential of radio. At the beginning of the First World War, the 
Hungarian government purchased two more radio transceivers to keep a connection 
between Budapest, Sofia, and Istanbul (in addition to the already working connection 
with Vienna). The war further accelerated research in the already exciting areas of 
radiotelephony and wireless telegraphy. In the fall of 1921 a new five kilowatt telegraph 
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station opened in Csepel.
4
 The first Hungarian broadcasting studio was actually an old 
furniture-moving cart that stood on Gyáli Street. The first two kilowatt radio transmitter 
(later enlarged to three kilowatts) in Csepel was imported from Germany in January 
1925. Opening experimental broadcasting began in May of that year, four years after 
Pittsburgh’s KDKA station made the world’s first public broadcast.5 
By 1925 the government clearly recognized the potential of radio broadcasting. 
Archival sources indicate that from the early 1920s foreign consulates paid extra attention 
to the development of this new technology. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the 
correspondence between the London consulate and the KÜM. Károly Rácz, who was also 
foreign correspondent of the MTI, pointed to the development of the new media in Great 
Britain and emphasized its utility for global communication and propaganda.
6
 In many 
ways it was the BBC model, “chartered by the Crown and operated for the national 
benefit,”7 which provided the blueprint for the further growth of Hungarian radio. The 
question was not if the government should or should not be concerned with the new 
media, but to what degree. There were two international alternatives to select. The first 
alternative was to follow the US model. It was a more “chaotic” system in which radio 
was a private and unregulated enterprise. The BBC model was the more “orderly,” for 
radio remained a private enterprise, enjoyed government monopoly, but was state-
                                                             
4 Kilowatt is the SI unit measuring power. In the case of radio broadcasting it measures the power of 
electromagnetic output. In simple terms the greater the number is the farther and better quality transmitting 
is possible.  
 
5 “Tízéves magyar rádió-- A Magyar Királyi Posta és a Magyar Telefon Hirmondó és Rádió Rt. együttes 
kiadása a Magyar Rádió fennállásának tizedik évfordulója alkalmából” (Budapest, 1935), 7-9. 
 
6 MOL K66, 239. csomó III/6/2 (London, March 11, 1924). 
 
7 César Saerchinger, “Radio as a Political Instrument,” Foreign Affairs 16, no. 2 (January, 1938): 245. 
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regulated.
8
 With Ministry of Commerce order 32.250/1925 the Hungarian government 
selected the second model. The government—while retaining the right of licensing—
gave the broadcasting monopoly to the newly-formed MTHR under the MTI consortium, 
and as such fell under the majority ownership of Hungary’s media czar, Miklós Kozma. 
Thus the MTHR was responsible for studios, technical apparatus, and programming. The 
governmental organ of the Hungarian Royal Postal Service was responsible for supplying 
and maintaining the broadcast system (broadcast towers, relay stations, and the like).
9
 
The latter was also responsible for collecting license fees from would-be radio listeners. 
(As a 1977 Hungarian pop-song by the group LGT says, “one had to pay equally for good 
and bad news.”) Kozma’s connection to government circles explains the decision in part. 
However, most historians also agree—though there is little or no written evidence—that 
Kozma also unofficially agreed to fund non-radio-related governmental expenses.
10
 
 From this point onward the government’s interest and support of radio 
broadcasting remained constant. The first official Hungarian broadcast took place on 
November 30, 1925, from MTHR’s new studio, which was essentially a modified three-
bedroom flat on Rákóczi Street. The ceremonial opening of the studio took place the next 
day with Horthy and his family representing the government.
11
 Kozma’s speech left little 
                                                             
8 For more on the diffrenceces between the American and the British system, see Michele Hilmes, Network 
Nations: A Transnational History of the British and American Broadcasting (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
1-83. It was Hilmes’s characterization of “chaos” versus “order” that I employed. 
 
9  “Tízéves magyar rádió,”10-11. 
 
10 Ormos, Kozma, 139. 
 
11 “Tízéves magyar rádió,”10-11. 
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doubt about the role that the radio was to play in Hungary’s cultural diplomatic 
campaign:  
The arsenal of the Hungarian culture has been augmented with a powerful 
weapon. Everybody knows the significance—especially to today’s Hungary—of 
the fact that the Hungarian word can pass beyond our borders through these 
waves. Broadcasting’s calling is not limited to bringing Hungarian culture to the 
home, but its importance is that this is the only free connection to our blood 
relatives who have been torn from us, and furthermore to demonstrate out cultural 
supremacy over other nations.
12
 
Other sources state that Kozma also added that “business considerations will be 
secondary to the needs of Hungarian culture.”13 This was the attitude that the government 
expected, especially because, in the meantime, the KÜM was spending more and more 
energy studying the diplomatic possibilities of radio broadcasting. Studies of the British 
broadcasting system gave government officials considerable food for thought about the 
radio’s role in “world propaganda and world publicity.” While they realized that there 
was no possible way to compete with the likes of the BBC, the conclusion they drew was 
clear. Radio was a new tool in the “European competition for cultural-propaganda,” and 
Hungary could not afford to miss out in this competition. The next logical step therefore 
was to build a more powerful radio transmitter.
14
 September 27, 1927, marked the 
beginning of the construction of a new twenty kilowatt transmitter in Lakihegy. The new 
transmitter was 150 meters in height and its two towers were 460 metric tons each.  
                                                             
12 Quoted in Ormos, Kozma, 138-9. Also see  István Salamon, ed., Rádiótörténeti szöveggyűjtemény 
(Budapest: Magyar Rádió Rt.1999), 9. 
 
13 Quoted in István Kollega Tarsoly, ed., Magyarország a XX. században, vol.3 (Szekszárd: Babits Kiadó, 
1998), 355. 
 
14 MOL K66, 239. csomó III-6/2 (London, June 28 and June 29, 1926). 
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Broadcasting began on April 29, 1928. In November 1928, Kozma was able to note—not 
without pride—that the radio had moved to the forefront of (governmental) interest.15 
The role of radio in Hungarian cultural diplomacy was debated on the floor of the 
Hungarian Diet. Member of the House Ákos Dencz, for example, argued that the radio 
was such a monumental discovery that perhaps only the steam engine could compete with 
it. He pointed out that radio waves do not respect boundaries, but enmesh the globe from 
shoddy huts to sparkling skyscrapers. As such, all nations aim to utilize its immense 
potential. It is especially important to Hungarians because—he recalled an earlier remark 
made upon the first successful Hungarian broadcast—“we have something to say, we 
have pain, we have grievances; and this is what we cry through the ether, where there is 
no toll-keeper, who could stop us.”16 The next representative, Gyula Petrovácz, pointed in 
a different direction. In his analysis, while he agreed that the radio’s ability to speak to 
foreigners was unquestionably important, the radio’s other important role was helping to 
break out from the “cultural blockade.” However, for Petrovácz the goal was to reach 
Hungarians who were living in the neighboring successor states.
17
 Indeed, radio 
broadcasting had three target audiences: Hungarians at home, Hungarians abroad, and 
foreigners elsewhere. The latter two were very much connected with the country’s 
cultural diplomatic campaign. The goal of radio was twofold: to provide high quality and 
entertaining programming to Hungarians living in the neighboring countries and, at the 
                                                             
15 MOL K429 Xerox/1. In his diary he emphasized that both Lajos Walkó (KÜM minister) and Kuno 
Klebelsberg “discovered” the radio. See notes for November 10, 1928 and November 11, 1928. 
 
16 Képviselőházi Napló, XVI. kötet, 1927, 252-253 (November 23, 1928). 
 
17 Ibid., 254.  
 
257 
 
same time, to represent Hungary’s cultural superiority and its contribution to European 
culture to foreign listeners farther afield.  
The international community realized the potential dangers of radio, for as M. L. 
Sourek, chairman of the board of the Broadcasting Association of Czechoslovakia, put it, 
“no barriers can check the passage of Hertzian waves, which penetrate everything along 
their path.”18 In October 1927 approximately 600 delegates from sixty countries gathered 
in Washington D.C. to regulate the development and operation of radio broadcasting.
19
 
After seven weeks of intense discussion the conference agreed to 1) allocate of frequency 
bands for international radio broadcasting; 2) regulate broadcasting that affected other 
countries; 3) set standard rates for radio telegrams; 4) recognize internationally fixed call 
signals for various countries; and 5) regulate technical apparatus to prevent wave 
emission and interference between various national and international services.
20
 In his 
closing speech Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover stated that the agreement was a 
“sign of the progressive capacity of the world to solve international problems” and a “fine 
tribute to the character and the spirit of the delegations” from all the nations present at the 
gathering.
21
 To the small nations of East-Central Europe, including Hungary, radio 
presented a relatively affordable way to carry out their propaganda through the airwaves. 
This was not direct political propaganda. There was no open criticism of the neighboring 
                                                             
18 M. L. Sourek in International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, Broadcasting and Peace: Studies and 
Projects in the Matter of International Agreements (Paris: League of Nations, International Institute of 
Intellectual Co-operation, 1933), 205.  
 
19 “International Radio,” The Washington Post, October 5, 1927, 6. The number of nations represented in 
Washington DC is not clear. For example, The New York Times gave a figure of 79. 
 
20 “Agreements of International Conference Covers All Phases of Radio,” The New York Times, December 
4, 1927, 20. 
 
21 “Radio Convention Signed at Parley,” The New York Times, November 26, 1927, 12. 
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countries, nor were there demands for territorial revision in the broadcast. However, it 
was not apolitical either. On the contrary, radio broadcasting was designed to be an 
instrument of mass persuasion.  
The “radio is the permanent world-exhibit of [our] national culture,” stated the 
first director of the newly-established MTHR, retired Lieutenant-Colonel Ernő Szőts.22 
He was Kozma’s personal friend and wartime comrade, but it was not the only quality 
that made him the right choice. Szőts spoke a number of languages, which helped the 
MTHR to build international relations (MTHR joined the International Radio Union—
also known as the International Broadcasting Union— in 1926); he was energetic and 
wholly committed to his role. His first challenge was to find a suitable location for a new 
studio.  In the fall of 1928 the new palace of the radio ceremonially opened its doors in 
the same place Hungarian Radio still stands today. The demand for radio grew rapidly. In 
1925 there were approximately 10,000 radio subscribers; by the end of 1928 the figure 
stood at 168,453.
23
 The Budapest station was on air for ten and a quarter hours every day 
(on Sundays for eleven and a quarter hours). Hungarian literature was well-represented in 
the broadcast. The great figures of Hungarian literature from Mihály Babits through 
Zsigmond Móricz to Dezső Kosztolányi all appeared in front of the microphone. 
However, Hungarian literature had one main disadvantage, namely that it was in 
Hungarian. If the radio broadcast sought to reach foreign, non-Hungarian–speaking, 
audiences, it had to be able to speak to them in a language that was not as esoteric as 
                                                             
22 “Sóvárdi Szőts Ernő,” Rádióélet, March 14, 1930, 3. 
 
23 MTHR közgyűlési jelentése, 1929. The reports of the MTHR general assembly are available in the 
Archives of the Magyar Rádió Zrt. The collection is not a public archive. I would like to thank to Hajnalka 
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Hungarian. The answer was music, which was not only a source of entertainment but, as 
a universal language, it did not require translation. Hence, most of the programming 
consisted of music, which included classical, opera, and the ever-so-popular Gypsy-
music.  
From the beginning the MTHR sought to reach audiences outside of the country’s 
physical border and build an international style of programming. The “speaker” (another 
adopted word) announced the programs in French, English, and Italian. In 1931 the radio 
began to broadcast news in foreign languages (French, English, Italian, and German). 
This was also reinforced by a joint endeavor of the radio and the Magyar Külügyi 
Társaság (Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs).
24
 The relationship, which was not 
always without tension, produced a foreign-language lecture series whereby the European 
listeners were provided information on a variety of topics related to Hungarian culture 
and history. The growing recognition of Budapest radio—and the variety it provided— 
was perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in 1932 Hungarian radio’s guests included 
English novelist and playwright John Galsworthy, who received the Nobel Prize for 
Literature in the same year, British writer and pioneer of erotically charged romantic 
novels, Elinor Glyn, German composer and conductor Richard Strauss, and his French 
fellow composer Maurice Ravel.
25
 In order to elevate the Budapest Radio’s international 
profile, MTHR also organized programming exchanges with other nations. In 1931 alone, 
the Budapest station received thirty-five foreign broadcasts, which included those of Pope 
Pius XI from Rome, the NBC Symphony Orchestra from New York conducted by Arturo 
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Toscanini, Tristan and Isolde from Bayreuth, Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra conducted 
by Richard Strauss, the Oxford-Cambridge Boat Race, and the Faraday memorial 
celebration from London. On the other hand, the Budapest station sent 26 programs to 
173 foreign stations.
26
 Hungarian radio broadcast successfully transformed from an 
institution that, just a decade earlier, was housed in an old furniture-moving cart to 
becoming the voice of the nation abroad. However, not everyone agreed with the choices 
made. 
 
Domestic Challenges  
From the late 1920s onward the radio was a target of attacks that questioned its 
Hungarianness. One of the main charges against the radio was precisely something that 
had made it successful as a tool of cultural diplomacy: its international character. There 
were voices, mainly coming from rightist circles, arguing that no language other than 
Hungarian should be used. Rádióélet, the MTHR’s official weekly, responded to these 
charges in a quite frank fashion: “It benefits Hungary to introduce itself in these universal 
languages, because if it does not, it will only exclude itself.”  Furthermore, continued the 
editorial, “we must love ourselves, but the warm love of our nation will not make us the 
center of the universe.”27 Others pointed toward an alleged foreign bias in the radio 
programming, especially in relation to music. It was quite a sensitive issue since two-
thirds of Hungarian broadcasting was music. It was part of the larger European trend in 
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which 66 percent of programming was music programming and 34 percent prose.
28
 Some 
argued that there was too much Gypsy music. This was the trump card of those who 
believed that Hungary was already too much associated with Gypsies. Zoltán Kodály, 
Béla, Bartók, and Eugene (Jenő) Ormándy, while not directly involved in the row about 
the quantity of Gypsy music on the airwaves, all contributed to the argument in various 
forums. For example Ormándy—who was the conductor of the Philadelphia Orchestra for 
forty-four years—argued passionately on the pages of the Hungarian Quarterly that 
modern Hungarian music rooted in the spirit of the Magyar peasant and had “nothing to 
do with the gypsy [sic] music which is too often mistaken as ‘tipically Hungarian.’”29  
Others however claimed that there was too little Gypsy music. Some protested against the 
idea of broadcasting music from abroad as part of the European concert series that 
included Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin. Rádióélet once again refuted these charges and 
pointed out that during 1930 the radio played the works of 410 Hungarian 
composers/musicians as against those by 893 foreign composers. The ten most frequently 
aired Hungarian composers were Ferenc Lehár, Ferenc (Franz) Liszt, Imre Kálmán, Jenő 
Hubay, Ferenc Erkel, Béla Bartók, Pongrác Kacsóh, Károly Goldmark, Ernő Dohnányi, 
and Zoltán Kodály, in descending order. The ten most played foreign composers were 
Schubert, Mozart, Verdi, Wagner, Beethoven, Puccini, Chopin, Johann Strauss II, Bach, 
and Brahms, in descending order.  “To those charging us with foreign bias,” insisted  the 
editorial, “we ask if they could produce overnight the new Hungarian Bach, Mozart, 
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29 Eugene Ormándy, “Modern Hungarian Music,” The Hungarian Quarterly 3, no. 1 (Spring 1937): 164-
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Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1939), 379-419. 
 
262 
 
Haydn, Beethoven, Schubert, Johann Strauss, Wagner, Rossini, Verdi, Puccini, Bizet, 
Debussy, Tchaikovsky, Grieg, Chopin?” 30 To those critiquing jazz music for being too 
decadent and foreign to the Hungarian spirit, the editorial pointed out that all the 
performers were Hungarians, and they often played pieces composed by Hungarians. 
These pieces were as Hungarian as those composed in the age of Rákóczi, the editorial 
argued vehemently.
31
 Ernő Dohnányi was invited to be the musical director of the radio 
to address these charges. According to the statistics, in 1931 the programming included: 
51 operas from the Hungarian Opera House, 3 operas from the studio, 8 operas on  
gramophone-records, 5 operettas from the studio, 28 classical concerts from the 
Hungarian Academy of Music, 23 concerts from the Vigadó (Budapest concert hall), 183 
philharmonic concerts, 163 opera concerts, 312 performances of popular or light music, 
153 military band concerts, 138 performances of choir music, 257 gramophone concerts, 
the broadcasting of 470 Gypsy bands, 60 Hungarian folk-song-nights with Gypsy bands, 
44 jazz bands, 1331 prose broadcasts (including poems and literature and informational 
programs), 178 dramas, musicals, and cabarets, 136 religious programs, and 209  courses 
of various kinds, including language lessons.
32
 
Despite the occasional criticism, Hungarian radio continued to provide a 
balanced, entertaining, and high quality programming to listeners at home and abroad. 
Under Dohnányi the MTHR and the government organized the Hungarian Ferenc Liszt 
Year (1935-36). The stated goal was to emphasize the world-famous composer’s 
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Hungarian roots and promote the establishment of a “Liszt-cult.” Accordingly, between 
September 1935 and October 1936 the program included no less than 562 pieces by the 
composer. The Liszt European concert of September 10, 1936, was transmitted to 
fourteen European and eighty American stations.
33
 In order to ensure the quality of 
Gypsy music—which remained the one of the most popular genres both at home and 
abroad—the radio decided to supervise the bands and their selection. This actually led to 
strife, known as the Gypsy War, between the radio and the Gypsy musicians. The 
relationship thankfully one word was mended and in 1937 a two-hundred member Gypsy 
band playing Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsody No.2 celebrated the Gypsies’ 500-year legacy 
in Hungary.
34
 The Hungarian radio became a popular spot for foreign musicians as well. 
In 1936 alone 54 foreign soloists and 23 conductors performed in the Budapest studio.
35
 
In the same year, the Hungarian radio received 85 programs from abroad and provided 62 
broadcasts, even from as far away as Japan.
36
 The radio also continued its foreign 
language programming in 1936, with 120 lectures in five languages. 
37
 The MTHR not 
only remained committed to its international style of programming but continued to 
widen its scope, not the least because Hungarian radio continued to enjoy the undivided 
support of the government.  
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Radio: Cultural Diplomacy’s Sharpest Weapon 
The KÜM was also interested in the utility of radio, for it too recognized 
broadcasting as a modern way of providing a voice to Hungary abroad. It was especially 
active in carrying the voice of the nation to the English-speaking nations. For example, 
Hungarian ambassador to the United States, Count László Széchényi—husband of 
American heiress Gladys Vanderbilt—gave a radio address at the Columbia Broadcasting 
System (CBS) on May 25, 1930. Using his extensive network of  connections he was able 
to recruit Nicholas Longworth, Speaker of the House, to give some  introductory remarks, 
which emphasized that Hungary “had been a nation for more than a thousand years—a 
people intensely proud of their nationality, highly cultured, exceedingly musical—they 
have produced Franz Liszt and no nation can ask for more glory than that—and with a 
national desire for liberty and self-government that has met the instant response and 
sympathy of the United States.” Széchényi’s own address touched on the question of war-
guilt, and the “heroic struggle” of post-Trianon Hungary, before he drew historical 
connections between the two countries.
38
  
The KÜM was also instrumental in bringing the voice of Miklós Horthy to the 
American audience on May 1, 1932. A letter by César Saerchinger, CBS European 
Service Director, is evidence that the idea to have a guest speaker for the first Hungarian 
broadcast in America came from the Hungarian Legation in London.
39
 Kozma personally 
intervened with István Csáky (foreign minister at the time) to find the right “prominent 
figure.” Kozma pointed out that other nations had already exploited this possibility. He 
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especially emphasized the radio addresses of Tomáš Masaryk of Czechoslovakia, 
Wilhelm Miklas of Austria, and Heinrich Brüning of Germany. Kozma was not sure who 
should give the address, but he stressed the need for someone “whose name means 
something in America.”  He made a point of noting that while he knew that the Regent 
was not inclined to doing “this sort of thing,” he would prefer if Horthy would change his 
attitude to the issue on special occasions.
40
 We do not know what had to happen for 
Horthy to change his mind, but despite his known dislike of modern technology he 
indeed agreed to give the radio address. His English-language message was well received 
in the US.
41
 The New York Times, under the headline “Regent of Hungary Heard Here on 
Radio,” reported on the event and quoted some of Horthy’s message, which praised 
George Washington (it was the 200th anniversary of his birth) and President Hoover, 
while it also emphasized the friendly relations between the two nations.
42
 
The KÜM also paid attention to foreigners connected with broadcasting. For 
example, when Vernon Bartlett, BBC correspondent and former secretary of the League 
of Nations’ London branch, visited Budapest, the KÜM had already received advance 
notification about his impending visit. Accordingly, he was wined and dined, introduced 
to the Hungarian political and cultural elite, and received the close attention of the 
government in general. As a result, reported the Pesti Hirlap, five million BBC listeners 
learned about Hungary through Bartlett’s special. The newspaper quoted Bartlett as 
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stating that “in a sensible world, if everyone would think sensibly, then the Hungarian 
borders would be amended.” It was something, as the paper noted, that Hungarian radio 
could not put forward so bluntly without charges of irredentism.
43
 KÜM employees in 
every major country continued to seek out opportunities to present Hungarian culture and 
history (and even politics) to foreign listeners.  
The true breakthrough in Hungarian radio broadcasting came with the completion 
of the new 120 kilowatt Lakihegy station. The old Lakihegy station was barely a year old 
when the MTHR already started planning for a larger transmitter. The assembly pointed 
out that European nations had launched a building program of bigger stations, in 
accordance with the International Radio Union standards, a maximum of 100 kilowatts—
(one might note that the maximum transmitter limit in the United States remained at fifty 
kilowatts). The members referred to the fact that Germany decided to build eight new 100 
kilowatt stations, while a new 100 kilowatt station was already under construction in 
Prague. They were especially worried about the Czechoslovak radio’s plans to build more 
powerful stations in Košice (Kassa) and Bratislava (Pozsony) with “detrimental effects” 
on the quality of reception of the Hungarian broadcasts.
44
 The 314 meter tall metal 
structure, the tallest in Europe at the time, was ceremonially opened on December 2, 
1933, by Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, whose speech was broadcast live. With the new 
tower Hungarian radio became one of the most powerful and modern broadcasting 
operations in Europe and the Lakihegy antenna remained the symbol of the Hungarian 
Radio until the first decade of the twenty-first century. The new tower not only provided 
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its broadcasts with an unprecedented range, but it also enabled new programming 
changes. Budapest I broadcast from the new tower, and the new station Budapest II was 
broadcasting twenty-eight hours per week from the old twenty kilowatt setting, while the 
new shortwave Budapest III, from Székesfehérvár, broadcasted overseas.
45
 Further 
development and modernization of the studio system continued. The MTHR hired the 
best and most talented professionals.  Hence György Békésy, then a communications 
engineer, was able to design the acoustics of the radio’s Studio 6. The studio was built 
between 1932 and 1936 especially to house and broadcast live concerts.
46
 By the mid-
1930s Hungarian radio was a significant factor in cultural diplomacy. Just a few weeks 
after the opening of the Lakihegy transmitter Kozma openly acknowledged the role of 
radio in Hungarian foreign policy: 
In the world-competition of nations, small nations [too] want to prevail, 
[however] since they do not possess quantity of arms, they must all the more 
prevail through the quality of arms. This is especially true for everything that is 
Hungarian related, because we are not only a small nation, but we are also a 
mutilated nation. Our culture is not only there as a guardian of our national 
existence, but also as a weapon in achieving our future goals. In this arsenal one 
of the sharpest weapons is the radio.
47
 
The development of this “sharpest weapon” did not go without notice. Countries of the 
Little Entente and the international community both recognized that the seemingly 
apolitical instrument of radio was indeed a potent political apparatus. 
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From “the Battle of Radio Armaments” to War 
In his aptly-entitled article “The Battle of Radio Armaments” American publicist 
and propaganda strategist Heber Blankenhorn argued for a close connection between 
broadcasting and international friction. He blamed the nationalist attitudes in 
broadcasting for many of the contemporary problems. The radio race for larger 
audiences, with bigger and better transmitters, was responsible for the “high-power 
broadcasting armament,” which he compared to a naval arms race that sought to develop 
the largest caliber of battery guns. According to the author, while the United States was 
upholding the legal limitations of 50 kilowatt stations, others were not. “Little Hungary is 
to have one of 120 kilowatts, Prague 120, Vienna likewise.” He continued that “Poland’s 
new station, supposed to be 120, has just started up at 156. Berlin and Paris are going up; 
and so are the Russians. The Russians, as part of the Five-Year Plan, are thinking of 
spending $45,000,000 for a station of 500 kilowatts and a short-wave transmitter to reach 
anywhere.”48 Blankenhorn voiced his disapproval over a development that turned radio 
from instrument of cooperation to weapon of war: 
“Free” radio means an easy and constant interchange of thought between one 
country and another. Free trade in radio broadcasting may well prove a source of 
international understanding and good will. But the trend is not in that direction. 
Threats and fears, hostile radio barriers and controversies promise little to human 
kind. “Science,” which was made for peace, devised the horrors, the gas, and 
liquid fire of the last war. The throttling of radio may bring about a result quite as 
hideous.
49
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The Washington Post did not mince its words either offering an editorial “Unseen World 
War is Fought; Nations Fill Ether with Words.” While the editorial did not use the word 
“cultural diplomacy,” it is very clear that the author of the piece understood the basic 
rationale behind the competition for listeners: 
A new world war is being fought today with an old, old weapon—words. Nations 
all over the globe hurl verbs, nouns, and adjectives across the sky day after day, 
night after night, in an endless battle which no one sees, a battle of which man 
never before has experienced. It is war by radio. . . . It is war, but diplomatic war. 
The broadcasts placate rather than threaten. Their battle is for friends. They try to 
get their particular nation’s attitude across to the people of other nations. They 
build their national, social, political, and economic viewpoints into programs in 
such a way that they will not be consciously noticed but will still be 
unconsciously felt. . . . Warfare in this ethereal realm may take strange forms. 
Sympathy may be transmitted in music. . . .War—or peace— teams cannot be 
formed without sympathetic ties between peoples.
50
 
Although the editorial concluded that radio may also be a tool of peace, for people 
sympathetic to one another will not go to war, it was not a sentiment that would have 
been shared by Hungary’s neighbors.    
The Little Entente countries were also keenly aware that the Budapest station 
reached Hungarians within their borders. A letter from István Munka, a Hungarian 
teacher living in southern Czechoslovakia, to the MTHR is representative of the growing 
tension. In the letter he states that since 1927 he has been a faithful listener of Budapest 
radio. He was among the first in his small village to possess a radio and the set often 
ended up on the front porch so others—mainly fellow Hungarians—could also enjoy the 
broadcast. According to Munka, in December 1930, he received a citation for disturbing 
the peace. The citation claimed he was listening to the Hungarian National Anthem, even 
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though he insisted that on the day in question this was not broadcast.
51
 As a first step, the 
Little Entente countries turned to the League of Nations International Institute of 
Intellectual Cooperation with charges of Hungarian propaganda inadmissible. On the 
word of the correspondence of Frigyes Wünscher, acting director of MTI, with Ferenc 
Mengele, head of the press department at KÜM, the International Radio Union’s meeting 
saw a heated debate, where Kozma disputed not only the charges against the Hungarian 
radio, but the role of the union vis-à-vis the International Institute of Intellectual 
Cooperation. The letter emphasized that the Little Entente’s action should be monitored, 
but for now this should not be made public.
52
 Predictably, three days later the Budapesti 
Hirlap’s headline stated that “the Little Entente wants to silence the Hungarian radio.”53 
According to the editorial, the Little Entente employed three different tactics. First, in the 
pages of national and international media it accused the Hungarian radio of broadcasting 
propaganda endangering the peace and agitating among minorities. Second, the 
respective nations introduced laws controlling the radio audience. And finally, the third 
phase should be to bring these charges to the international community, making it into a 
“European issue.”54  
The neighboring countries’ growing criticism of the Hungarian broadcast served 
only as a reassurance to Kozma and company that the radio was achieving its goals. Both 
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the technical quality and the entertainment value of Hungarian radio programming were 
superior to its neighbors. It was something that even the contemporary Czechoslovak 
Kultura magazine (from Trnava [Nagyszombat] in today’s Slovakia) acknowledged. The 
magazine maintained that the most significant problem was the poor technical quality of 
the Bratislava broadcasts and its meager programming. It also pointed out that in the 
Slovak region everyone, including ethnic Slovaks, preferred to listen to Radio 
Budapest.
55
 The article further argued that the favorable position that the Budapest station 
enjoyed among all listeners was due to the fact that Prague did not supply enough Slovak 
cultural programming. On the other hand, the Hungarian radio, keenly aware of this 
tension between Prague and the proponent of more independent Slovak culture, offered 
Slovak nights on the radio.
56
 A newspaper in Subotica (Szabadka) in Yugoslavia’s 
Vojvodina region, which had a large Hungarian population, made similar comments. 
According to this source—as reported in the Hungarian newspapers—because of the poor 
technical quality and low programming standards of its competitors everybody in the 
region listened to  Hungarian radio, which through its relay station was able to provide 
clear and entertaining broadcasts. The Subotica newspaper demanded the construction of 
a 200+ kilowatt Belgrade station and in the meantime asked for the seizure of crystal 
radio receivers.
57
 It is representative of the Hungarian attitude that András Hóry, 
permanent deputy minister in the KÜM from 1934-1935, sent a letter thanking Kozma, 
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stating that the “recognition coming from the enemy pages” was the best testimony to the 
patriotic and quality work of the radio.
58
  
While quality programming remained radio’s best asset in the field of 
broadcasting competition, it did not shy away from direct political confrontation either. 
On October 9, 1934, a lone gunman assassinated King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and 
French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou in Marseilles. While the assassin was a Bulgarian 
national (of Macedonian ethnicity, to further complicate the story) he had close 
connections with the Croatian Ustaša movement (separatist, ultra-national fascist group). 
The Ustaša had, in turn, close ties with Hungary and Italy. Following the assassination 
Yugoslavia, supported by Romania and Czechoslovakia, charged the Hungarian 
government with responsibility for the assassination. The case went to the League of 
Nations. In the meantime—by December—the Yugoslav government had expelled 
thousands of ethnic Hungarians from its territory. The situation was becoming perilously 
close to an armed conflict between the two countries.
59
 The “radio-war” between 
Hungary and members of the Little Entente intensified. The Hungarian press reported 
that in April 1933 the Czechoslovak government had introduced censorship of radio 
broadcasting, which could endanger “the democratic values of the republic.”60 
Czechoslovak radio also temporarily discontinued its Hungarian language programs. 
According to contemporary Hungarian reports, in Uzhgorod (Ungvár) the Czechoslovak 
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authorities made public listening to Hungarian radio a punishable offense.
61
 The MTHR 
decided that it needed the aid of a professional diplomat. In January 1935, Jenő Nelky, 
former chief of the KÜM’s press department, ambassador in Vienna, consul in Argentina 
and the USA, became the head of the radio’s foreign division and the permanent 
representative of Hungary at the International Radio Union.
62
 The Hungarian–
Czechoslovak radio-war even made it into the pages of the American Current History and 
Foreign Affairs. In the former, the Czechoslovak censorship was mentioned as a reaction 
to Hungarian agitation. It also highlights the fact that since there are “no frontiers in the 
air” Belgrade too built a powerful new transmitter, which, according to the official 
statement, was to “penetrate everywhere where southern Slavs live and drown out 
Hungarian revisionist propaganda.”63 César Saerchinger was even more critical of 
Czechoslovakia. In his view, “Czechoslovakia is the only democratic country using 
‘authoritarian’ methods for the consolidation of its regime. Its excuse for the curtailment 
of freedom on the air is that in view of the country’s precarious strategic position the end 
justifies the means.”64 Yet he could not have known that Hungarian radio, by 1938, was 
secretly broadcasting anti-Czech propaganda and agitated for the rise of Slovak and 
Rusyn national sentiment.
65
 Later, with the First Vienna Award, Hungary received part of 
its lost territories from the by then defunct Czechoslovakia. As Hungarian troops were 
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marching into Košice (Kassa), so were the employees of the Hungarian radio. Walking 
next to them were people of the MFI. While radio sought to give voice to Hungary 
abroad, the film elite was looking to make Hungary visible on the international stage.   
 
The Birth, Destruction, and Rebirth of the Hungarian Movie Industry, 1896-1929 
Interwar Hungarian political elites sought to utilize cinematic production to 
inform and enlighten foreign audiences. It was a significant challenge, for the image of 
Hungary was rather negative and was often based on stereotypes connected with Puszta 
Romanticism. Cultural diplomacy’s aim was to destroy the image of a Hungary as 
backward, semifeudal, and generally anachronistic. Instead, it aspired to present Hungary 
as a modern, progressive, and European country. Having a modern cinema industry was 
essential in these efforts. However, the development of Hungarian cinematic production 
was not as straightforward as that of the radio. 
In 1921 a story appeared on the front page of the Hungarian weekly A Mozi (The 
Cinema) entitled “My Excursion to 1938 and Back. My Guide: H. G. Wells.” The story-
teller took a trip to the future with the help of Wells’s time machine. He visited 
Hüvösvölgy, in the second district of Budapest, which by then had become home to a 
giant Hungarian film studio. In his imaginary voyage the narrator had coffee with the 
most influential people in the European film industry (Olaf Fønss, Fritz Lang, Conrad 
Veidt, and Robert Reinert), all of whom were working in Budapest. Paul Wegener—
director of the film The Golem—was putting the finishing touches to his tenth movie, 
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made in Budapest.
66
 Another director was complaining that the Budapest studios could 
produce only 800-1,000 films a month, which could still not satisfy the American 
public’s thirst for Hungarian movies. They alone insisted on 300 movies per month. The 
last stop on the journey was Budapest’s Margaret Island. Both Wells and the narrator saw 
a large English sign on the giant glass dome that covered the entire island. It read: 
“World.” Upon descending through the opening of the dome, they landed in a medieval 
German town. They then witnessed the Grand Canal of Venice, and city scenes of 
Constantinople, Moscow, and Amsterdam. There were hundreds of structures in this 
strangely invigorating place, which—as they learned—was known as Film City 
(Filmváros).
67
  
The author’s imagined journey to the future illustrates the hopes and aspirations 
of some of the Hungarian film elite. Yet, in 1921, these hopes and aspirations might have 
been seen as fantastic as the idea of time travel. At the time the Hungarian movie industry 
was in a state of utter shambles. This had not always been the case. Moving pictures 
arrived in Budapest in 1896 during the millennial celebrations. Soon thereafter the city’s 
vibrant coffeehouses became make-shift movie theaters. None was more famous than the 
Velence (Venice), where the history of Hungarian cinema began, with the headwaiter 
(József Bécsi) doubling as the projectionist.
68
 This new mode of entertainment was 
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incredibly popular among Hungarians and the number of cinemas grew at an amazing 
pace.
69
 The celebrated Hungarian writer Frigyes Karinthy even declared that “the moving 
picture is the most wonderful creation of human ingenuity.”70 By 1912 there were 270 
permanent movie theaters in Hungary.
71
 By the eve of the First World War there were 
108 cinemas in Budapest alone.
72
 The first Hungarian film studio, Hunnia, was built in 
1911/12.
73
 The first Hungarian moving picture A tánc (The Dance) was made in 1901:  it 
was a series of films depicting various dance forms. Two of the first Hungarian narrative 
films—or dramatic art films—were the 1912 Nővérek (Sisters) and Ma és holnap (Today 
and Tomorrow).
74
 Others soon followed. By the end of the First World War there were 
over two dozen film studios at work and, between 1914 and 1918, they released well over 
250 pictures.
75
 It was during this era that the likes of Mihály Kertész (who later became 
known as Michael Curtiz, famed director of the 1942 classic Casablanca), Sándor Korda 
(later Alexander Korda, director and producer, one of the founding fathers of the British 
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film industry), his two youngest brothers Zoltán and Vincent, and Béla Blaskó (better 
known as Béla Lugosi of Dracula fame), among others, began their careers.  
The short-lived Bolshevik Revolution of 1919 brought to power a regime that was 
among the first in postwar East Europe to utilize cinema for political purposes. 
Commissar of Culture and Education, György Lukács, paid special attention to the movie 
industry, which, Nemeskürty claims, almost uniformly supported the Bolshevik regime, 
though not primarily out of ideological  considerations. According to Nemeskürty, the 
main reason behind the support of the Hungarian film industry was economic interest, 
because under the previous system most of the power rested with the film distributors and 
cinema owners, not with the filmmakers.
76
 Hungarian film production was nationalized—
this was a world first—and put under the control of a Commissars’ Council and two other 
governmental organizations. Béla Paulik, László Márkus, and Sándor Korda produced 
thirty-three feature films. Mihály Kertész directed the movie Jön az öcsém (My Brother is 
Coming), which was one of the first, if not in fact the first, agitprop film.
77
 Even more 
importantly the Hungarian Bolsheviks also utilized film production to produce their own 
newsreels, entitled Vörös Riport (Red Report). The regime produced twenty of these 
newsreels, each about five minutes in length.
78
 
 In August 1919 the Hungarian Soviet Republic fell and the new regime 
dismantled the movie industry. Miklós Horthy’s counterrevolutionary forces unleashed 
the most violent retribution. The White Terror targeted Left-wing intellectuals and 
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politicians, as well as Jews. Sándor Korda, Mihály Kertész, Béla Lugosi, Béla Balázs, 
and György Lukács were only a few names in the long list of artists and intellectuals who 
were forced to leave Hungary. Distrusting films, the new Horthy regime severely 
restricted film production and distribution. Most of the films (features and newsreels) 
made under the Kun regime were destroyed. Cinema operators, mainly Jews, did not fare 
much better. According to contemporary police reports, as result of the enforcement of 
the 8454/1920 M. E. order, 75 percent of cinema owners were forced to sell, for they did 
not receive new permits.
79
 The report added that this did not achieve the desired results. 
Most of the new owners were completely lacking in know-how and capital, and hence not 
able to operate the cinemas proficiently and so many of them failed. By 1921 only eighty-
three movie theaters were in operation.
80
 
 Industry professionals and leading intellectuals took stock of the state of the 
Hungarian film industry and emigrated. Others tried to find solace in envisioning a better 
future through a time machine. Still others attempted to convince the government to 
reform the regulations surrounding movie production and distribution. László Márkus 
(later director of the National Opera) tried to bring about change by arguing that 
Hungarian-made films should be used in the country’s propaganda abroad. As he put it: 
“we must use everything that can induce the conscience of the world [to revise the 
Trianon Treaty] and film, being an art form that echoes through the souls of the masses, 
is the most suitable above all others.” What sort of films should Hungarians make? 
Márkus argued that it must be an entirely Hungarian product that represents the culture of 
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Hungary, and as such it would illustrate the “cultural superiority” of the country, which in 
his mind was the only “incontestable” and “irresistible” argument in support of 
Hungarian justice. Therefore, he continued, Hungarian films should not make “awkward” 
pictures where the harbor of Újpest doubles for the sea, the old district of Buda for Paris, 
and Váci Street for New York, but it should tell the stories of Hungarian scholars, 
Hungarian artists, and other Hungarian figures set in Budapest, in the Hortobágy, or at 
Lake Balaton.
81
 Even more to the point was film director Pál Fejős’s 1922 open letter to 
the minister of the interior. Fejős pleaded to the minister to reconsider the regulations that 
limited film recording within Budapest by requiring the purchase of special daily permit. 
This permit was not only expensive, but also demanded a number of bureaucratic steps, 
such a certificate of good moral standing (erkölcsi bizonyitvány) to prove that one was 
politically and socially reliable. He asked the minister to imagine himself for a moment 
as a film director. Would he want to deal with all these procedures? Would he want to ask 
leading actresses to provide evidence of their birthdates? He continued by arguing that 
the regulations made it impossible to make movies in Hungary: 
Your Excellency! In the name of the once so promising Hungarian film industry 
and film art, I ask Your Excellency to remedy this terrible situation before all the 
embittered Hungarian directors, actors, cameramen leave for abroad, where the 
state aids film production, and one is  not obliged to complete an obstacle course 
before each recording. Help us, Your Excellency! There are already too many of 
us in emigration!
82
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His plea apparently fell on deaf ears. In 1924 Fejős too left Hungary. Indeed, the once 
promising Hungarian film industry was nearly destroyed. There were no seasoned 
directors and no investment capital. Elsewhere, in the mean time, cinema was fast 
becoming a profitable industry, and a significant factor not only in entertainment but also 
in politics.  
By the mid-1920s the new regime consolidated its power. With the domestic 
situation secured, the government began to reassess its relationship to the movie industry. 
In order to raise much-needed capital in 1923 the Ministry of the Interior, with the 
6900/1923 B. M. decree, allowed the return of the displaced Jewish cinema operators by 
making partnership arrangements lawful.
83
 Diplomats began to suggest to the government 
that Hungary needed to make use of the cinema’s ability to inform and propagandize. The 
New York consulate requested pictures and films that would depict Hungarian folklore, 
fishing and hunting, industry and commerce, as well as parades and festivals. The consul 
emphasized that the requested material should be free of propagandistic overtones and 
“accompanying tales.”84 The Hungarian Consul in Munich, in his memorandum 
addressed to KÜM, argued that the “movie as an educational and cultural tool is 
indispensible” and “it alone will be the illustrative source material in the future.” As an 
example, the consul offered the model of German Kulturfilme to follow.
85
 The poor state 
of the domestic film industry was also a topic of Parliamentary debates. József Pakots, 
one-time screenwriter and Social Democratic member of Parliament contended that the 
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once promising movie industry was in ruins because official circles failed to appreciate 
the “internationally great interest” in film production. Now, he continued, as the 
government struggles to find ways to  portray the achievements of Hungarian culture 
abroad and to publicize the negative economic and social impact of the Trianon Treaty to 
those who created it, Hungary must follow other nations’ examples and support film 
production. Pakots emphasized that the question of the domestic film industry was not 
only an economic, but a cultural, social, and propagandistic issue.
86
 
 One of the people who listened was Miklós Kozma, whom Prime Minister 
Bethlen appointed in 1922 to invigorate the works of MTI. Kozma was politically the 
right choice. He was a former military officer, supporter of the counterrevolution, and 
until 1920 captain of national defense. He was also a committed supporter of the White 
International, an aborted attempt to bring together a German-Austrian-Hungarian-Russian 
anti-Bolshevik alliance, which, according to historian Mária Ormos, illustrates that early 
Kozma was a “foreign policy illiterate.”87 Even if one accepts Ormos’s judgment on 
Kozma’s foreign policy abilities, it is unquestionable that he was among the first to 
realize that the country needed to remodel its news and information service. With the 
moral and financial support of the KÜM, the East News Reel Agency was created, which 
served as the first attempt to produce Hungarian-made newsreels for foreign audiences.
88
  
                                                             
86 Nemzetgyűlési Napló, XXXV. kötet, 1922, 103 (October 21, 1925). 
 
87 Ormos, Kozma, 74. 
 
88 On this agency I could not find further documentation. My only source is the manuscript of Tibor 
Megyer (Meyer), who was one of the first news cameramen in Hungary. Tibor Megyer, “A magyar 
filmhiradó és annak fejlődése egy operatőr szemszögéből és saját élményei alapján, 1923-1961” 
(unpublished manuscript, available at the Magyar Nemzeti Filmarchívum [MNFA— Hungarian National 
Film Archive], 1975), 1. I thank Márton Kurucz for making this source available to me. 
 
282 
 
In the next few years three major events signaled the growing interest of 
government circles. In 1924 the MFI was established with Miklós Kozma and Zoltán 
Taubinger (who later, as part of the trend that supported more Hungarian-sounding 
names, changed his surname to Tőrey) at the helm. The business model for the new 
company was provided by the Italian LUCE. Kozma travelled to Italy to study Italian 
film production and upon his return wrote a fifty-eight-page study on his experiences. 
Even more telling was his private letter to András Hóry, Hungarian ambassador in Rome, 
in which he told his friend that he had also prepared a confidential “aide-memoire” to the 
Cabinet, in which he suggested that the reorganization of the country’s film industry 
should be based on the Italian model in its entirety, while pointing out some of the 
differences between the situation of the two nations. He also told his friend that the new 
film law would be based on his recommendations, but this information was too sensitive 
and could not be leaked to the press under any circumstances.
89
 The new company’s main 
profile, similarly to LUCE, was propaganda, documentary, and newsreel production, and 
as such it enjoyed the financial support of KÜM. Accordingly, the new company received 
60,000 pengő (c. $141,500) from KÜM.90 The government became not only a major 
shareholder in the new company, but also its best customer. Shortly after its 
establishment the MFI took over newsreel production and produced the Magyar Híradó 
(Hungarian News).  
Prime Minister István Bethlen’s 6292/1925 decree established the Filmipari Alap 
(Film Industry Fund) in order to support and regulate film production and distribution. 
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Among the board of directors one could find representatives of KÜM, VKM, and the 
Ministry of Interior. In order to finance home-grown film production (and the operation 
of the Film Industry Fund) the government levied a new tax on movies based on their 
length. Hungarian-made movies received differential treatment, and were very often were 
entirely exempted from the tax.
91
 
The third episode on the road to recovery was the creation of Hunnia Film in 
1928. One of Hungary’s largest film studios, the Corvin, went bankrupt in 1925. The 
Film Industry Fund bought out the studio and started to modernize it. The goal of the 
810,000 pengő (c. $1,910,400) investment was to resurrect domestic film production. 
While nominally independent, in reality the new company was very much under 
government control. János Bingert, a former police captain and employee of the Ministry 
of Interior, became the director of Hunnia.
92
 Hunnia was also the largest beneficiary of 
the Film Industry Fund for years to come. The mandate of Hunnia was clear. In 
accordance with the unofficial division of labor, while MFI was responsible for the 
production of Kulturfilme, documentaries, and newsreels, while Hunnia was to produce 
Hungarian-made feature films. 
While the government attained a degree of control over the film industry, it did 
not coordinate and control its activities in same way that the Soviets, and later the Nazis, 
did.
93
 The timing of growing government interest, however, was not an accidental. Just as 
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academia and tourism, the film industry also benefitted from the fact that by 1927 
Hungary had broken out of its postwar isolation. Because the Bethlen administration’s 
more active foreign policy that sought to gain support for the revision of the treaty, the 
country’s foreign image became important. The film screen, which provided “an 
unrivalled method of propaganda,” to quote British writer W. Somerset Maugham, was 
not to be left out from the arsenal of Hungarian cultural diplomacy.
94
 
 
Celluloid Résumés—the role of Kulturfilme and Newsreels 
A confidential memorandum written by Zoltán Gerevich, a KÜM ministerial 
advisor, called upon all Foreign Ministry outposts to pay special attention to those foreign 
movies that were “so-called Hungarian or Hungarian-related films.” He referred to some 
of the movies that included Hungarian related elements such as raffish Hungarian 
hussars, which painted a negative picture of Hungary. In order to avoid these sorts of 
cinematic representations, which, according to Gerevich, “were not only hurtful, but 
downright offensive,” all KÜM employees were ordered to use both official and 
unofficial avenues to remedy the situation.
95
  
Changing the “offensive” image of Hungary abroad required new tools. 
Censorship of course only worked in the domestic market.  To counter negative film 
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images the government had to find a film genre that could neutralize harmful 
characterizations of the country, but do this without being too propagandistic. The 
choices were Kulturfilme and newsreels. The former was developed by the German UFA 
(Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft) in the mid-1920s to illustrate the achievements of 
past and present German culture and life.
96
 The question of what the national image 
should look like on the screen divided Hungary’s cultural, film, and political elite. 
In the beginning of cinema most people believed that the new art form would be 
universal and not national. However, by the 1930s—especially with the introduction of 
the “talkie”—the national film became an issue of great importance. In the case of 
Hungary the debate was centered on the feature films’ cinematic representation of 
Hungarianness. On one side, as in the case of tourism, stood those who imagined 
Hungary as a progressive, modern, and urbanizing nation. The stories of these movies 
were little different from those of Hollywood, with the modern Budapest middle-class 
providing the subject matter. Movies, such as Hyppolit a lakáj (Hyppolit the Butler), 
Meseautó (Dream Car), or Havi 200 fix (200 a Month Salary) and similar films 
“glamorized bourgeois values and luxury, technological and economic advance, and 
urban Budapest.”97 These films, largely created by returning Hungarian Jews, painted a 
picture of Hungary as a progressive country, where people dancing the foxtrot and 
enjoying all that modern life had to offer.
98
 On the other side, were the movies that 
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situated Hungarianness in the recent past, in the stories of the countryside, and their 
subject-matter was centered on the peasants, aristocrats, and the hussars. For the non-
Jewish film elite and for conservative nationals these images symbolized the true essence 
of Hungary.
99
 Ultranationalist sentiment, anti-Semitism, and the influence of the German 
film industry were not the only reasons behind this debate. As David Frey’s study points 
out, economic considerations too played a large role. The movie-going public abroad was 
not interested in the same Hollywood-type (and Weimar Germany) middle-class pictures, 
for “debonair aristocrats, gypsy-music-singing peasants, cowboys on the Puszta plain, 
gentry nationalists—these were the images they knew and associated with Hungary.”100 It 
was an argument that Pál Fejős made upon his return to Europe and Hungary. In the 
Nyugat conference on film he argued that Hungarian cinema cannot compete with 
Hollywood. Instead, it needed to provide “exotica,” which might be “kitsch” (giccs), but 
would open the American market to Hungarian films.
101
 In the same time, as Hungary 
recovered from the Great depression, the domestic film market changed.  As peasants and 
workers became movie-viewers, studios started to make movies for domestic 
consumption, where the heroes and heroines were those that the new audience easily 
associated with: the nineteenth century figures of hussars, noblemen, and the peasants of 
the countryside.
102
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 Kulturfilme and newsreels, unlike feature-films, were not primarily market-
oriented products. They were not market-oriented in the sense that their function was not 
to make profit, but to inform the audience, to present the country in the best possible 
light. As a result, interwar Hungarian Kulturfilm was a curious mixture of old and new, a 
combination of traditional and modern, and the fusion of country and city. The first 
attempt to produce such a picture especially for foreign audiences was the 1928 film 
Hungária. This was produced by MFI and was paid for by the KÜM. The Foreign 
Ministry received 200,000 pengő (c. $471,700) from the state budget (152/res.1927) for 
“foreign film propaganda.”103 According to one of the cameramen, Tibor Megyer, the 
production required significant investment (cameras, copy editor, labeling apparatus, 
etc.).
104
 Five cameramen worked in rotation under the supervision of a KÜM employee, 
Dr. Ernő Walter.  In the end they shot 10,000 meters of raw footage, which they cut by 
careful editing to 1800-2200 meters.
105
 The end-product was the 1928 silent Hungária, an 
“Ode to the Remaining Hungarian Lands,” in eight acts. 
The first scene leaves little to the imagination, for it plainly presents the 
grievances of post-Trianon Hungary. In line with the official stance on the issue—
dictated by Prime Minister István Bethlen and the KÜM—the issue of revision is the 
central theme of the first act. The accompanying subtitle reads as follows: 
There was little attention paid to the Hungarians by the world. From under the 
shadows of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy it only rarely burst through the 
Hungarian name. Yet it [Hungary] has been living in the heart of Europe for a 
thousand years. For one thousand years it has been standing guard on the peak of 
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the Carpathians, so that behind it the West could build in peace. After one 
thousand years spent safeguarding the cross [now] the cross of Trianon was 
placed on its shoulders. This cross split this living organism into five parts. [Here 
a picture shows the map of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. The new borders 
are drawn in, and then the picture breaks into pieces.] The remaining rump, 
however, amazingly, through heroic efforts, under the leadership of noble 
Admiral Miklós Horthy [“vitéz nagybányai Horthy Miklós” in the original] 
continues to function, in order to be worthy of the traditions of the last one 
thousand years. [Image shows Horthy walking out of the palace and looking into 
the camera] 
The country was represented as the bastion of the West against the invading hordes. This 
“Eastern Bastion of the West” mentality was, as previous chapters illustrated, was one of 
the main tropes of Hungarian self-understanding. It was the country’s sacrifice that made 
it possible for the now ungrateful West to grow and progress. Yet, even after the “unjust” 
treaty, Hungary continues to thrive. In the next scene the audience sees Count Albert 
Apponyi (who represented Hungary at the Paris Treaty negotiations) and Prime Minister 
Bethlen as they visit the countryside. As the picture continues to roll,  one cannot help but  
see it as a celluloid résumé whereby all that is positive or noteworthy is being illustrated: 
the Hungarian countryside with its picturesque scenery, its agriculture, its wine 
production  (with special emphasis on Tokaj), its folklore and village festivals, sites of its 
past with centuries-old castles, churches, and provincial centers. Here and there the 
picture and the supplementary captioning make reference to the consequences of Trianon 
for Hungary’s waterways or emphasize the fact that only the city of Sopron received the 
right to decide its future by plebiscite. Scenes depicting the state of Hungarian heavy 
industry and mining continue, before coming to Budapest. The city comes to life with its 
cultural and tourist sites, and of course, as the “world’s number one spa-city.” A few 
illustrated pictures of Lillafüred are followed by images of Lake Balaton. After paying 
homage to the role of education, the audience is introduced to the Hungarian Levente 
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Association (mandatory youth organization) and learns about the Hungarian triumphs in 
the Olympic Games and other sporting events. The closing images depict the St. 
Stephen’s Day celebrations and the festive annual procession of the Holy Right Arm (the 
relic of St. Stephen).
106
 
 Hungária (1928) received extraordinarily positive media coverage at home. Even 
before its release, the Magyar Filmkurir stated that at last the film joined the “Hungarian 
cause,” which was the revision of Trianon, and through this sort of propaganda Hungary 
would acquire new friends. “For it was our national disaster,” continued the piece, “that 
until now they [foreigners] did not know us, because if they could have known us, if they 
had been aware that here lives a highly cultured nation, which should have never been 
broken apart or balkanized, for it is a sin, then Trianon would not stand now as the 
darkest page of Hungarian history.”107 The exclusive domestic premiere of the picture 
was on August 23, 1927, at the Royal Apolló Theater. The audience included Hungarian 
and foreign dignitaries, among them Kuno Klebelsberg and Miklós Kozma. All the major 
newspapers reported on the event and all—even the Left-leaning Népszava—gave it 
nothing but accolades. Nearly all the papers pointed out that the film was not made for 
domestic audience. Instead, they continued, the purpose was to inform the rest of the 
world about the nation. To that end, the government made all possible steps to distribute 
the film in Europe and America.
108
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 KÜM spearheaded the foreign distribution of Hungária (1928). The film was 
immediately furnished with English, French, and German language captions. The 
embassies and consulates in London, Washington DC, New York, Paris, Brussels, 
Vienna, Berlin, and Munich received copies and the authorization to distribute them in 
accordance with their best judgment.
109
 However, the Great Powers were not the only 
targets. The KÜM paid for Italian and Spanish language copies (a free screening of the 
latter was held at the 1929 Barcelona World’s Fair).110 At the request of the Hungarian 
Consulate in Helsinki the KÜM also financed the production of Finnish, Swedish, 
Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian-language copies. There were even discussions about an 
Esperanto version of the film.
111
 KÜM employees organized screenings in schools, in 
cultural institutions, as well as at special events. One such special event for example, took 
place, on February 14, 1930, at the Svensk-Ungerska Sällskapetsin in Stockholm. The 
matiné screening began with a speech by vice consul Sándor Kiss. He made clear the 
purpose of the program: 
A few days ago I was asked by somebody whether this Hungarian film, which we 
will show you today, means that we want to make propaganda—yes or no. Well, 
to such a question the usual answer of a diplomate [sic] would have been an 
evasive one. But I went right into the matter and answered with plain yes. Yes, we 
mean propaganda by it. But all of us, you as well as I, are trying to make 
propaganda if we are abroad. We do try to make our country known to give the 
best possible idea of our nation and of our country to all those foreigners whom 
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we meet. And anyone who does not think and act like this is not worthy of being 
called a son of his country!
112
 
The program, which in addition to the film included Hungarian music, was a success. The 
audience, including diplomats, journalists, and even members of the royal family, 
responded to the film with enthusiasm. The local newspaper, Stockholm Dagblad, 
reported that indeed the “program was in service of propaganda, but it was a really 
appealing, elegant, and serene propaganda.”113  
 Despite the seeming success of Hungária (1928), the film, and with it the 
Hungarian cultural diplomatic campaign, faced a number of problems. First, there was 
the issue of competition. Other East and East Central European countries too recognized 
the utility of film. Contemporary newspapers reported that Polish and Czechoslovak 
movies made inroads into European markets, especially that of France.
114
 It was also 
reported that the “grand Czech national film,” Saint Wenceslas, received one million 
crowns from the government.
115
 The Hungarian news reports were correct. Victor 
Velek’s outstanding study—which was published, tellingly, in 2010 to commemorate the 
September 28 Czech National Day—illustrates that after early financial problems the 
Czechoslovak government stepped up and financed the making of Saint Wenceslas. The 
silent movie was a historical epic to commemorate the thousand-year anniversary of the 
martyrdom of Duke Wenceslas, “the highest symbol of Czech[oslovak] statehood and 
                                                             
112 MOL K66, 164. csomó III-6/c (February 14, 1929). Original is in English. 
 
113 Ibid. Original Hungarian translation of the Swedish article. 
 
114 “És mi mit exportálunk?” Magyar Filmkurir, January 20, 1929, 6. 
 
115 “Nemzeti film készül egymilliós állami támogatassal,” Magyar Filmkurir, January 5, 1930, 6. 
 
292 
 
personification of humane values.”116 Romania, Hungary’s other competitor on the 
international stage, also utilized cinema to shape foreign public opinion. The Romanian 
Ministry of National Propaganda (1927-1936) took charge of documentary film 
production. It hired domestic and foreign companies and professionals. Under its aegis, 
writes Romanian film historian Manuela Cernat, the Romania Film company released the 
1929 Today’s Romania—Picturesque Romania (Romania Azi—Romania Pittoreasca).117 
The 3200 meter film, directed by Iosif Bertok, similarly to Hungária (1928), illustrated 
Romania’s past and present, its tourist sites, its industry and agriculture, and the capital 
Bucharest. The film premiered on November 29, 1929, in the Bucharest National Theater 
before beginning an eight year domestic and foreign tour.
118
  
The second great challenge was the introduction of sound-film or “talkies.” On 
October 6, 1927, Warner Bros. released the first true talkie, The Jazz Singer starring Al 
Jolson. Another Al Jolson feature, The Singing Fool, was the first talkie shown in 
Hungary on September 29, 1929. It was not until 1931 that the first Hungarian-made 
talkie premiered, A kék bálvány (The Blue Idol). Despite high expectations the movie was 
not a commercial success. However, Hyppolit a lakáj (Hyppolit the Butler) in the same 
year was a great hit with the Hungarian movie-going audiences.
119
 At the same time the 
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KÜM received a number of reports stating that Hungária (1928), while a success, could 
no longer accomplish its objectives due to the triumph of sound-film. The MFI offered to 
make a new, sound-version of Hungária.
120
 The new film was to be one of the crowning 
achievements of Hungarian cultural diplomacy. 
Making a talkie required a great deal of money. However, the Great Depression 
left the country’s treasury in a precarious situation, meaning that the government alone 
could not finance the remaking of the movie. The original estimate called for 40,000 
pengő (c. $94,340), which would not include the required number of prints. The KÜM 
appealed to various sources.  In the end the movie was paid for by contributions from 
governmental and semigovernmental circles and the leading sections of Hungarian 
industrial life (the latter included two of the greatest Jewish industrial barons, Manfréd 
Weiss and Leó Goldberger):   
KÜM .............................................................................................. 10,000 pengő 
MÁV (Hungarian State Railway)  ................................................... 10,000 pengő 
Budapest Székesfőváros (Budapest Metropolis)  ............................. 10,000 pengő 
Goldberger Textile Works...............................................................  5,000 pengő 
Manfréd Weiss Works  ...................................................................  5,000 pengő 
United Incandescent Lamp and Electrics Company  ........................  5,000 pengő 
Hungarian Rubber Ware Factory  ....................................................  5,000 pengő 
Szent Lukács Gyógyfürdő (St. Lukács Thermal Baths)  ..................  1,000 pengő 
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Total   .......................................................................................... 51,000 pengő 121 
The result of these efforts was the 1934 version of Hungária.
122
 The final cost of the 
1522 meter long film was 42,000 pengő (c. $99,056). The MFI was committed to making 
Hungária (1934) a quality product. The art direction was the work of László Kandó, a 
painter; the accompanying music was the work of Ernő Dohnányi and Sándor László; and 
the camerawork was done by István Somkúti. 
The film starts out with a modeling clay-made map of historical Hungary, being 
cut up with a bayonet. Once again the opening caption summarizes the Hungarian 
position regarding the validity of the Trianon Treaty: “The people of this cruelly and 
imprudently mutilated country persistently strive to bring forth a future that is worthy of 
its grand past. Its rich culture presented much to the European civilization, but it also 
faithfully guards the ancient genuineness of its eastern origin.” The second sentence 
provided the guiding principle of the selection, which aimed to combine the traditional 
and modern elements of Hungary to present them as equally essential components of the 
Hungarian character. The opening scene takes the audience to the Austro-Hungarian 
border village of Horvátjárfalu.
123
 Here, a well-situated border guard politely checks the 
incoming German-speaking tourists’ passports and informs them (in German) about the 
length and the condition (“200 km on a very good highway”) of the road to Budapest. 
The next scenes suggest alternative ways to reach Budapest, by a modern train or by a 
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ship on the Danube. The Budapest images aim to illustrate the metropolitan quality of the 
city, which harmoniously coexists with its historical sites. The “world’s first spa city” is 
emphasized through lively pictures of thermal baths and the wave-pool of the Hotel 
Gellért. Once again, sport motifs are front and center as the audience learns about the 
Hungarian accomplishments in the Olympic Games, water polo, rowing, track and field 
events, soccer, tennis, boxing, gymnastics, fencing and the somewhat less “Hungarian” 
sports of  water-skiing and polo. A lengthy part of the film shows agricultural production, 
which utilizes both “ancient and modern” methods. The scenes of harvest festivals—with 
the indispensible Gypsy violinist and the csárdás—add an exotic look to traditional 
village life. It is interesting, and somewhat perplexing, that the second sound bite of the 
movie depicts the unintelligible sound (“pi-pi”) that a man makes while calling the 
household’s turkeys. As the film continues the audience is told that while Hungary is an 
agricultural country, its industry has also achieved “European significance.” To illustrate 
this point (and to live up the needs of the sponsors), the Manfred Weiss Works and the 
Goldberger Textile Works are shown in great detail.  
After these scenes of modernity the audience is transported to the serene 
countryside of the Great Plains where herds of horses, cattle, and the like roam free.  The 
provincial cityscapes of Szeged, Debrecen, Veszpém, Pécs, and Sopron appear before the 
film reaches Lake Balaton and its “capital,” Keszthely. Here once again the audience can 
see the mixture of old (the medieval abbey of Tihany) and new (motorboats on the lake). 
The film’s last scene offers a clearly political message—sort of bookending the picture as 
a whole. The caption reads as follows: “The Hungarian nation’s devout struggle—which 
seeks life, peace, culture, and a better future— trusting in  God and the youth of Hungary,  
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is led by the re-vivifier  of the maimed country, Miklós Horthy.” The Regent is shown 
with the palace guards, in the St. Stephen’s Day procession, while surveying the troops at 
the Fourth International World Scout Jamboree (1933) held in Gödöllő, Hungary. During 
the last images the Hungarian National Anthem serves as the background music. The last 
frame of the film slowly zooms in on a campfire surrounded by youth. The last sound 
heard is their shout: “Hajrá!”(Let’s go!).124 
The film was less confrontational in its tone than was its 1928 counterpart. With 
the clear exceptions of the beginning and the end, there was no obvious depiction of 
irredentism. There were no irredentist statues, no discussion of the creek, which during 
the peace negotiations was supposedly introduced as a navigable river, nor is there any 
mention of plebiscites. Secondly, Horthy is the only political figure pictured. Bethlen 
(who was no longer prime minister, although he remained influential) and Count 
Apponyi (who died in 1933) do not appear in the 1934 version. The film’s main goal was 
to provide an informative and enlightening picture of Hungary. It was also designed to 
gain notice for Hungary as a tourist destination. To this end, the film harmoniously 
combines the old and the new. The film was to provide evidence of Hungary’s 
uniqueness that rooted in its traditional countryside. The pictures of the Puszta and its 
people, underlined with carefully selected folk music served this purpose. On the other 
hand, the film also sought to dismiss stereotypical representations of Hungary. Hungary 
was unique not backward. To further this point the modern scenes of industry and 
cosmopolitan Budapest were accompanied with modern music selected by Ernő 
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Dohnányi. However, the end goal of the picture was the same: to create a positive image 
of Hungary abroad in order to gain support for the country’s revisionist goals.  
The film premiered in March 1934 at the Royal Apolló. The audience included 
Miklós Horthy, Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kálmán 
Kánya, and two of Hungary’s future Prime Ministers, Béla Imrédy and Kálmán Darányi. 
The domestic press praised the film and one paper even argued that Hungária (1934) was 
a testament to Hungary’s willingness to live, to create, and to work despite Trianon.125 In 
addition to the Hungarian version, three German, four French, one Italian, and two 
English versions were soon made.
126
 The contract between the KÜM and the MFI 
(represented by Baron Lajos Villani and Zoltán Taubinger respectively) allocated 60 
percent of any profits to the Foreign Ministry and 40 percent to the film studio. The MFI 
and the KÜM decided that the latter was to be responsible for distribution in Germany, 
France, Switzerland, the United States, Scandinavia, and South America.
127
 
Hungária (1934) travelled far and with great success. The KÜM, wherever 
possible, made an attempt to sell the distribution rights. Both commercial and political 
considerations led to this decision. For example, Villani negotiated a contact with the 
French Leo Film Company that allowed the distribution of Hungária (1934) in France 
and its colonies, Holland and the Dutch colonies, Belgium and the Belgian colonies, as 
well as in Luxemburg. The Hungarian foreign representative institutions and agencies, 
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however, retained the right to screen the movie at special showings, free of charge.
128
 
Similar negotiations were carried out with Gaumont-British Pictures in the UK, LUCE in 
Italy, and the UFA in Germany.
129
 The latter allowed Hungária (1934) to be screened in 
all UFA cinemas and a shorter version to be sent with all UFA made movies to all 
German cinemas—albeit in exchange for free copies.130 In order to avoid a “propaganda-
smell,” the film was often screened under the sponsorship of various friendship societies 
that were not directly connected with governmental institutions. For example, in Italy the 
film premiered in Rome on April 26, 1934, under the aegis of the Amici dell’ Ungheria 
(Friends of Hungary) society.
131
 Similarly, in Paris the film premiered under the egis of 
an ad-hoc society (Comité des Amitiés Franco-Hongroises), created by the embassy staff 
for this occasion. Here, in order to avoid any possible charge of propaganda, the opening 
scene—with the bayonet slicing up the map—was cut and a French publicist was hired to 
introduce the film.
132
 According to the embassy report, the first two showings were a 
“smash hit” (“bomba siker”). The KÜM also gave plenty of rope to the embassies to edit 
the film to the best of their judgment (for example, to cut the length of the industry scene 
or order additional captioning).
133
 In New York the film premiered on board the S.S. 
Hamburg. The event was sponsored by the American-Hungarian Academy of Art and a 
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New York Evening Post journalist was invited to make the opening remarks.
134
 By 1937 
eighteen Hungarian embassies, consulates, and the like owned at least one copy of the 
film, from Washington D.C., through Buenos Aires, to Teheran.
135
 Hungária (1934) was 
also successfully screened in Ankara, Algiers, and São Paulo. During 1937 in northern 
Brazil alone the film was screened in twenty-four cities on forty different occasions.
136
  
It is difficult to gauge the success of Hungária (1934) internationally. However, 
the main point, one could argue, is that the government believed that the film was a great 
success.  Embassy reports show that the film was often praised for its artistic direction 
and musical score. The international print media also reported on the picture. According 
to one report, the screening of the film was so successful in Holland, for example, that 
even Het Volk (which was a publication of Dutch Social Democrats—traditionally 
opposed to Hungarian political and revisionist aims) praised the film as “excellent 
propaganda about an interesting country.” Moreover, the report emphasized, it also 
brought the question of Trianon to the forefront (it illustrated this with a map) and argued 
that the minority question was obviously still not remedied.
137
 If the goal was to become 
visible on the international stage than one can certainly say that the Hungária movies did 
just that.   
Prompted by the accomplishments of these films the government continued to 
finance future Kulturfilme to promote Hungary abroad. The subject matter of these films 
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continued to promote Hungary as tourist destination (both modern Budapest and the 
serene countryside), introduced the accomplishments of Hungarian horticulture, and 
promoted the St. Stephen myth.  The Ministry of Trade and Commerce, the KÜM, and 
other governmental and semigovernmental organizations financed the production of 
Hallali (French word for horn that signals the end of the hunt]; Budapest Fürdőváros 
(Spa City Budapest); Magyar falu (Hungarian Village); A magyar falu mosolya (The 
Smile of the Hungarian Village); A magyar nép derüje (The Radiance s of the Hungarian 
Folk); A magyar falu művészete (Art of the Hungarian Village); Magyar ló (Hungarian 
Horse); Magyar bor (Hungarian Wine); Magyar gyümölcs (Hungarian Fruit); Vadászat 
Magyarországon (Hunting in Hungary); Szent István, a magyarok első királya (St. 
Stephen, the First King of the Hungarians); and a number of others introducing 
Hungarian swine, cattle, and poultry husbandry. These films were screened world-wide, 
including at world’s fairs and film festivals, where they received a number of awards and 
other certificates of merit.
138
 A German-language copy of the Vadászat Magyarországon 
found its way to Herman Göring, as a personal gift for his support of the Hungarian 
Hunting Exhibit in Berlin.
139
  
The Hungarian government circles’ and the film elite’s continuing support of the 
Kulturfilme was not a uniquely Hungarian trend. Reading through government 
correspondence and media sources it becomes clear that many nations in Europe (and 
beyond) made use of the genre. For example, during the Seventh Venice Bienniale in 
1939 thirteen nations—from Hungary to South Africa— exhibited no fewer than fifty-six 
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Kulturfilme.
140
  Romania by this time had established its National Cinema Office (1936) 
with the mandate to produce documentaries and newsreels.
141
 Two of their Kulturfilme, 
Bukovine, pays des monastères and Au pays des “Motz”; were screened at Venice—to 
the great irritation of the Hungarian government. The latter, Au pays des “Motz” or Țara 
Moților in Romanian, was directed by the “father of the Romanian cinema,” Paul 
Călinescu, who won the top honor in the Kulturfilm category.142 The film represented the 
life of the Moți people, inhabitants of the northwest Transylvanian Apușeni Mountains, a 
region that a year later—under the provisions of the Second Vienna Award became part 
of Hungary. In light of the significant growth in the Romanian movie industry (and its 
success at Venice), which in the mind of the KÜM presented a danger to Hungarian 
interests, Baron Villáni ordered the Bucharest embassy to pay special attention to it. In 
case of any anti-Magyar sentiment the embassy was to report to the KÜM, so that Villáni, 
using international agreements and friendly relations, could limit or ask to censor those 
Romanian films’ screening abroad.143 To be sure, the 1930s saw a rise in the importance 
of Kulturfilme. The genre became an accepted, once more even preferred tool of cultural 
diplomacy. Yet it was not the only type of cinematic production that attracted the 
attention of the governments. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Magyar Híradó was the product of MFI from 1924 
onward. As time went on newsreel production became the monopoly of MFI. Even 
though the company did not receive further direct financial support from the 
government—nothing from the budget of the Film Fund—it remained a major 
shareholder in the company. In the beginning, the Magyar Híradó was a rather primitive 
enterprise. It had only two cameramen and hardly any foreign connections. The Híradó 
was slow and remained silent, which created a great deal of tension with cinema owners. 
According to Tibor Megyer’s manuscript, it was only in 1929 that he was sent to England 
to study the Fox Movietone sound-system.
144
 In 1930 there was another milestone in the 
development of the Hungarian newsreel, when Fox Movietone News filmed a sound 
report with Miklós Horthy. The report included a speech from the Regent (both in 
Hungarian and English) that was screened around the world.
145
 By the spring of 1931 the 
MFI had purchased the German Tobis-Klang system, which was fitted into a car, allowed 
to create outside reports. (Later it was exchanged for sound system made by the 
Hungarian engineer Károly Pulváry, which offset the cost considerably). The first 
Hungarian made sound newsreel premiered in September 1931. The news changed its 
name to Magyar Világhíradó (MV—Hungarian World News), signaling the achievement 
and the future aspirations of the Hungarian news. 
MV was both a business and a political venture. In order to make the MV relevant 
and commercially successful the MFI signed newsreel exchanges with a number of 
foreign news agencies. Among the first were the French Éclair-Journal, the German 
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UFA-Tonwoche, the Austrian Selenophon, and the British Gaumont. What was to be 
included in the news, what was to be received from and sent abroad was decided during 
the weekly executive committee meetings. The government remained visible in the 
decision-making process, but the selection was not solely directed by politics. Testimony 
to this point is the personnel on this executive board. For example, during the July 27, 
1933 executive meeting the MFI was represented by Miklós Kozma and Zoltán 
Taubinger, the KÜM was represented by Baron Lajos Villáni, while the VKM was 
represented by Lóránd Horváth.
146
 
What would a typical MV include in 1933? The 240 meters long MV #492 
contained the following reports: 1) “Discount Cruises to Vienna;” 2) “Passion Plays in 
Budaörs” (Hungary); 3) “World’s Scout Jamboree at Gödöllő (Hungary);” 4) “Hungarian 
Triumphs in  London” (track and field), 5) “July 14th in France” (from Éclair-Journal); 6) 
“[Wiley] Post’s Flight around the World” (from UFA-Tonwoche); and 7) “French 
National Sailing Championship” (from Éclair-Journal). It was also decided that newsreels 
containing pictures of the World Jamboree, of Hungarian female athletes, and of the 
passion plays were allowed to be sent abroad.
147
 As one can see, the news was 
informative, but not entirely apolitical. The selection of news sent abroad suggests that 
the MFI promoted the country’s culture in accordance with some of Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy’s main themes that publicized the country’s international status and its 
commitment to Christianity. 
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However, at times MV had to take a more direct political stance. For example, 
during the Marseilles crisis, in the same way as the radio did with its international 
broadcast, MV decided to produce a 250 meter long special report on the plight of the 
Hungarian refugees. The MFI produced twenty-eight copies and using its connections to 
various foreign news services the report was distributed in Germany, Austria, France, 
Italy, the UK, Poland, and the United States.
148
 By special envoy they also sent a copy to 
Geneva (where the League of Nations was discussing the charges against Hungary). 
According to the MFI minutes, the KÜM and the Hungarian delegation to Geneva 
expressed their appreciation for the specially-made film, for it was “seriously useful.”149 
In order to increase the influence of the MV, the MFI also continued to seek new 
contacts in the international news community. By 1936 the MFI sought to find a way to 
distribute its MV in the neighboring countries. The transaction was designed as quid pro 
quo trade without monetary exchange. From the discussion surrounding the deals, it is 
clear that both the KÜM and the MFI realized the potential influence of MV on the ethnic 
Hungarians living in the successor states. The first contact was the Prague-based Elekta- 
Journal (later with the also Prague-based Aktualita). It was soon followed by an 
agreement with the Zagreb-based Svetolon.
150
 In 1937 negotiations were also started with 
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the Romanian ONT News, which was under the supervision of Romanian government 
circles.
151
 
The relationship between the MFI and the KÜM was quite peculiar and not 
without difficulties.  As mentioned earlier, the KÜM owned 40 percent of MFI’s shares 
and the government remained the company’s main (one could say sole) customer. 
However, during 1935-36 Kozma became the minister of interior and successfully 
lobbied to change the division of labor that had hitherto existed between Hunnia and MFI 
(feature films vs. Kulturfilme and news). While the MFI indeed embarked on the 
production of feature films, it did not receive money from the Film Fund. The KÜM also 
began to apply more and more pressure on the MFI with regard to its programming, 
which until then was based on reciprocation with other countries and remained rather 
civil. Villáni expressed the wishes of the KÜM that the MFI should make an effort to 
place political news in Czechoslovakia through its connections with Elekta-Journal. The 
polite, but firmly negative, answer from the MFI pointed out that in 1936 Elekta had to 
date received and screened fifteen Hungarian- related reports, while MV only screened 
four Czechoslovak-related ones. The letter continued that unwanted pressure on the 
Czechoslovak partner would not only jeopardize the results achieved to date, but it would 
destroy the relationship.
152
 At the same time the KÜM also instructed its representative in 
Prague to pay extra attention to the subject-matter of the Czechoslovak news. There is 
little to no documentation on the actual results of this exchange, but one document 
testifies that a report about the 1937 Italian royal and governmental visit to Budapest 
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indeed made it into the Czechoslovak news. It is another matter that the Prague 
representative of KÜM was far from happy with the quality of the one-minute report and 
called it “the mockery of the spirit of Hungarian-Czech film exchange agreement.”153  
Another issue further poisoned the relations between the government and the 
MFI.  In late 1937 the MFI decided to raise its capital stock by 150,000 pengő (c. 
$417,222). The KÜM refused to take part in the increase, as a result its share decreased to 
20 percent. An internal KÜM memo testifies that the ministry was very fearful of 
relinquishing its seat on the board of the executive committee and argued that the KÜM 
could not afford to surrender its influence and control of MFI matters for the Kulturfilme 
and newsreels were the “most effective and grandest instrument of propaganda.”154 
Unfortunately, once again, there is no documentation on the outcome of these 
negotiations, but one can assume that the government and the MFI found a solution. I am 
basing this assumption on a number of facts. First, the MFI retained its monopoly and 
continued to be the sole producers of Kulturfilme and newsreels. Second, the KÜM 
actually intervened at the Finance Ministry on the behalf of MFI so the latter could 
receive special consideration for its exports. Third, the Ministry of Interior 54.100/1939 
order stipulated that 30 percent of all “shorts” screened in the cinemas had to be 
Hungarian -made (ergo MFI-made).
155
 Lastly, is the fact the Baron Villáni was still 
present at the weekly meeting of the executive board suggest that KÜM retained its 
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influence.
156
  There were fewer and fewer colorful reports about swimsuit fashions in 
Miami, about the Tour de France, about dancing Japanese mice, and about the Miss 
Europe competition. The news became dominated by domestic and foreign political 
reports. Of course, this could have been due to the worsening international situation. But 
it could also be that the MFI finally became the unofficial “mouthpiece” of the Hungarian 
government for good. 
 
Conclusion 
With the outbreak of hostilities, both radio and newsreels become overtly political 
instruments. For example, the new 31 kilowatt Košice (now once again Kassa) station 
began broadcasting in 1942, following a significant investment to replace an apparatus 
taken by Czechoslovak authorities. By then a small broadcasting station was also in 
operation in Cluj (Kolozsvár) with the stated goal of achieving a broadcasting monopoly 
throughout Transylvania—especially those regions populated by ethnic Hungarians.157 
The plan to build a powerful new station did not come to fruition. There were also plans 
for building a film studio in Cluj.
158
 Under the influence of growing anti-Semitic 
sentiment, supported by the Jewish Laws, both radio and film production was 
restructured in order to create a Christian national culture. A great number of artists 
decided to leave the country, including Béla Bartók, famed director István Székely, and 
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Hungarian film star Gyula Kabos.
159
 Other highly successful directors, such as Viktor 
Gertler and László Gaál were forced out of the industry (the latter was killed by the 
Hungarian Arrow Cross sometimes in 1944).
160
 Both radio and film production tried to 
serve the government’s efforts to keep Hungary out of war, but without much success. 
Miklós Kozma became the governor of the Sub-Carpathian region annexed by Hungary. 
Here he was directly responsible for depriving the region’s Jewish population of their 
legal rights, including the right to own property. Moreover, he was indirectly responsible 
for the murder of 10,000-15,000 Hungarian Jews, who were without citizenship papers 
and as such were deported from the region and murdered at Kamenec Podolski by the 
Einsatzgruppen.
161
 By then radio broadcasting the Germans and the Italians had come to 
rely on the radio. Now and then their broadcasts tried to address the West and try to 
persuade them that the war against the USSR was a defensive war. The radio also became 
the instrument of a last-ditch effort to jump ship in October 15, 1944, when the 
Hungarian government sought to make a separate peace with the Allied Powers. A few 
hours later fascist thugs from the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party occupied the building of 
the radio; many people were arrested and some even murdered. In December 24, 1944, 
after nearly two decades of innovation and growth, Budapest radio fell silent. The pride 
of Kozma’s radio, the 120 kilowatt Lakihegy station, was blown up by German forces.162 
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Film production fared somewhat better—especially that of feature films. There was little 
possibility for Kulturfilme, and newsreel production suffered from the same lack of 
source materials as the radio, which stemmed from Hungary’s isolation. The film 
industry, by then “Christianized,” sought to retain a level of cultural sovereignty vis-à-vis 
Germany.
163
 
Kozma once said that “Our Lord was especially kind to us in that he gave this 
invention [meaning radio] to humanity after Trianon.”164 Indeed, the political significance 
of radio and cinema grew at incredible pace. In the post-First World War period these 
new inventions enabled nations to present themselves, their images, and their sounds on 
the international stage. The realization of these phenomena was by no means limited to 
Hungary. Nor were they important only to the Bolsheviks, the Fascists, and the Nazis. All 
developed nations utilized these new instruments of mass persuasion. In Hungary, a 
country that competed with its neighbors for the attention of the world, radio and cinema 
were especially important. These instruments’ contribution to Hungary’s cultural 
diplomacy cannot be underestimated. They reached people beyond the physical border of 
the country. One did not need to be studying in a university or be part of a certain 
intellectual circle to turn on the radio. One did not need to be wealthy to buy a cinema 
ticket and take a virtual tour of the country. This is something that Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy recognized quite early. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“If there is an international institute of propaganda, it ought to present a diploma 
to the Hungarian entrusted with the task of placing Hungary’s grievances before 
the world” 
                                                                                        (Bernard Newman, 1939)
1
 
“It is perfectly true, of course, that good cultural propaganda cannot remedy the 
damage done by a bad foreign policy, but it is no exaggeration to say that even the 
best of diplomatic policies may fail, if it neglects the task of interpretation which 
modern conditions impose.” 
                                                                                                          (Anthony Eden, 1937)
2
 
 
In regards to interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden’s point about the relationship between cultural propaganda and foreign 
policy is apropos. Even if one accepts—for the moment—that Hungary carried out 
“good” cultural propaganda, it indeed could not remedy the Hungarian leadership’s “bad” 
foreign policy. Since the mid-1930s, Hungary inched closer and closer to Nazi Germany. 
The territorial gains of the First Vienna Award seemed to justify this policy. Teleki was 
one of the few who realized the danger inherent in Hungary’s German orientation, yet it 
did not stop him from continuing the pro-German course. Why? After all, some of the 
lost territories had been returned, and now, the political elite, as well as the manipulated 
domestic public, expected more. To achieve this goal the assistance of Germany seemed 
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paramount. Secondly, there was the issue of the ever-growing presence and influence of 
Hungary’s own extreme-right. In the spring 1939 elections the Hungarian Arrow-Cross 
secured 900,000 votes and won over forty seats in the Parliament, essentially becoming 
the second most powerful force in Hungarian politics.
3
 It was under these circumstances 
that the Teleki government joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in February 1939, exited from 
the League of Nations in April 1939, and passed the country’s Second Jewish Law in 
May 1939.  However, the “tight-rope” prime minister, as I mentioned earlier, also refused 
to allow German troops to use Hungarian railway lines in their attack on Poland. 
Moreover, Hungary actually opened its border in September 1939 to Polish refugees.  
This action was representative of Teleki’s second goal, which was to maintain neutrality 
during the war, for he correctly understood that Germany’s attack on Poland would bring 
Great Britain, France, and even the United States into the conflict. Teleki sought to assure 
that Hungary would not get involved in a war with any of the Great Powers. He 
recognized that neutrality would gain favors for Hungary after the war. He even 
reestablished diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.  Hungarian cultural diplomatic 
efforts were redoubled in France, Great Britain, and in the United States. In March 1940, 
Teleki authorized preliminary work for the organization a government-in-exile in the 
United States to begin. Based on the experience of the First World War, the prime 
minister wanted to make sure that Hungarian interests would be represented abroad even 
under German occupation, since he believed Western victory was inevitable. The success 
of the German blitzkrieg changed his mind. According to his biographer, historian Balázs 
Ablonczy, Teleki was especially distraught by the fate of the small Western and Northern 
European countries of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Holland. His faith in an Allied 
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victory waned. Accordingly, he ordered the return of the five million dollars that was sent 
to the Hungarian Minister in Washington, János Pelényi, to establish a government-in-
exile.
4
 Even as he continued his efforts to maintain neutrality and Western goodwill, once 
again, the country moved closer to Nazi Germany, which was by now seen as the 
potential victor in the war. When the Soviet Union began pressuring Romania for 
territories in Bukovina and Bessarabia, Hungary turned to Berlin to guarantee its share.  
The Second Vienna Award of August 1940 granted Northern Transylvania to 
Hungary.  In exchange for the German arbitration, Teleki agreed to recognize the 
Volksbund as a privileged and exclusive party representing Hungary’s German minority. 
In addition, the government agreed to supply Germany with food and raw materials 
beyond the requirements agreed upon in the joint economic deal signed in 1935. Ferenc 
Szálasi, leader of the Hungarian Arrow-Cross, was pardoned and released from prison. 
Finally, Hungary joined the Tri-Power Pact (or Tripartite Pact) in November 1940.
5
  Less 
than a week later both Romania and Slovakia followed suit. Nobody wanted to be at a 
disadvantage in the competition for Hitler’s goodwill. Another unforeseen consequence 
was the negative international reaction to the Second Vienna Award. Great Britain 
refused to recognize the treaty as valid, although it stated that new border arrangements 
would be necessary after the war. The US was also critical, but showed some degree of 
sympathy.
6
  
                                                             
4 Ablonczy, Pál Teleki, 207-08. 
 
5 Juhász, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 175-76. 
 
6 Ablonczy, Pál Teleki, 215. 
 
313 
 
Teleki’s cultural diplomatic machinery set out to legitimize these territorial gains 
in the eyes of international public opinion. However, there was very little room for 
Hungary to maneuver. German troops were stationed in Romania and Slovakia.  In 
addition, Hungary had shared a border with the Third Reich after the Anschluss. The 
prime minister learned through unofficial channels that a German attack on the Soviet 
Union was only a question of time. Once again he reconsidered the aims of Hungarian 
foreign policy. He tried to sign a nonaggression pact with Moscow, which, in the face of 
Horthy’s opposition, was essentially reduced to a trade agreement. As a gesture of good 
faith, and a channel to the world, the Teleki government approached Yugoslavia and 
eventually in December 1940 signed a treaty guaranteeing permanent peace and eternal 
friendship between the two countries. At the same time relations between Yugoslavia and 
Germany deteriorated. It was obvious to all that a German attack would come sooner 
rather than later. Teleki recognized that Hungary would not be able to refuse Germany 
again. It would ultimately mean that Hungary would be fighting a war on the side of 
Germany against the West and the Soviet Union. In the mind of Teleki, this was an 
unwinnable war.
7
 
In the face of this unsolvable situation, Teleki—by now clinically depressed due 
to personal and professional problems—committed suicide on April 2, 1941. With his 
death the last link to the West was gone, for, despite his anti-Semitic policies and staunch 
revisionist attitude, Teleki was much respected in the Western world. Teleki’s act was not 
able to arrest the country’s tragic decline. The new Hungarian government led by László 
Bárdossy made a last-ditch effort to save face. It articulated that Hungary would join the 
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impending German action against Yugoslavia, only if and when Yugoslavia as a political 
entity ceased to exist. This did not fool anyone. Indeed, before April 11, 1941, as 
Hungarian troops crossed into former Yugoslav territories, Great Britain had already 
severed diplomatic relations with Hungary. In his communiqué to the Hungarian Minister 
in London, British Foreign Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, left little doubt 
about the position of his government:    
His Majesty’s Government was until quite lately trying to understand the 
undoubtedly difficult position of your Government has found themselves in both 
externally and internally. We have shown more than one sign of this 
understanding. But now you have handed over your country to the opponent of 
England and have, almost simultaneously, attacked the country with which only 
a few months ago you concluded a pact of friendship. This will remain an 
everlasting shame upon the reputation of Hungary. If a country is no longer 
master of her fate and voluntarily resigns her independence, then at least she 
should not sign a pact of friendship which she then breaks. Tell it at home that 
England will remember that when peace will be made. . . . Teleki was the last 
man in whom we had confidence. We shall have no more dealing with those who 
are now in power.
8
 
This was perhaps the very moment when Hungarian cultural diplomacy had lost its 
raison d’être. 
Hungary rapidly moved toward disaster. On June 26, 1941, Hungary declared that 
it considered itself at war with the Soviet Union (albeit there was no official declaration 
of war). On August 8, Hungary passed its Third Jewish Law prohibiting marriage and 
sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews. On December 6, Great Britain declared war 
on Hungary. On December 12, Hungary declared war on the United States. In January 
1943, the 200,000 man strong Second Hungarian Army engaged the Red Army at 
Voronezh. The result was catastrophic: 40,000 Hungarian soldiers died, 35,000 men 
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injured, and about 60,000 captured. Prime Minister Miklós Kállay tried to renew contact 
with the West and even with the Soviet Union in order to seek a separate peace. Hitler 
has suspected as much and, as a result, on March 19, 1944, German troops occupied 
Hungary. Between May 15 and the end of June—under the new Prime Minister Döme 
Sztójay—Hungarian authorities, in collaboration with the SS, deported 440,000 
Hungarian Jews mostly to Auschwitz. In addition, thousands of Hungarian Gypsies 
shared a similar fate. (The number of these victims is strongly contested. Historians 
offered estimates ranging from 5,000 to 50,000). In early July, Horthy stopped 
deportations. His belated action in the end spared approximately 200,000 Budapest Jews 
from being deported to Auschwitz. As a last ditch effort, various official and semiofficial 
circles, including the group under the leadership of Miklós Horthy Jr. and Domokos 
Szent-Iványi (colleague, student, and friend of the late Pál Teleki), tried to initiate peace 
talks with the West and the Soviet Union. In a radio address on October 15, 1944, Horthy 
proclaimed an armistice. However, by this time he did not command the loyalty of the 
necessary political and military forces. On the very next day, under professional and 
personal duress, Horthy resigned as Regent and relinquished power to the leader of the 
Hungarian Arrow-Cross, Ferenc Szálasi. Under his regime of terror tens of thousands of 
Jews were murdered and his thugs began the summary execution of other Hungarian 
civilians. On December 21, 1944, a Provisional National Assembly met in Debrecen and 
elected a new National Government with Béla Dálnoki Miklós as its prime minister.
9
 By 
this time the Red Army had encircled Budapest. During the 102-day siege 38,000 
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civilians died along with 40,000 German and Hungarian soldiers and about 80,000 Soviet 
Red Army troops.
10
  
On April 13, 1945, the war ended in Hungary. The results were tragic: 
approximately 900,000 dead and 600,000 in Soviet POW camps. Approximately 40 
percent of the national wealth was destroyed.
11
 The Soviet troops’ incredible sacrifice 
liberated the country. However, the liberation was also accompanied by the mass rape of 
women, deportations, and the beginning of a different kind of occupation that would last 
until 1989. On February 10, 1947, Hungarian representatives signed a treaty in Paris. 
Despite designs for a federalized reconstruction of the region and plans for new borders 
(based on ethnic composition) the Paris Treaty essentially reestablished the Trianon 
borders.
12
  
So does this mean that cultural diplomacy failed? This seemingly simple question 
is, in reality, quite complex. Can we take ambassadorial communications reporting on the 
“great success” of the film Hungaria in Brazil at face value? After all, can one evaluate 
the impact of a well-written journal article on its readers or assess the influence of Béla 
Bartók’s music on foreign radio listeners? Today we may be able to do so, but how can 
we compute the sum of emotional or other responses of a faceless public during the 
interwar period? There remains uncertainty about how to measure the public’s response, 
not to mention cultural diplomacy’s influence on actual policy. In the end, the small 
                                                             
10 For more on this see Krisztián Ungváry, The Siege of Budapest, trans. Ladislaus Löb (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2005).  
 
11 Romsics, Magyarország története, 269-270. 
 
12 For more on the post WW II designs, see Ignác Romsics, Múltról a mának (Budapest, Osiris Kiadó: 
2004), 264-283. 
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Eastern and East-Central European countries lacked the means to poll the objects of their 
cultural diplomatic campaign.  Yet one cannot entirely sidestep this question. Thus, with 
the obvious benefit of hindsight, I would like to examine the success and failure of 
Hungarian cultural diplomacy by looking at its short and long-term impact.  
If one considers the short-term goals of interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy 
then one must conclude that the campaign was a failure. From 1918 to 1941 the 
Hungarian government in cooperation with the country’s intellectual and industrial elite 
sought to create a positive image abroad in order to gain the necessary international 
support for the revision of the Trianon Treaty. The country indeed regained some of its 
lost territories, but it had absolutely nothing to do with its cultural diplomatic campaign. 
It was a result of a mistaken foreign policy carried out by traditional diplomacy, and the 
country paid dearly for it later. One of the main objectives was to convince international 
public opinion of Hungary’s Western/European character. This is much harder to assess, 
but Teleki’s eulogy in the Washington Post indicates that old stereotypes, just as old 
habits, indeed do die hard. Despite all the efforts to the contrary, Hungary continued to be 
seen as an Oriental country that had just lost its Oriental prime minister in an Oriental 
fashion:  
There is something Oriental about the suicide of the Hungarian Premier, Count 
Teleki, that might almost be interpreted as a form of racial atavism. The Magyars 
have for many centuries been thoroughly assimilated into the West European 
culture, but they were, as the very name of their nation still imply, of relatively 
recent Mongolian origin. Though we do not know the full circumstances 
surrounding his death, it is obvious that Count Teleki killed himself not for 
personal reasons—for the highest reason of state. In other words, it was an official 
action in his official capacity. It has already been interpreted as a deliberate 
admission to the Hungarian people that his policy of gradual appeasement, skillful 
and honest as it was, is responsible for the present unhappy conditions of his 
country. It can also be interpreted as an official diplomatic notification to the 
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Germans that he considered that Hungarian participation in the presumably 
impending attack on the Yugoslav nation, with whom his government so recently 
entered a treaty of perpetual friendship, would be an act of national dishonor.  
By no Western standards, even the strict, chivalric standard of the 
Hungarian nobleman, can Teleki’s honor be called into question. He had been 
guided throughout by the most unselfish motives, and it is known that his concept 
of what would best preserve the peace and independence of his country often ran 
strongly counter to his personal sympathies concerning the war. His errors, 
however serious, were committed in the purest of good faith. He had done his best 
to avert the catastrophe, and more than their best it is said even angels cannot do. 
His final gesture was much like that of the Oriental who believes that faith can be 
lost through fate as well as forfeited by an act of will. It was Oriental, too, in this 
suggestion that national honor can be restored by an act of individual sacrifice. It 
recalls those mandarins of the Celestial Kingdom who strangled themselves on a 
hint of the Emperor’s displeasure, the Japanese general who slew himself because 
of minor tactical mistake, and the Tokyo policeman who atoned with his blood for 
having inadvertently made the Son of Heaven 20 minutes late for an official 
function.
13
 
Interwar Hungarian diplomacy failed because it was built upon two delusions. 
First, there was the Hungarian elite’s mistaken belief in the inherent and obvious 
greatness of Hungary and the justness of its cause. Their error was in trusting that cultural 
diplomatic tools could help to gather enough international support for the revision of the 
treaty. As this study shows, their efforts to prove the country’s alleged cultural 
superiority and European character did not stop at empty phrases and slogans.  Between 
1919 and 1941, but especially after 1927, under the Hungarian government’s direction 
the country’s cultural production underwent a wide-ranging modernization. With the 
assistance of the country’s intellectual elite the Hungarian government established a 
number of cultural and academic institutions abroad and founded scholarly publications. 
In order to attract visitors they also mobilized the country’s nascent tourist industry. Last, 
but not least, the government also utilized the opportunities provided by the modern 
                                                             
13 “Count Teleki,” The Washington Post, April 5, 1941, 8.  
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media: radio and cinema. In the end, illustrating the country’s historical and cultural ties 
to Europe and providing evidence for an existence of a modern Hungary brought very 
little political value. The reason behind this was the second delusion, which Hungary 
actually shared with its neighbors.  
The second delusion was believing that Hungarian problems—or small countries’ 
matters in general—carried much weight in an international system that was dominated 
by Great Power interest. There were people who recognized this early on. For example, 
one intellectual wrote the following about English public opinion: 
We Hungarians are suffocating here at the eastern borders of European 
civilization; we live in Central Europe and think of ourselves in Europe. For us 
the world is Europe, world politics is the politics of Europe; international 
questions are European questions. . . . The Englishman can feel that he is in the 
center of the world. He is the overlord of a kind of empire where the sun never 
sets and one that oversees the lives of one quarter of humanity. . . . England thinks 
in continents, while for us Europe is the world. . . . In Europe it [England] is 
seriously concerned only with two powers. France and Germany. . . . Maimed-
Hungary’s events and problems are no interest of the English public opinion and 
of English politics.
14
  
Despite this realization this author also argued that Hungary must carry on 
promoting its cultural supremacy, not through propaganda but through scientifically 
sound historical, geographical, and political publications written in foreign-languages.
15
 
Efforts continued but with no avail. For example, under the Darányi government, 1936-
1938, Hungary made attempts to renew ties with other Western powers, especially Great 
Britain, in order to free itself from Germany’s economic and political influence. After the 
March 1938 Anschluss, the new Hungarian government, led by Béla Imrédy, established 
                                                             
14 Sándor Körmendy-Ékes, “Az angol közvélemény” Magyar Szemle 7, no. 3 (November, 1929): 273-74.  
 
15 Ibid., 277. 
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ever-closer ties with Berlin, but at the same time it also continued to make attempts to 
gain British  economic and political support. After all, Hungary now shared a border with 
Germany, which was a situation that made a lot of people nervous. The British attitude 
once again was nonchalant, best illustrated by the following remarks made on May 29, 
1938, by Sir Orme Sargent of the British Foreign Office:   
I am sure there are lots of unhappy Hungarians who would like Great Britain to 
protect them from being ‘absorbed’ by Germany, and who hope that this may be 
effected by Great Britain’s economic intervention. But all our past experience, 
and all our present evidence, goes to show that Hungary cannot be rendered 
independent of Germany by any economic action that we can take. . . . There are 
other countries where British interests are definitely more important and where 
moreover we have got the means of reinforcing our position, such as Greece in 
the first place and possibly also Roumania. Don’t therefore let us be tempted to 
waste our energy or our money in trying to salvage countries like Hungary, where 
the game is already up.
16
 
In sum, practitioners of interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy—similar to their 
Czechoslovak counterparts—failed to realize that such efforts could not prevail in an era 
of international relations that was dominated by Great Power interests, weakened by 
worldwide economic problems, and stained by the largely discredited League of Nations. 
However, more than anything else, Hungarian cultural diplomacy failed because its goal 
of revising the Trianon Treaty was of no interest to anyone else but the Hungarians. 
If one considers the long-term impacts of Hungarian cultural diplomacy, then the 
picture is less bleak. Interwar cultural diplomacy helped the legitimization of Hungary’s 
status as an independent state. After the Second World War the international community 
                                                             
16 Quoted in Juhász, Hungarian Foreign Policy, 138. Emphasis is mine. On the changing nature of 
Hungarian-British relations see: Géza Jeszenszky, Az elveszett presztizs (Budapest: Magvető, 1986); Gábor 
Bátonyi, Britain and Central Europe, 1918-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); and András Bán,  
Hungarian-British Diplomacy, 1938-1941 (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004). 
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did not question the country’s right to exist. On the other hand, after the 1947 Paris 
Treaty revisionism was no longer a possibility.
17
 Cultural diplomacy lost its importance. 
Under the regime of Mátyás Rákosi—Hungary’s very own “little Stalin”—cultural 
relations and cultural diplomatic activities, if we can even call them that, were limited to 
the Soviet Union. Anikó Macher suggests that between 1953 and 1955 Hungary was able 
to secure some autonomy to conduct its own cultural relations. Cultural exchange 
programs were started with France (at the state level) and Great Britain (at the 
nongovernmental level). This time the Revolution of 1956 disrupted these developments. 
In 1959 the political situation normalized enough to speak of official cultural diplomacy, 
which, not unlike during the interwar years, involved publishing, musical events, and 
other cultural exchanges. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of 
improving relations with the West, especially with NATO member countries.
18
 Once 
again cultural diplomacy was seen as an accepted, perhaps even preferred, tool for 
diplomats to use in convincing the West about liberalization under the new regime of 
János Kádár. Indeed, Kádár’s Hungary enjoyed a certain degree of freedom as far as its 
cultural policy went, which in the absence of freedom to conduct independent foreign 
policy was especially important. Moreover, as Macher points out, the Hungarian 
Communist Party was increasingly anxious about the possible influence of a growing 
Western cultural presence, especially on the part of the French and British, and thus made 
                                                             
17 On cultural diplomatic activities of this period, see József N. Szabó, Hungarian Culture—Universal 
Culture: Cultural diplomatic Endeavours of Hungary, 1945-1948 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1999). 
  
18 Anikó Macher, “Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1957-1963: Echoes of Western Cultural Activity in a 
Communist Country” in Searching for Cultural Diplomacy, eds. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. 
Donfried (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011), 75-88. 
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cultural policy a priority.
19
 With the UN’s December 1962 decision to take the 
“Hungarian Question” off its agenda, these fears subdued a bit. By 1963 Western 
countries once again had diplomatic representation in Budapest, and cultural diplomatic 
activities continued to serve as a permitted tool to cultivate relations with the West.
20
 
Cultural capital, built up during the interwar years, helped Hungarians to retain a 
degree of independence. The infrastructure that was created in service of interwar cultural 
diplomacy remained essential during the communist regime. The New Hungarian 
Quarterly was relaunched in 1960 and until its reorganization in 1993 remained one of 
the very few English-language academic journals that offered an overview the country.
21
 
Cultural institutions–although in a more politicized form—continued to serve as an 
avenue to the foreign public.
22
 The tourist industry similarly benefited from interwar 
achievements and allowed Hungary to have a very lively tourism sector after its borders 
were reopened. The Lakihegy radio transmitter continued to serve Hungary and 
Hungarians abroad until 1977. The Hunnia Film Studio was nationalized as well and 
served as the backbone of the Hungarian film industry for years to come. However, 
perhaps the most important long-term achievements of interwar cultural diplomacy were 
its unintended consequences. These state projects in some sense were built and sponsored 
to be “weapons” of Hungarian revisionist offensives, but in actuality through this 
modernization they helped to alter the cultural and intellectual landscape of the country 
and move Hungary forward to the twentieth century. Finally, in some ways these 
                                                             
19 Ibid., 89.  
 
20 Ibid., 90-95.  
 
21 Since 1993 the journal once again published as The Hungarian Quarterly.  
 
22 Ujváry, A harmincharmadik nemzedék, 162-65 
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achievements helped Hungarians to retain a sense of belonging not to the Soviet Union, 
but to Europe. After 1989 Hungary, along with its neighbors, once again faced the 
challenge of proving its Europeanness.   
In the end, however, the real significance of interwar Hungarian cultural 
diplomacy lay not necessarily in its success and failure. This study, more than anything 
else, is about its perceptions and limitations. The Hungarian leadership mistakenly 
perceived that the post-First World War remapping of East and East-Central Europe had 
much to do with Hungary’s foreign reputation. In reality, it was a result of Great Power 
interest. They also incorrectly believed that by altering the country foreign reputation—
changing the international public’s perception of Hungary—they could also alter the 
postwar settlement. Once again, the postwar settlement was altered by Great Power 
interests and conflicts. They also misperceived the significance of their own 
achievements. In actuality, promoting Hungary as the “shield of Christendom,” 
disseminating the message of Hungary as “the easternmost outpost of the West,” and 
professing its “Europeanness” mattered very little in the grand scale of international 
relations. 
In examining interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy this study is also about 
limitations. First, there are the limitations of cultural diplomacy itself. Cultural diplomacy 
could work if it were coupled with a sensible foreign policy. Hungary’s aim to revise the 
treaty limited the successful outcome of its cultural diplomatic efforts. Cultural 
diplomatic efforts also require an interested audience. This raises a question about the 
responsibility of Great Powers vis-à-vis small countries. The second limitation is just 
that: the limitations of being a small country. Post-First World War Hungary and its 
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neighbors might have been independent political entities, but because of their 
dependencies—economic, military, and diplomatic—this independence was rather 
limited. Their ability to navigate the troubled waters of the period was restricted by their 
lack of power, which is the main characteristic of small countries. Here again, one might 
think about the Great Powers’ responsibility to recognize and positively act upon this 
fact. Of course, this is not to entirely absolve Hungary (and its neighbors) for what they 
did. The Hungarian leadership’s unwillingness to accept the postwar settlement—just as 
its neighbors’ unwillingness to alter it—determined much of the country’s future fate. 
Finally, by examining the epoch and this particular subject matter, this 
dissertation has also sought to alter the perception and stretch the limitations of our own 
understanding of interwar Europe. Discussions of interwar European history should not 
be limited to the usual suspects of Germany, Great Britain, and France.  By investigating 
the unique perspective afforded to us by the small countries of the region, we can perhaps 
reevaluate how we see the period as a whole. In my view, the story of interwar Hungarian 
cultural diplomacy illustrates that the epoch cannot be perceived as a mere prelude to the 
tragedy of the Second World War that followed. Instead, we should view it as the 
culmination of the First World War that preceded it. In this story the small East and East-
Central European countries, including Hungary, have their own place, for they are 
essential components to our understanding of the period as a whole—together with their 
successes, failures, and delusions. 
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